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This study is about the ending of conflicts. It examines the United Nations (UN) capacities in 
Conflict Transformation activities through the deployment of multifunctional peace 
operations. It is a study of how the UN seeks to transform violent conflicts into the state of 
being non-violent conflicts. Thus, a study that examines the process of creating a self-
sustaining peace (positive peace), and not only examining how to reduce the risk of 
resumption of violent conflict (negative peace). Herein, the study favours the concept Conflict 
Transformation as an extension of the term Conflict Resolution. 
The multifunctional peace operations in Mozambique and Rwanda are chosen as case studies. 
The UN deploys the peace operations to implement the comprehensive negotiated settlements 
in these countries. The focal point is the means that the UN utilises, and not so much the 
consequences, to build a self-sustaining peace. The two case studies are analysed to generate 
knowledge of when the UN manages to build peace, and under H.ihat circumstances there are 
obstacles for conflict transformation. Hence, the study is about the effectiveness of UN 
multifunctional peace operations. 
To gain a comprehensive understanding of the UN's capacities the project is divided into four 
sections. First, build a theoretical framework through a discussion of the relevancy that 
different cont1ict theories (Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict 
Transformation) have for a theory of UN peace operations. Next, give an account for the 
evolution and typology of peace operations together with case examples. Third, seek an 
understanding of the different connict specific situations in Mozambique and Rwanda. 
Finally, analyse the Conflict Transformation processes in the two countries by comparing the 











The study concludes that the UN capacity in Conflict Tesolution activities is a dependent 
variable. In general, it demonstrates that peace is contingent on the conflict specific situation; 
support from the international community; sufficient resources; and the successful conclusion 
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This project is concerned with the effectiveness of the United Nations (UN) multifunctional 
peace operations designed to assist in the ending of the Mozambican and Rwandan intra-state 
wars. The UN's Security Council authorised these peace operations to implement a range of 
tasks and thereby secure the transition from war to peace. Herein the UN seeks to get the 
warring parties to abide to their written commitments to peace. The UN seeks to address the 
root causes of conflicts and build the necessary political conditions for a sustainable and 
democratic peace. In all, secure the transition from war to peace. 
Nonetheless, the end stories of the UN multifunctional peace operations contribute to a 
tangled image of UN's involvements in conflicts. Out of the eighteen UN multifunctional 
peace operations between 1988 and 2002, missions with an agenda for political-institution 
building, under one-third of the countries could be classified as electoral democracies. I Thus, 
what can the UN, in reality with all its constraints, do to prevent the recurrence of war? This 
life-or-death question for millions of people gives rise to the following research project 
having the effectiveness of UN multifunctional peace operations as the focal point. 
1 Here democracy refers "to the process whereby the rulers and procedures of citizenship are applied to 
political institwions previously governed by other principles (coercive control). expanded to include persons not 
previously covered (ethnic minorities), or extended to cover issues and institwions not previously Sllbject to 
citizen participation (state agencies)". (Melissa Labonte, "Dimensions of Postconflict Peace-building and 
Democratisation", Global Governance Vol. 9 No.2 (April-June 2003): 261-72.) Countries considered with 
authoritarian regimes were Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Congo 
(Kinshasa), East Timor, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone. Somalia, and Tajikistan. Furthermore, as EI Salvador, 
Guatemala, Mozambique, and Namibia were electoral democracies. and only Croatia classified as a liberal 
Democracy. See Andreas Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation", and Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid 











The project is to be seen within the study of peace operations that focus on the effectiveness 
of the peace operations as to the design and conduct. Central to this is which conditions 
contribute to effectiveness of multifunctional peace operations and under which conditions 
this concept fails. Mozambique and Rwanda are chosen as cases because a comparison 
between the two cases is well suited to contribute to an answer. First, the UN authorises a 
multifunctional peace operations to assist the peace process in both countries. Second, the 
outcomes of the UN interventions are entirely contrasting. Whilst the United Nations 
Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) concludes effectively and has been seen as a success 
ten years down the line, the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAtvUR) has been seen as 
a failure based on its catastrophic consequences. 
The study is pursued through the framework of a comparative case study. In particular, 
the cases are chosen based on a most-similar system basis, which aims to explain the 
different outcomes of the UN interventions by comparing two similar cases. First, they 
are both exposed to an intra-state war in which the government fought an insurgency 
movement sponsored by an adjacent country. Second, the conflicts culminated in two 
comprehensive peace agreements with relative similarities. Moreover, the parties 
asked the UN to facilitate the implementation of the settlement. 
Compared to quantitative studies, a two-case study has the opportunity to engage more 
deeply with each case rather than superficially handle many cases. Still, the study is 
not limited to one case only. An advantage of this is that a nuance understanding of 
Conflict Transformation and the UN comes into play by comparing two cases. 
However, the findings of this study cannot function as generalisations to other cases as 
the findings are highly contextualised. Any peace operation must be flexible and offer 
unique adopted means to suit the particular conflict. 
The overall aim of this study is to identify how the UN executes Conflict Transformation 
customised to Mozambique and Rwanda. This will be analysed through the perspective of 
Conflict Transformation. Moreover, investigate through a literature study how the UN in 
these two cases attempts to end the conflicts, and develop a baseline conceptual framework to 
reflect upon the ability of the UN to transform conflicts. 
These objectives lead to the research problem. Why did the two countries tuke such different 











explain the relative success of the UN operation in Mozambique and its failure in Rwanda? 
Herein, the research problem is tasked to analyse under what circumstances does the UN 
accomplish its objectives of Conflict Transformation, i.e. what set of variables provide as 
necessary conditions for a successful multifunctional peace operation? More specific: What 
are the critical Sllccess factors in Mozambique? What are the critical failure factors in 
Rwanda? 
The study aims to investigate and critically reflect upon the UN Conflict Transformation 
enterprise and the interventions in Mozambique and Rwanda. Their respective mandates and 
the following execution of them is the starting point for the evaluation to find the critical 
factors for effectiveness. In this case, as seen above, this will entail a study of the political 
dimension of the UN enterprise in particular. The study will not consider the economical and 
the social dimensions of the enterprise. Furthennore, the study will engage at the levels of the 
protagonists rather than emphasising the grass-roots level. Finally, the study analyses the 
means that the UN utilises in the ending of conflicts, and not so much the long-term 
consequences of the venture. 
The study is structured in four different chapters. The below section gives an outline of each 
chapter, the main issues each will address, and the logical sequence of the chapters. 
First, build an outline for a theoretical framework in which peace operations are understood. 
The objectives are to define the concepts pertinent to this study induding the UN 
tenninology. Moreover, discuss the relevancy that Conflict Management. Conflict Resolution, 
and Conflict Transfonnation as different conflict theories have for third party intervention and 
peace operations as such. 
Second, give an account for the evolution, typology, and some empirical cases of UN peace 
operations. The purpose is to characterise the peace operations that differ in size and scope. 
The concept of the multifunctional peace operations is given a more thorough attention with a 
presentation of six specific operations. The critical factors determining the effectiveness are 
identified in each of these operations. 
Third, compare the conflict specific situations in Mozambique and Rwanda in four different 
sections each answering one of the following questions: What are the causes of the conflicts? 
What are the natures of the conflicts? What leads to the peace agreements, and how are they 
negotiated? What leads to the UN involvement in the conflicts? The motive is to gain an 











Finally, assess the ONUMOZ operation and the UNAMIR operation to secure a self-
sustaining peace in Mozambique and Rwanda. The chapter considers four sub-goals of the 
operations: the political component, the military component, the police component, and the 
electoral component. The aim is to identify the critical factors determining ONUMOZ's 











Theoretical Framework for Peace 
Operations: Conflict Approaches 
5 
This chapter seeks to marry the existing conflict theories to third party intervention and then 
build a theoretical framework for peace operations. The purpose of this is three-fold: (i) clear 
up the definitional wrangle that exists in the literature as to certain concepts; (ii) identify what 
the literature knows about the most effective ways to deal with conflict; and (iii) portray 
within which theoretical framework peace operations are understood, and the operations in 
Mozambique and Rwanda in particular. 
The outline of this section is as follows: First, define important concepts. Second, discuss the 
relevancy of three different approaches for a theoretical foundation. Finally, present the 
theoretical framework. 
2.1 Terminology: Key Terms 
Before the discussion of the theoretical framework, it is necessary to define core concepts 
relevant in understanding peace operations. The section defines conflict, peace, and different 
strategies to approach conflicts, i.e. Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict 
Transformation. 
2.1.1 Conflict and Violent Conflict 
A conflict exists when there are perceived incompatible objectives between parties, and when 
these goals are pursued.2 The situation arises out of demands on individuals to make 
unacceptable compromises. These are in some instances beyond human tolerance and 
l Louis Kriesberg, "Social Conlliet Theories and Conniet Resolution" Peace and Change Yo!. 8 No. 











capacity? The usage here applies to any political conflict whether the agents pursue it by 
peaceful or violent means. Political violence is one out of many symptoms of conflicts. 
Violent conflict indicates that one of the parties resort to the use of force to further its 
interests. More precise, a conflict causes the death of less than 1,000 people per annum due to 
organised and/or collective political violence (the death of more than 1,000 people is referred 
to as war).4 These definitions can be used to understand the conflicts in Mozambique and 
Rwanda. 
On the other hand, conflicts have positive dimensions seeing them as a contributor to 
change and development beyond status quo. Hence, a conflict becomes negative when 
a society no longer can represent, manage, or resolve its interests in a productive 
manner as the conflicts can develop violent expressions.5 Thus, conflict is both 
inevitable and necessary, but at times destructive. 
2.1.2 The Ends of Conflict: Negative Peace and Positive Peace 
The research community has commonly conceptualised peace as the anti-thesis of war and 
political violence - 'the beating of swords into ploughshares'. It is a situation free from 
physical violence. This is in accordance with the classical views that understand peace as 
stability and order.6 However, Galtung's interpretation of peace has extended the 
understanding beyond this viewpoint. He differs between the concepts of negative peace and 
positive peace. In the former situation. there is absence of direct violence although structural 
and cultural hostility, repression (political) and exploitation (economical). still exist in the 
sense of an indirect violence. In positive peace, in contrast, justice is present and structural 
violence (repression and exploitation) is missing.7 Related to peace operations, the situation of 
) John Burton. Conflict: Resolution and Provention (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1990), 15. 
4 Melvin Small and David Singer. Resort to Arms: Illternational alUi Civil Wars, J 816- J 980 (Berverly 
Hills: Sage, 1982). 
I Adebayo Adedeji, "Comprehending African Conf1icts", in Comprehending and Mastering African 
Conflicts: the Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Go~'ernallce, ed. Adebayo Adedeji (London: Zed Books, 
1999),7. 
6 Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Clausewitz all argue peace as order and stability. See Agostinho Zacarias, 
The United Natiolls and Illternational Peacekeeping (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 
9. 
7 lohan Galtung. "Violence and Peace", in A Reader in Peace SllIdies, eds. Paul Smoker. Ruth Davies, 











negative peace is an instrument to reduce the risk of resumption to violent conflict. The aim is 
to prevent a relapse into overt violence. Positive peace, on the other hand, aims for the 
establishment of a self-sustaining peace, which prerequisites removal of the underlying causes 
of the conflict.8 This implies a two-fold exercise. First, secure conditions free from violence 
(the negative task). Second. consolidate a sustainable peace (the positive task). 
2.1.3 Means to End Conflicts 
As there are two different ends to peace, so are there different means to end conflicts. This 
study is found within the field of Conflict Resolution. It focuses on the means to settle 
disputes so that the needs and interests of the parties in a conflict are no longer frustrated.9 
Here, the peace process is the overall project of ending conflicts in which Conflict 
Managemellt, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation are different components at 
help. These are the concepts often used in the academia to study how conflicts end. 
First, Conflict Management, or conflict regulation, represents one technique in dealing with 
conflicts and refers to the limitation, mitigation, and containment of violent conflict. It 
represents a form that positively regulates conflicts. 10 Second, Conflict Resolution is a more 
comprehensive term that aims to address and resolve the deep-rooted causes of conflict. 
Third, Conflict Trans/onnation aims to address the root causes, as with Conflict Resolution. 
Further, transform the negative structures, and importantly the social relationships and the 
situation that created conflict. Hence, Conflict Transformation denotes either a step beyond 
Connict Resolution or a development of it. II In all, the staging from the first concept to the 
final follows a deepening of change in the causes of the conflict. The aim is to transform 
Pergamon Press), 13. (Reprinted from "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research", Journal of Peace Research, 1969: 
167-191). 
8 Oliver Ramsbotham, "Reflections on UN Post-Settlement Peacebuilding", International Peacekeeping 
Vol. 7 No. 1 (2000): 170·6; l'vtiall et a!., "Post-Settlement Peacebuilding", chapter seven of Colltemporary 
Conjlict Resolution: The Prevention, IHanagement and Transfonllation of Deadly Conflicts fifth edition 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, \999), 186-94. 
9 Louis Kriesberg. "Conflict Resolution", in Peace and World Security Sll/dies, ed. Michael T, Klare, 
sixth edition (Boulder. CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 176-7. 
10 Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, "Inlroduction", chapter one of 
Contemporal)' Conflict Resolution: The Preventioll, Management and Transfonnation of Deadly Conjlicts fifth 
edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 21. 











violent conflicts into peaceful processes of economic, social, and political change, i.e. place 
conflict on a peaceful footing. 
The above concepts are academic terms for how to conceptualise the ending of conflicts. 
However, it is useful to address the practitioners' concepts of the three strategies in Conflict 
Resolution, i.e. peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace~building. They share respectively 
some commonalities with the concepts presented above, but are somehow different. 
Whilst peacekeeping aims at reducing violence by having a military contingent in an 
interlocutory role, peacemaking refers to the making of peace through various mechanisms 
such as mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and conciliation so that conflicting protagonists 
with contradictory interests can be reconciled. Peace-building is the process addressing the 
practical implementation of peaceful social change through the means of socia-economic 
reconstruction and development. 12 These definitions share commonalities with the UN 
definitions of the same concepts that are presented below. 
2. 2 United Nations Responds to Situations of Conflict: the Different Concepts 
The United Nations Charter determines that among one of the main purposes for the UN is the 
maintenance of international peace and security.13 In his report An Agenda for Peace (1992), 
tbe Secretary-General at the time, Boutros-Ghali, identifies the following four different 
concepts as different actions to respond to conflicts: preventive diplomacy; peacemaking; 
peacekeeping; and post-conflict peace-building. The section below identifies how the UN 
defines these concepts. This will in turn help us to understand how the UN responds to 
conflicts. Furthermore, it clarifies and bridges the definitional wrangle at play in the literature 
regarding these concepts. 
2.2.1 Preventive diplomacy 
The report defines preventive diplomacy as the action to address tensions before they result in 
violent conflict or limit the spread when violent conflicts occur as by dealing with the 
underlying causes. There is a two-folded aim to stop violence and preserve peace. In so doing, 
the UN utilises different measures: build confidence between potential conflicting parties 
12 See lohan Gallung. "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace-building", 
in Peace. War and Defence - Essays ill Peace Research Vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers. 1975).282-304. 
13 United Nations, "Chapter I Purposes and Principles". in The Charier of United :Va/iollS. Article 1 











through personal contacts; deploy a fact-finding mission so that the preventive steps may be 
taken based on accurate knowledge; early warning system can identify whether a threat to 
peace exists; and preventive deployment of a UN mission could prevent a crisis to biossom,I4 
Such steps need to respect the sovereignty of the states and henceforth requires consent of the 
pruties to intervene, and must be executed in accordance with the principle of neutrality. 
2.2.2 Peacemaking 
Peacemaking, the report suggests, seeks to bring antagonising parties together and lay the 
foundations for a dialogue so that an agreement can come into life. The aim is to appease 
conflicts whether it is to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts. In so doing, the UN has a 
comprehensive list of peaceful means that is in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter 
(see below in section 3.1.1). One such element that has shown effectiveness is mediation. 
Then parties in a conflict come together under UN auspices to settle the conflict through 
negotiations. However, as the report argues, the effectiveness of peacemaking measures 
depends on the political will of the parties to the conflict. ls In all, peacemaking implies that 
the UN will help create peace, remove obstacles to peace, and help facilitate agreements,16 
2.2.3 Peacekeeping 
Peacekeeping is a deployment of a UN peace operation in the area of conflict that normally 
involves the following components: military, civilian, and police. As preventive deployment, 
the aim of peacekeeping is to halt violence and preserve peace. The concept implies the 
helping of implementing negotiated settlementsY This has made the UN peacekeeping to 
take different roles in different conflicts, such as separating the protagonists and monitoring 
their conduct; implementation of comprehensive settlements; preventive deployment; and 
J.j Ibid.: paragraphs 23-32; and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Beyond Peacekeeping", Nell' York Journal of 
Journal oflnfemational Law and Politics VoL 25 (1992-93): 119. 
15 Ibid.: paragraphs 34-7, 
16 United Nations, "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Develupment in Africa". Repurt of the Secretary-General on the work uf the urganisation, General J\ssemhly and 
Security Coul/cii Document A/52/871-S/1998/3/8, 13 April 1998: paragraphs US-20. 
17 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy. Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping", SeC//rit.\' COl/llcil Document S/2411 J, 17 June 1992: paragraphs ..\6-50 [ Available Online I 











protecting humanitarian interests. IS Peacekeeping has been an effective enterprise that has 
brought a degree of stability to numerous areas of tension. 19 
2.2.4 Post-Conflict Peace-Building 
Post-conflict peace-building is the newest concept launched in An Agenda/or Peace, which is 
"action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in 
order to avoid relapse into conflict". The objective is to halt violence and preserve peace to 
better the security situation for ordinary people. The report suggests that both peacemaking 
and peacekeeping operations need to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support 
structures that will consolidate peace. Such actions may include disarming the parties, 
destruction of weapons, de-mining, repatriating refugees, advise security personnel, monitor 
elections, promoting human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and 
promoting political patticipation.2o Peace-building aims to work in cooperation with existing 
humanitarian or development activities? I Post-conflict peace-building is the opposite of 
preventive action. Whilst the latter seeks to prevent crisis to happen, the former tries to avoid 
a crisis to reoccur. 
2.2.5 Summing Up 
The above section has given an account for the four different actions the UN identifies to 
respond to conflicts. The table below is summing up the main features of each concept whilst 
comparing them along the rationale of intervention, the aim, techniques, and the stage of 
intervention. 
It is clear from the above presentation that these concepts merge into each other and cannot 
easily be separated. For example, it is difficult pinpoint peacekeeping evolves into the stage of 
peace-building as it is recognised that peace-building is no longer restricted to the post-
[8 United Nations, "The Causes of Conniet and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa"; paragraphs 36-40, 
19 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peal.:emaking and 
Peacekeeping": paragraphs 46-50, 
llllbid,: paragraphs 55-9; and Boutros-Ghali, "Beyond Peacekeeping": 120-1. 
11 United Nations. "The Causes of Contliet and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 











conflict stage. Peace-building is later understood as actions also taken out before full blown 
violence has taken place. 
Table 2.2.5: The main features afpreventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-
building. 
I Approach Preventive I Peacemaking Peacekeeping Post-conflict peace-
diplomaey building I 
!: 
i Rationale Address tensions or Settle agreements Keepin8 truce by Strengthen and 
for limit the spread holding parties apart solidify peace 
, intervention 
Aim Halt violent conflict Appease contlicts Halt violent contliet Create self-
and preserve peace and preserve peace sustaining peace 
Techniques Confidence building; Mediation; Separating Disarming; 
fact-finding; early negotiati on; conflicting parties; demobilisation; 
warning system; and arbitration; implementation of reforming the 
preventive conciliation; judicial comprehensive security sector; 
deployment settlement; or other settlements; monitoring elections, 
, mechanisms to reach preventive promoting human 
a peaceful settlement deployment; and rights; reforming or 
protecting strengthening 
humanitarian governmental 
interests institutions; and 
promoting political 
participation 
. Stage of Pre-violence Escalation De-escalation Post-violence 
I intervention 
The above presentation helps us to understand peace operations. At this stage, peace 
operations are UN deployed operations using preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, or post-settlement peace-building to maintain international peace and security. 
Peace operations refer to activities undertaken to preserve and restore peace before the 
outbreak of conflict, during conflict, and after a conflict has been negotiated an end. 
Moreover, peace operations combine the use of these different techniques. 
It is important to mention here that this definition is hostage to older fonns of peace 
operations that only executed peacekeeping. These operations would freeze the conflict with a 
peacekeeping force so that peacemaking could take place. Under this two-phase approach, 
peacekeeping and peacemaking occur before settlements and peace-building can take place 
after them. 
2.3 Towards a Theoretical Framework: Discussion 
With the above presentation, the discussion of the relevancy that the different conflict 











Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transfonnation are approaches at the heart of the 
discussion. In tum, this makes the backdrop for a theoretical framework for how conflicts best 
can end with the deployment of a peace operation. In so doing, the section appreciates 
attempts at theorising third party interventions that have been taken place since the 1990 
onwards. Only then by conceptually addressing peace operation, as Weiss suggests, can an 
understanding of peace operations and attempts to improve the current enterprise of 
addressing conflicts realistically be expected.22 The rationale is thus to address the contested 
ideas of how to increase the effectiveness of peace operations. 
The field of Conflict Resolution is a relatively new field with its start in the 1950s and 1960s, 
at the height of the Cold War, when the superpowers with their possession of nuclear weapons 
threatened human survival. Conflict Resolution as a defined specialised field came of age in 
the post-Cold War era. Within these years, however, the International Relations (IR) met the 
new arrival with scepticism as IR already had its own understanding of categories related to 
international conflict. Except from the threat of the nuclear weapons, Conflict Resolution 
evolved as a critique against Realism, which did not have, as claimed by Conflict Resolution, 
an effective way of dealing with conflicts. For the Realist, containment and control is the best 
to hope for as power is the main arbiter in international relations. Conflicts are inevitable and 
caused by an inherent aggressiveness or by the international system. To this, Conflict 
Resolution offers an alternative paradigm for dealing with conflicts, i.e. resolving them. Later, 
with the changing international climate after 1989, International Relations and Conflict 
Resolution approaches to conflicts started to merge as a richer cross-fertilisation of ideas 
began. Still, various voices criticise Conflict Resolution. Realists see the field as softheaded 
not focusing on power and coercion as the currency in international politics. Radical thinkers, 
such as neo-Marxists, argue that Conflict Resolution seek to reconcile different interests that 
should not be reconciled as there are forces of exploitation and oppression. A third critical 
voice claims Conflict Resolution as a Western enterprise that cannot be applied to other 
cultural settings. 
2.3.1 Conflict Management: Conserving Status Quo 
In pursuing peace operations, Conflict Management has been the traditional approach closely 
related to the concept of peacekeeping. Traditional diplomacy has operated within the 
:: Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Options: Implementing an Agenda for Peace", 











framework that defines a certain set of assumptions. Violent conflicts are herein seen as an 
inherent aspect of human existence caused by the competition of scarce resources. This makes 
resolution of conflicts unrealistic as they are in zero-sum situations. Hence, a compromise 
solution is unacceptable for the parties as much as a self-sustaining settlement is impossible. 
Therefore, the aims have been to reduce suffering and ameliorate the symptoms of the conflict 
by controlling the situation, and broker compromises through settlements. The approach 
ignores the aspects of positive peace and is satisfied by settling peace as absence of war. 
Settlements and cease-fires determine the success.23 The role of a deployed peace operation in 
this model would be to execute the negative task, i.e. by coercive means, if necessary, to (re-) 
d b'l' 24 generate an ensure sta 1 tty. 
Diehl, Druckman, and Wall's study suggests that peace operations manage conflicts. Peace 
operations "reduce violence, increase stability, and enhance security" in the area of 
deployment.25 All are elements that indicate that the conflicts are managed. It illustrates that 
Diehl et al. operates in a Conflict Management framework. However, Conflict Management 
can at best only hope for elimination, and at worst, hope for suppression of political violence. 
This is problematic as it becomes associated with status quo. In negotiation and mediation, the 
most powerful parties, as a function of the balance of political power, accrue the largest 
benefit.26 As scholars suggest, peace operations are only a strategy to control agents so that 
violence can be reduced. It returns the belligerents to status quo ante without addressing the 
causes of violence.27 Hence, Conflict Management only mitigates violent conflicts without 
seeking to transform the deep-rooted causes of the conflicts. Moreover, it is not an attempt to 
build new, stable, and sustainable structures, but to alleviate the symptoms of conflict. Hence, 
Conflict Management tends to seek settlements that consequently withhold the needed long-
23 A.B. Fetherston, "Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice", 
International Peacekeeping Vol. 1 No.1 (1994): 8. 
2'; Stephen Ryan, "Contlict Management and Conflict Resolution", Journal of Terrorism and Political 
Violence Vol. 2 No. I (1990): 56-60. 
15 Ryan, "Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution": 51. 
16 Fetherston, "Pulting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice": 8. 
27 Galtung. Peace by Peace/iff Means: Peace and COllflict, Development and Ci\'iIi~a/ioll, 103, 112; 
'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding": John w. Burton, Violence 











term sustainable solution of the conflict and rather cools the conflict to potentially boil over 
. 1 28 agam at a ater stage. 
Consequently, the above discussion shows that Conflict Management offers little theoretical 
basis if the aim is to bring about positive peace 
2.3.2 Conflict Resolution: "Re-solution" of Status Quo 
The number of multifunctional peace operations deployed in the Post-Cold War era outdates 
the use of peace operations in a Conflict Management approach only. Recent operations have 
rejected the status quo ante, and the aim has been to construct a more just society less prone to 
violence. The positive task has been taken onboard exercised within the framework of 
Conflict Resolution. Hence, as Burton suggests, Conflict Resolution is more comprehensive 
and aims to address and resolve the deep-rooted causes of conflict. It marks a departure from 
the settlement approach?9 Consequently, the conceptualisation shifts from peace operations 
as instruments for conflict control to approaches that contribute to more enduring resolutions 
of cont1icts. Fetherston has made an interesting contribution in this manner. She suggests that 
the UN peace operations, as a third-party activity based on consent, is a form for Conflict 
Resolution, and hence could make the use of theoretical developments from that field. 3D Ball 
argues that the aim of Conflict Resolution is to stop the violence by reaching an agreement on 
key issues. 31 The question is then how to reach an agreement. 
Burton's generic theory, the theory of basic human needs, is here relevant. He assumes that 
individuals have a set of basic human needs, such as identity, participation, and security. 
Social, political, or economical situations cause the deprivation, which in tum leads to 
conflict. Burton suggests furthermore that compromise is only feasible at the point when the 
2~ See Raimo Vayrynen, New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolutions and Conflict 
Transformation (London: Sage 1991). 
29 Burton. 
11) A.B. Fetherston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: SI. Martin's Press, 
199-1). 
'\ Nicole Ball, "The Challenge of Re-building War Torn Societies", in Managing Global Chaos. eds. 











basic human needs are pleased?2 Long-term frustration of these needs constitutes one 
precondition for and generates, in Azar' s terminology, 'protracted social conflicts' (PSC).33 
Moreover, at the outset of a contlict, individuals pursue an objective cause that along the 
process transforms to a subjective (mis-) perception. Alongside this follows a stereotyped 
reading of the "other" that worsens particularly at the violent stage. Consequently. the parties 
eschew from any constructive communication.34 Hence, the peace operation needs to facilitate 
the necessary dialogue so that constructive interaction can proceed, i.e. in contrast to the 
coercive intervention by Contlict Management.35 From this follows a re-perception of the 
issues involved in such a way that promote mutual understanding. This strategy, Fetherston 
asserts, aspires to generate a long-term solution of the contlict created and sustained by the 
parties themselves.36 Moreover. the approach of Conflict Resolution holds that fundamental 
issues Cl:'Jl be resolved as they portray non-zero sum situations. Win-win situations are 
obtainable.37 The challenge is to convince the parties to perceive that they are in a positive-
sum game. 
The Conflict Resolution approach. as mentioned above, aims for the positive task. However, 
success becomes difficult to fulfil. Fetherston argues that the making of a positive just society 
32 John Burton, "Human Needs Theory", chapter three of Conflict: Resolution and Provemion (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1990). 36-41. 
3J Most current conflicts can be classified as PSCs. Hence, Azar identifies thereby the sources of 
conflicts to be predominantly within rather than between states. Azar suggests there to be additionally three 
sources of conflict. First, the 'communal content' as the identity group is at the core of the conflict problem with 
its relationship to the state. Second, 'governance and the state's role' can contribute to frustrate the identity 
group needs. Third, 'international linkages' refers to the political-economical relations of economic dependency 
within the internatIonal economic system. See Edward Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: 
Theory and Cases (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990). 
}4 Ronald J, Fisher and Loraleigh Keashley, "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and 
Consultation within Contingency if Third Party Intervention", JOllmal of Peace Research Vol. 28 No. 1 
(February 1991): 34, 
.'5 Ryan, "Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution": 59. 
)6 Fetherston, "Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice"; 8-10 . 
. 17 Ryan, "Connie! Management and Contlict Resolution": 56-60. This approach represents the problem-
solving methodology to Conflict Resolution, which have been pursued by the 'scholars practitioners', e,g, 
Bunon. Azar, Mitchell, de Reuck, and Banks, They see that there are chances of attaining self-sustaining 











is unlikely. She resettles the approach to favour a pro-active process towards the positive 
end.38 
The 'contingency model', as suggested by Fisher and Keashley, is an attempt of integrating 
peace operations to the theory of Conflict Resolution. The model executes a sequenced 
approach and favours the use of different techniques at different points in the conflict cycle. 
The model assumes that the effectiveness of intervention is dependent on the specific 
sequencing.39 Within this perspective, peace operations are applied most often on the 
escalation or de-escalation stage.40 Rather than being a Conflict Management approach, peace 
operations need to become a Conflict Resolution activity to achieve results beyond status 
41 quo. 
However, as do Conflict Management, so suffers the framework of Contlict Resolution 
problematical shortcomings. First, Conflict Resolution presents itself often as too formulaic, 
i.e. a specific solved outcome follows from a distinct recipe. The contingency model is one 
example. What is considered the right solution is rendered as discursive truth and represents a 
form of progressive linearity. Conflict Resolution assumes to know violent conflict to the 
extent that it has the power over it, and thus to solve the problem of it. Enlightenment, based 
on the knowledge of the cause and the solution, would rearrange the conflict.42 When the 
Conflict Resolution approach has been successful is has been applied on an ad-hoc basis 
favouring innovative and creative ideas than on a recipe or formula foundation. 
Second, a problem with the Conflict Resolution framework is that it prescribes a solution 
within the same structures that made the conflict escalate into violence. As with Conflict 
.18 Though success is difficult to foresee, Fetherston establishes a benchmark for positive peace that acts 
as a long-term ideaL This is based on some criteria for evaluation. First, the extent to which the parties to the 
contlict agree and accept the solution; second, the degree of the duration of a settlement; and third, the scale of 
change in the relationships between the agents before and after the settled dispute.38 This implies that the end of 
Conflict Management is short-term and is only a preliminary requirement for success, whilst Conflict Resolution 
aims at establishing positive peace. See Fetherston, "Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must 
Inform Practice": 9-10. 
39 Fisher et al.. "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within Contingency if 
Third Party Intervention": 32-9; Ronald J. Fisher, 'The Potential for Peacebuilding: Forging a Bridge from 
Peacekeeping to Peacemaking". Peace and Change Vol. 18 No.3 (July 1993): 253 . 
• 0 The preventive deployment of a UN mission in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) is an exception of this rule. 
41 Fetherston. "PUlling the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory :\iust Inform Practice": 12-4. 
n A.B. Fetherston. "Peacekeeping. Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of 











Management, the framework of Conflict Resolution reinstates status quo. The latter aims 
beyond the controlling aspect of the former, but falls short and becomes another feature of the 
same system, as Fetherston suggests: "vY'hich only seeks stability within the confines of that 
system, a system which already made the war possible ".43 These methodological approaches 
of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution are problematical, as Bendafia suggests, 
since they sustain the minimal levels of redistribution and representation.44 
Third, peace operations as a technique within Conflict Resolution tends to produce practices 
that coincide with past assumptions rather than practices that coincide with the needs of 
specific here and now situations. Past experiences develop present practice.45 
However, peace operations have neither fulfilled the aim of long-term solutions with a se\f-
sustaining peace. The point to make is not to dismiss Conflict Resolution, but to reform the 
solution or open for transformation. Conflict Transformation offers an opportunity of 
rethinking third party interventions tied, again, to the idea of positive peace.46 The ending of 
conflict is not the only goal as Conflict Transformation aims further to prevent the conflict of 
relapsing into violence. 
2.3.3 Conflict Transfonnation: Transforming Status Quo 
The peace operations deployed in the post-Cold War era have proved it difficult to separate 
peacekeeping from peace-building. The multifunctional peace operations have been an 
exercise in Conflict Transformation, or post-conflict peace-building, albeit under the title of 
peacekeeping. Herein, successful Conflict Transformation addresses the root causes in the 
same manner as the Conflict Resolution approach, but goes a step further by attempting to 
build a sustainable peace. Conflict Transformation tries to reverse the destructive processes 
that accompany violence. The concept of Conflict Transformation thus shifts away from the 
focus on warriors, with whom the two above techniques have been concerned, to the attitudes 
·13 Ibid.: 196. 
JJ Alejandro Bendaiia, "Conflict Resolution: Empowerment and DisempowermenC, Peace and Change 
VoL 21 No.1 (1996): 69-70 . 
.15 Fetherston et al.. "Overcoming Habitus in Conflict :\1anagement: UN Peacekeeping and War Zone 
Ethnography": 102. 












and socia-economic circumstances of ordinary people.47 The main objective of the process is 
structural change.48 Several premises underlie Conflict Transformation. Peace requires social 
transformation, and peace encompasses many different issues, and Conflict Transformation is 
a process rather than a specific activity and must be seen as an outcome of this. 
The relevancy of Conflict Transformation must be seen in the context of the peace-building 
literature. Here, GaItung's tradition is relevant. Burton follows this and identifies a two-folded 
model for peace-building. For Burton, Conflict Resolution offers short-term ends, as it is only 
a solution to the causes of the conflict. "Provention" offers rather a long-term perspective. It 
aims at addressing the root-causes of conflict in making those changes necessary for 
removing the structural difficulties, and promoting conditions that create cooperative 
relationships.49 Furthermore, Ryan supplemented the discourse when he suggested the need 
for a change in the mutually negative conflict attitudes at grass roots leve1.5o 
Lederach developed these ideas further and offers an 'integrated framework for peace-
building' with the prime focus on the context of reconciliation. The approach defines peace-
building as a process addressing the underlying structural, relational and cultural roots of 
conflict. It reflects the whole array of stages and approaches needed for the transformation of 
conflicts towards sustainable, peaceful relations and outcomes.51 Hence, restoration and 
rebuilding of relationships are at the heart of his ideas. He aims for the 'sustainable 
transformation of societies' in a long-term perspective, and neither the management nor the 
re-solution. Transformation of these conflicts, PSCs, occurs along the process of changing 
relationships and creating social space to meet the end of peaceful relationships. Lederach 
-17 Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, "From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: 
Understanding Conflict and Peace-building in the New World Disorder", Third World Quarterly Vol. 20 No.1 
(1999): 15 . 
.\8 Christopher Mitchel!, "Beyond Resolution: What does Conflict Transformation actually Reform?", 
Peace and Conflict Studies Vol. 9 No, I (May 2002), [Available Online) 
<http://www.gmu.edulacademic/pcs/CM83PCS.htm> (14. March 2004 j, 
49 John Burton, "Conj/iet: Resolu/ion and Proven/ioll (New Yark: St. Martin's Press. 1990), 3, 
50 Stephen Ryan. Er/znic Conflict and International Relmio1lS (Aldershot and Hants: Dartmouth, 1995), 
51 Jean Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliatio/1 in Di\'ided Societies (Washington 











suggests a bottom-up peace-building approach, but stresses at the same time the middle range 
leadership to be the key to sustain the process.52 
Thus, by linking the concept of Conflict Transformation to interventions the UN has a more 
realistic opportunity to accomplish positive peace. Compared to management and resolution, 
Conflict Transformation addresses a change in the context of the conflict that accompanies 
destructive violence. The aim is to transform the conflict into a non-violent mode. It allows a 
war or a violent conflict to end without the resolution of all the underlying sources. The 
central idea is that these unresolved dimensions are now operating in a new context, this 
within a new set of rules not allowing for political violence. 
However, the ideas of Conflict Transfommtion are neither unproblematic as the two above 
approaches. The danger comes to play when the projects lack self-criticism. 
2.3.4 Summing Up: Towards an End beyond Status Quo 
Peace operations favouring a Conflict Management approach would most likely succeed to 
keep the peace between belligerents. However, the direct violence is often a symptom of the 
deeper conflicts, and management only would pacify the violence without solving the 
problem of structural violence. The Contlict Resolution approach contributes to solve the 
deeper underlying causes of conflict. Some of the multidimensional peace operations 
presented below illustrate this move away from applying management only. Peace operations 
have evolved to be a joint military and civilian project. Peace operations, as Last argues, 
apply defensive tactics that follow military doctrines, to control and prevent violence. The 
operations pursue offensive strategies to attack the sources of conflict to de-escalate tensions, 
and restore trust and confidence between communities when implementing peace 
agreements.53 Hence, as Whitaker suggests, peace operations are a midwife at the birth of new 
strategy.54 The UN has been involved in Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution. 
However, without transforming the socio-economic situation the end portraying social justice 
and sustainable positive peace cannot be accomplished. 
5! Ibid., 27-52. 
>3 David M Last, "Peacekeeping Doctrine and Conflict Resolution Techniques", Armed Forces and 
Society Vol. 22 No.2 (Winter 1995): 202.187-211. 












Furthennore, if there are problems of applying Conflict Management alone, it is problematic 
to apply Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transfonnation without effective management of 
violence. Continued violence feeds destructive processes that in tum undennine the process of 
transformation. Conflict management can address the direct violence, and thus create a room 
in which Conflict Resolution followed by Conflict Transformation can take place. Whilst the 
resolution techniques settle an agreement, the latter process seeks to refonn the whole peace 
process into the stage of positive peace. Thus, Conflict Resolution and Conflict 
Transfonnation share commonalities that, in tum set them aside from the Conflict 
Management approach. Table 2.3.5 below summarises the approaches' main characteristics. 
Table 2.3.4: The main features of Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation. 
Approach Conflict Management Conflict Resolution Conflict Transformation 
Aim Reduce violence and Resolve the conflict Place the conflict on 
contain the conflict peaceful footing 
Nature of the Zero-sum game Positive-sum game Positive-sum game 
conflict 
Role of the third Coercive and control the Non-coercive; facilitate a Non/coercive; facilitate a 
party situation pnx:ess of problem solving change in the destructive 
structures 
Focus Violence; interposition Issues and interests Structural context; changes 
in relationship 
Level of Field Official efforts and elites All levels, including grass 
intervention roots. 




Outcome Limit violence; negative Short term: prevent relapse Long-term: ~elf-sustaining i 
peace • intoviolence peace; POSltl ve peace 
In all, whilst Conflict Management is a necessary precondition for Conflict Resolution and 
Conflict Transfonnation, the two latter approaches are required to meet the end of positive 
peace that management of violence cannot. Moreover, a successful accomplishment of 
peacemaking and peace-building, as the UN defines them, requires peacekeeping and vice 
versa. The assumption suggests that the intervention strategy of peace operations would use 
the favourable components of each approach as they complement each other. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The rationale of this chapter grew out of the lack of a theoretical underpinning with respect to 
UN peace operations. In the presentation, important concepts in relation to peace operations 











to undertake the comprehensive task to build a theoretical framework for third-party 
intervention and peace operations as such. A discussion of the relevancies that three conflict 
theories have for a theoretical foundation for peace operations followed. With the premise of 
establishing positive peace, the exercise found that Conflict Transformation enjoys the best 
starting point. The approach includes actions to build systems to contain conflicts, and 
transform the structures that nurture conflict. It offers the best prospective to help societies to 
reach the state of non-violence. However, the discussion showed further that applying 
Conflict Transformation alone would work against its purpose. An accumulated approach that 
considers Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation is 
healthier. The aim is to take the advantage of the strengths in the three approaches to exercise 
the positive task in the process of ending conflicts, i.e. aim to reduce the risk of resumption of 
violent conflict and the establishment of a self-sustaining peace place conflict on a peaceful 
footing. In all, this makes up the context in which peace operations are understood in this 












United Nations' Peace Operations: 
Evolution, Typology, and Cases 
The aim of this section is to give an account for the evolution of the UN peace operations, 
from those of ciassical peace operations to those of multifunctional peace operations. 
Moreover, give an account for these various different categories of peace operations. An 
empirical example illustrates each peace operation concept. The concept of multidimensional 
peace operation is given most thoroughly attention. Finally, six different multifunctional 
peace operations are examined. 
The purpose of this is to demonstrate that peace operations range in both size and scope, but 
that some share commonalities more than others do. Further, describe the crucial differences 
between multifunctional peace operations on the one hand, and other categories of peace 
operations on the other hand. Finally, identify the critical factors determining either success or 
failure for a set of multifunctional peace operations. In all, prepare for an understanding of the 
discussion of UN missions in Mozambique and Rwanda. 
3.1 The Problem of the Charter 
To understand how the UN peace operations have evolved it is necessary to examine Chapter 
VI (,Pacific Settlement of Disputes') and VII (' Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, 
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression') of the U:'-l Charter. 
3.1.1 Chapter VI 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter provides for non~coercive means to accomplish the end of 











of "international friction", and article 36 designates it to recommend "appropriate 
procedures or methods of adjustment" such as meditation or arbitration acts.
55 
The use of 
these measures would violate the sovereignty of the state intervened. Therefore, if the UN 
shall intervene legally consent from one of the parties is needed.
56 
Chapter VI has proven to 
be an important instrument for the Security Council
57
, and has made it the most compatible 
organ for the maintenance of peace and security. 
3.1.2 Chapter VII 
In contrast, Chapter VII of the UN Charter prescribes coercive means. It places national 
military resources at the disposal for the Security Council once it has fulfilled its task to 
identify any act of aggression or threat to international peace.
58 
The Chapter makes the 
Council responsible for determining when a situation requires collective security action.
59 
The blueprint suggests that a Military Staff Committee composed of representatives from the 
P5 would coordinate UN operations. However, this chapter has proven problematic given the 
reliance on consensus and cooperation in international relations. The tension throughout the 
Cold War caused by the global bipolarity was a major indicator of an international system that 
worked opposite. Given the ideological lenses of the two sides, the objective identification of 
an aggressor in any crisis was not possible, nor would military staff representing the P5 act as 
a unified command.
60 
55 United Nations, "Chapter VI Pacific Settlement of Disputes", in The Charter of the United Nations, 
Article 34 and 36. 
56 Ibid.; "Chapter I Purposes and Principles", Article 2. 
57 The Security Council is the core organ to address the maintenance of international peace and security 
acting on behalf of the UN members. Fifteen member states compose the Council of which five is permanent 
(China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the US, PS), and the rest changes every [oo.J between the remaining 
ten members. The Security Council's decision needs nine votes on procedural matters, whilst resolutions on 
other matters need fourteen votes (countries to a dispute cannot vote). See United Nations, "Chapter V 'The 
Security Council"', of the Charter of the United Nations. 
58 The underlying aim of this ambiguous international security project was a reaction to the failure of its 
predecessor, the League of Nations, to preserve peace. The League failed to hinder the Italian fascist regime in 
occupying Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and subsequently fell short to uphold its force in international relations. (Norrie 
Macqueen, "The History, Politics and Law of United Nations Engagement with Africa", in United Nations 
Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960 (Edinburgh: Parson Education Limited, 2002),3-4.) 
59 United Nations, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace. Breaches of the Peace. and Acts of 
Aggression", in The Charter of the United Natiolls, Article 39. 












This context gave rise to peace operations as the third set of measure that the UN could use to 
fulfil its aim of preserving a security role in the Cold War. Despite the fact that the Charter 
does not explicitly provide for peace operations, later references to peace operations have 
been known as grounded in "Chapter-Six-and-a-Half'. They are poised between the non-
coercive means of Chapter VI and the enforcement actions dealt with in Chapter VII.
61 
Hence, there are some arguments that the Security Council has an implied ability to create a 
peace operation. The Security Council authOlises the peace operations in furtherance of 
peaceful settlement under Article 36, or pursuant to the acceptance of provisional matters 
called from under Article 40.
62 
Peace operations constitute something more than the 
recommendations provided for in Chapter VI with its military presence, and peace operations 
are not pure military enforcement as envisaged under Chapter VII.
63 
Moreover, the Security 
Council has been deploying operations closer to Chapter VII in order to enforce provisional 
measures.
64 
However, the "Uniting for Peace Resolution,,65 provides the General Assembly 
on a legal basis to authorise a peace operation. The Assembly utilised this to mandate the First 
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF J). 
In addition, the Charter provides the Secretary-General with relatively diminutive authority, 
though the various holders of the post have developed an impressive set of powers to be used 
in peaceful settlement of disputes and other situations. The office holders perform the 
61 Carolyn M Stephenson, "New Approaches to International Peacemaking in the Post-Cold War 
Period" in Peace and World SeClirity Swdies, ed. Michael T Klare, sixth edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
1994),21-2, 14-27; N. D. White. "The Legal Parameters of Peacekeeping: Constitutional Issues", in Keeping the 
Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 227-8. 
62 United Nations, "Chapter VI Pacific Settlement of Disputes·', Article 36; "Action with Respect to 
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace. and Acts of Aggression", Article 40. 
63 The United Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) illustrates a peace operation that 
combines non-coercive and coercive elements, The Security Council mandated the mission with both a civilian 
component along the line of "appropriate procedures or methods of adjustmellt" and a smaller military element 
to keep the peace between the Kingdom of Morocco and Frente Polisario. See William 1. Du(ch, "Building on 
Sand: UN Peacekeeping in Western Sahara", International SeCilrity Vol. 17 No, 4 (Spring 1993): 150-71. 
04 Nigel D. White. ·'The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues", International 
Peacekeeping Vol. 3 No.4 (Winter 1996): 51-2. Haiti. Somalia, and Rwanda are all examples of where the UN 
has taken action close to Chapter V II in enforcing provisional measures, but still not enforcement as envisaged 
under the full-blown sense of Article 42. 












executive task of the assignments defined by the various UN organs.
66 
The only autonomous 
power implies that the Secretary-General would bring to the attention of the Security Council 
any matter that the General reads as threatening international peace and security.67 Later the 
office holder's assignments have developed to be the executive commander of some peace 
operation forces within the framework of the Security Council's mandate.
68 
3.1.4 Summing Up 
The UN can use three sets of measures to maintain international peace and security. Two of 
these, Chapter VI and Chapter VII, have explicit provisions in the UN Charter. The third, 
Peace operations as seen by "Chapter-Six-and-a-Half' is in some way anchored in the 
Charter. despite the lack of a stated provision. The UN peace operations are between the 
peaceful recommendations and military enforcement. The section below renders how the 
peace operations have changed over time. 
3.2 The Peace Operations Evolve: A Brief History 
The peace operations have evolved through different phases. These phases have alternated 
between periods of rapid growth and periods of inactivity. In a review of the literature on the 
case-by-case assessment of the history of peace operations, seven different phases come to 
eye69: the Nascent Period, 1946-56; the Assertive Period, 1956-67; the Dormant Period, 1967-
73; the Resurgent Period, 1973-78; the Maintenance Period, 1978-85; the Expansion Period, 
1988-93; and the Contraction Period, 1993 onwards. They are not dealt with extensively here, 
and only a short account for the developments is given. 
66 United Nations "Chapter XV The Secretariat"'. in The CharIer of the United Nations, Article 98. 
These tasks may range from sending a fact-finding mission, to offering his good offices, to the organising and 
emplacement of peacekeeping force. 
67 United Nations "Chapter XV The Secretariat"', Article 99. A classic example on the use of this power 
was when the then Secretary-General Hammerskj!1lld brought the situation of the Congo to the attention of the 
Security Council in 1960. 
6' This applies to the traditional peacekeeping forces (see below for definition) and the missions to 
Namibia and Cambodia, On the other hand, a state or a group of state commanded the operations in Rwanda. 
Somalia, and Haiti both politically and military under a Security Council mandate. (White, "The UN Charter and 
Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues"; 55-6.) 
69 H. Wiseman, "The United Nations and International Peacekeeping: A Comparative Analysis", in The 
United Nariolls and the Maintenance of lnremmional Peace and Security (lJNITAR, 1987).264-99; Fetherston, 
Towards a Theory oj' United Nations Peacekeeping, 16; Dennis C. Jett. "A Brief History of Peacekeeping'". 











A significant increase in peace operations occurs in the Assertive and the Dormant period, 
mainly in response to the conflict in the Middle East. Tensions between the superpowers end 
these periods and are followed by eras in which the Security Council confines peace 
operations to the continuation of ongoing missions.
7o 
From the deployment of the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in 1948 and onwards to the end of the 
1980s, the Security Council mandates thirteen peace operations with the aim to support 
peacemaking efforts? I 
The change in international relations since the end of 1980s with the conclusion of the 
ideological confrontation paved the way for negotiated settlements to end proxy Cold War 
conflicts and intra-state wars in developing countries. Moreover, it made it possible for the 
Security Council to deploy an increased number of peace operations. The UN peace 
operations commence to help ending of intra-state wars in contrast to the previous peace 
operations. These new circumstances require new forms of action and include far more 
variables. These operations are known as multifunctional peace operations.72 However, many 
of these operations fail due to over ambiguity, and the current period commences. There has 
been little new activity and a decline in number, size, and scope of existing missions. These 
operations have been given Chapter VII engagement and thus contribute to the blurring of a 
clear conceptual distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 73 
3.3 Typology: Different Peace Operation Concepts 
Peace operations have so far been presented as one category. However, the many peace 
operations that the Security Council has mandated vary significantly. Boutros-Ghali suggests 
"peacekeeping has to be invented every day", and "there are as many types of peacekeeping 
as there are types of conjlict',?4 The following section introduces a categorisation based on 
70 Jett, 23-30. 
71 Marrack Goulding. "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping", International Affairs (Royal 
lnstilllte of llllernational Aflairs 1944-) Vol. 69 No. 3 (July 1993): 457; John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, 
"Second Generation Multinational Operations". The Washington Quarterly Vol. 15 No.3 (1992): 114-5. 
72 William J. DUTCh, "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the I 990s". in UN Peacekeeping, 
American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J. Durch (New York: SI. Martin's Press. 
1996),3-4,23; Mackinlay et aI., "Second Generation Multinational Operations": J 16-7. 
Jett, 31-4. 
H Cnited Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation", UN GAOR, 48th 











different peace operation concepts, i.e. the classical peace operation, tile preventive deployed 
peace operation, the humanitarian peace operation, and the multifunctional peace operation. 
The aim is to identify the crucial differences and gain a more comprehensive understanding of 
UN peace operations and multifunctional peace operations in particular. 
3.3.1 The Classical Peace Operation 
The concept of the classical peace operation refers to those peace operations deployed with 
the purpose to end violent inter-state disputes by supporting peacemaking efforts. Hence, 
deploy operations after the belligerent parties have agreed to a cease-fire that might not be 
self-sustaining?5 The traditional tasks have been interposing between belligerents, monitoring 
cease-fires, and observing frontier lines.
76 
Thus, the classical peace operation has been 
exercising Conflict Management. The operation has in general been based on three key 
principles: consent, impartiality, and non-use of force. 77 Furthermore. the classical peace 
operation has, except from the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONLIC), been employed 
to deal with inter-state wars. 
UNTSO is regarded as the first UN peace operation. The Security Council mandated the 
operation in 1948 to supervise the truce that came out of the first Arab-Israeli war. It was an 
unarmed military deployment encompassing the classical grouping.
78 
The United Nations 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE, 2000-) is another example of classical peace 
operation although it was deployed as late as in 2000. The objective of the deployment was to 
present an interposition between Ethiopia and Eritrea, two sovereign state members of the 
UN, supervise their troop withdrawals on the Hom of Africa and the redeployment of national 
forces, as well as determine the borderline between the countries. The Security Council 
75 Stephen Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles", International Peacekeeping 
VoL 7 No.1 (2000): 34; Norman Bowen, "The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping", International Journal 
on World Peace VoL 14 No.2 (June 1997): 4. 
Mark Malan. "A Concise Conceptual History of UN Peace Operations", African Security Review VoL 
6 No. I (1997): 18. 
Maurice Mamika, ''The Rules of the Game: the Three Guiding Legal Principles of Peacekeeping", 
Peacekeeping and International Relations VoL 25 No. I (January/February 1996). Peace operations differ from 
conventional combat operations in a number of ways. For a comparison see Sandra Cummer, 'The Challenges 
Faced by the Military to Peacekeeping Missions", Peacekeepillg and International Relations Vol. 27 No. I 
(January/February 1998): 13-17. 
United Nations, "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)", in The Bille Helmets: II 











mandated a total force of 4,200 military personnel (later extended to 5,600) that would 
position itself in the Temporary Security Zone setting up a buffer between the two 
countries.
79 
UNMEE shared therefore some similar characteristics with United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF, November 1956-June 1967), widely regarded as the classical 
model of UN peace operation following the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt.SO The 
UNMEE has managed to successfully keep the peace, through the approach of Conflict 
Management, between the two countries. The belligerents have shown willingness to 
cooperate, though some difficulties remained regarding the borderline.81 
3.3.2 The Preventive Deployed Peace Operation 
The purpose of preventive deployment of UN troops is to hinder that a conflict escalates into 
violence by increasing the political price that would have to be paid by the potential 
82 aggressor. Moreover, prevent the threatening spill over effect from an adjacent state. 
Another function is early warning. This happens on the request of one of the parties and is 
deployed on its territory only. The peace operation then takes the interposition role by 
controlling the buffer zones.S3 Hence, the Security Council deploys the peace operation 
before the armed conflict has broken out. 
The UN first, and up till now only, preventive deployment has been the United Nations 
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). UNPREDEP is an extension of, until February 
79 United Nations, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea", Security Council 
Document 5120001785, 9 August 2000. 
80 For details on UNEF see United Nations, "United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)", in The Blue 
Helmets: a Reriew of United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 35-55. In 
1958 Dag Hammarskj0ld, the Secretary-General at the time, drew from the military and political experience of 
UNEF I and produced the 'Summary Study', which proposed a number of operational benchmarks: Freedom of 
movement for the missioners within the operational zone; the UN shall not compete with the authority of the 
hosting state; the mission must not interfere with the domestic politics; military contingents could only be 
requested on a voluntarily basis; and, the principle of 'middle power peace operation'. See United Nations, 
N3943, 9 October 1958. 
81 Norrie Macqueen. "Reconstructing and Defining the Post-Col War State: The Horn of Africa", in 
United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960 (Edinburg: Parson Education Liimited. 2002). 229-31; United 
Nations, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea", Security Council Document 
5120031/186, 19 December 2003: paragraphs 33-7, 
82 Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles'" 34. 
,J Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping": 456-7; Mackinlay et al., "Second 
Generation Multinational Operations": 117; Oliver Ram,botham, Tom Woodhouse, and A.R Fetherston 











1996 when it become an independent mission, the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) that had been deployed in Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Macedonia in 
February 1992.
84 
The aim of UNPREDEP was to stop the spreading of the succession wars on 
the Balkans into Macedonia. A military component monitored the border with both Albania 
and the Republic of Yugoslavia, which co-functioned together with civilian elements to 
reconcile political and ethnical groups.85 In all, the 1,000 military troops together with the 50 
military observers, 26 police monitors, and the 168 personnel managed to accomplish 
UNPREDEP's objective of preventing the violent conflicts on the Balkans to spread into the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and furthermore contributed to peace and stability 
in the Southern Balkans.
86 
3.3.3 The Humanitarian Peace Operation 
The humanitarian peace operation is characterised by executing humanitarian relief supply 
with a war-fighting dimension. This operation takes pre-emptive military action if they feel 
threatened. The purpose is to ensure that humanitarian deliveries can resume.8? These 
operations are hence provided for more in Chapter VII of the Charter than Chapter VI, and 
thus contribute to the blurring of the distinction between peace operations and coercive 
action.
88 
These operations have been deployed at the stage when violence escalates.
89 
Furthermore, the Security Council mandates such interventions when the UN no longer finds 
the cooperation needed in order for the organisation to succeed.9o Hence, the humanitarian 
8. The objective of UNPROFOR was to create those necessary conditions of peace and security so that a 
solution to the Yugoslav crisis could be negotiated. For details see United Nations, "United Nations Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR), February 1992-March 1995", in The Blue Helmets: a Revielv of United Nations Peace-
keeping (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996),513-41. 
85 Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles": 35. 
86 United Nations, "United Nations Operations in the Former Yugoslavia after March 1995", in The 
Blue Helmets: a Re\'iew of United Nations Peace-keeping (New Yark: United Nations Publication, 1996),564-6. 
87 Harry Summers, "Peace Operations", chapter eight of The New World Strategy (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1995), 165-7; Mackinlay et aI., "Second Generation Multinational Operations": 117. 
88 Adam Roberts, 'The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping", in Managing Global Chaos, eds. Chester A. 
Crocker, Fen 0 Hampson. and Pamela Aall (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. 1996),302. 
H9 Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles": 34; Bowen. "The Future of United 
Nations Peacekeeping": 4-7. 











peace operation does not respect the non-intervention nonn in the same manner, as does the 
classical peace operation. Moreover, the concept executes a limited version of Conflict 
Management. 
The intervention in Somalia in December 1992 represents a humanitarian peace operation 
deployed with forceful means. The Security Council legitimised the Operation Restoring 
Hope9l with the objective of creating a secure environment and ensuring humanitarian 
deliveries to the Somali people as the warlords had hindered both local and international 
organisations from distributing food supplies to the starving population.92 There was a clear 
division of labour between the US and the UN. The former was to undertake the military role 
and create the needed secure environment for the latter to continue its work.
93 
The US would 
only open supply routes by using its military means provided for in Chapter VII.94 Hence, the 
28,000 American troops together with 17,000 international troops would not consider 
themselves with rebuilding the collapsed Somali state.95 Altogether, with its end in May 
1993, the Operation Restoring Hope had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia 
and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.96 Although violence continued, it is 
said that the intervention saved about 90,000 people.97 
91 The UN refers to this operation as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). 
92 Summers, "Peace Operations", [64. 
93 United Nations, "United Nations Operation in Somalia I and II (UN OS OM I and II), in The Blue 
Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996), 295. 
9~ Elgin Clemons, "No Peace to Keep: Six and Three Quarters Peacekeepers", New York University 
Journal oflnternationul L(lw and Politics Vol. 26 No.1 (Fall 1993): 135-9. 
95 William 1. Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State-building' in 
Somalia", in UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Unci!'il Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J. Durch 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996),320-1. 
96 United Nations, "United Nations in Somalia I and Ir', 296. 
97 When Operation Restoring Hope did not succeed in creating a secure environment, the Secretary-
Generallherefore recommended to the Security Council to set up a new UN mission (United Nations Operation 
in Somalia II, UNOSOM II), under Chapter VII of the Charter, with the mandate and armament necessary to 
enforce secure conditions for humanitarian operations. However, neither UNOSOM II managed to create a 
secure environment and suffered casualties thai later had an impact on the willingness for countries to do peace 
operations on Ihe African continent. See Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State-











3.3.4 The Multifunctional Peace Operation 
The multifunctional peace operations refer to those operations where the aim has been to 
implement a negotiated settlement.
98 
In general, the peace processes started with a cease-fire 
determined by comprehensive peace agreements. UN troops are deployed in the affected areas 
with the consent of the involved parties after the negotiation of the settlement has taken 
place.
99 
More specific, the objective is to help the belligerent parties to transform the violent 
conflict into state of being non-violent towards political reconciliation, democratic 
consolidation, and reconstruction.
IOO 
Compared to the other categories of peace operations, 
multifunctional peace operations represent a changing role for the UN in the move toward a 
prominent role for the organisation as an agent for democratic transitions, i.e. the UN seeks to 
address the root causes of conflicts and build the necessary political conditions for a 
sustainable and democratic peace. Hence, the UN has involved itself in processes of Conflict 
Transformation. 
In order to accomplish the objective, the various multifunctional peace operations have 
utilised a wide range of functions. These new peace operations monitor cease-fires. In 
addition, the multifunctional peace operations have been executing functions that employed 
both civilian and political elements. 101 The list of tasks is long: cantonment and 
demobilisation of troops; the destruction of and the formation and training of new armed 
forces; monitoring existing police forces and forming new ones; supervising (or controlling) 
administrations; verifying respect for human rights; observing, and/or conducting elections; 
undertaking information campaigns to explain the settlement, the opportunities it represents 
and the role of the UN. 102 
98 Mark Malan, "Peacekeeping in the New Millennium: Towards . Fourth Generation' Peace 
Operations", African Security Review Vol. 7 No. 3 (1998). [Available onlinel 
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ ASRl7No3/Malan.html (23.04,2004). 
99 Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles": 39, 
iOQ Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, "Introduction". in The Bille Helmers: a Review of Unired NariollS Peace-
keeping, United Nations (New York: United Nations Publication. 1996),5. 
tOl Durch. "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 19905", 3-4. 











The multifunctional peace operations vary both in breadth and in depth. 103 The differences 
follow naturally from the fact that these peace operations have been mandated to implement 
peace agreements, which in turn have been influenced by the parties of the conflicts, if not 
most extensively. Hence, the negotiated settlements set the agenda for the mandate that the 
Security Council authorises. The breadth of peace operations refers to the many different 
functions that UN has executed, and in what spheres the operation is involved to resolve the 
conflict. The depth refers to the degree of involvement and addresses the extent to which the 
U~ is engaged. 104 The presentation below reduces the number of functions to a set of 
components - the military, the civilian, the police, and the humanitarian component: 
I. The military functions: 
Monitor cease-fire. 
Cantonment, disarmament, and demobilisation of troops. 
Monitor withdrawal of foreign troops. 
Creation of new national armed forces. 
2. The civilian functions: 
Charing political commissions. 
Supervising or controlling governmental administration. 
Observing, supervising, or conducting elections. 
3. The police functions: 
Monitor performance of the local police. 
Reorganisation of a new police force. 
4. The humanitarian functions: 
Alleviate of human distress. 
Verify respect for human rights. 
Clearance of mines. 
The depth needs more explanation, as it opens for different concepts with slightly different 
content. Traditionally the UN has had four different levels of responsibility. First, the UN 
monitors when the mandate speaks of an observing role without authority to influence directly 
the agents involved. Second, supervision refers to the mandate where the U~ can request, but 
not order, the agents to change their behaviour. Third, control implies that the UN has direct 
line of control over the agents. Finally, conduct means authority to perform certain tasks 
lG] Sleven R. RUiner. "Setting the Scene: The Conceptual Underpinnings of the new Peacekeeping", 
chapter two in The UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace ill Lallds of COI!!licr Ajier the Cold War (Houndmills, 
Ba'ing~toke. Hampshire. and London: Macmillan Press, 1995).41, 











directly. Each concept accumulates the authority of the previous concept, and define conduct 
h h 
. . 105 
as t e most aut ontatlve concept. 
3.3.5 Summing Up 
The section above distinguishes between the UN peace operations. The operations vary both 
with respect to objectives and functions. They also vary in the use of Conflict Management, 
Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation. It is only the concept of the multifunctional 
peace operation that bring on board Conflict Transformation. The concept of the 
multifunctional peace operation proves to be the most comprehensive. The table below 
summarises and compares the different concepts. 
Table 3.3.5: The main features of the different peace operations. 
Type Classical Preventive I Humanitarian Multifunctional 
deployed 
Objective Keep peace and open Prevent conflict Humanitarian Strengthen and solidify 
for peacemaking escalation relief supply peace 
I Function Military Military Military; Military; civilian; police; 
humanitarian humanitarian 
Means to Conflict Conflict Conflict Combines the use of all 
end conflict management management management the three approaches 
• Stage of De-escalation Pre-violence Escalation Post-violence 
intervention 
• Peacekeeping Preventive Peacekeeping! Peacekeeping; post-
deployment; enforcement conflict peace-building I UN '"m 
peacekeeping I 
II Outcome Negative peace Negative peace I Negative peace Positive peace I 
1 I 
3.4 Different Multifunctional Peace Operations 
The effectiveness of UN multifunctional peace operations vary. This section seeks to address 
the UN's tangle image in the Conflict Transformation enterprise. The aim is to gain an 
understanding of the pattern of success and failure. The section below focuses on some of the 
main multifunctional operations that the Security Council deploys in the beginning of the 












Rwanda are chosen. Here, the UN sought to transfonn the violent conflicts into being non-
violent. They are chosen on the basis that they were exposed to multifunctional peace 
operations in an attempt to finalise the violent conflicts. Moreover, while some represent 
successes, other signifies failures. This helps us on the way to find the crucial critical factors 
for success or failure in the six multifunctional peace operations. 
The section follows a distinct pattern by presenting the different functions as provided for in 
their mandates. Then they are analysed whether their success or failure can be explained from 
the different actions of peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peace-building. However, the conflict 
specific situation is likewise appreciated. 
3.4.1 Namibia 
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNT AG, April 1989-Macrh 1990) in Namibia 
was the first multifunctional peace operation the UN deployed, and constituted an 
evolutionary step beyond the classical UN peace operations. UNT AG was to implement the 
Settlement Proposal of 1978 between South West Africa Peoples Organisation (SW APO) and 
the South African Government ending the quarter century long fight. The prime objective was 
to ensure that free and fair elections could be held leading to an independent Namibia. 
UNT AG had three different components. First, the military unit with a personnel consisting of 
4,500, monitored the cease-fire, cantonment of troops, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. 
Second, the 2,000 civilians were mandated to accomplish the transition to independence by 
creating the political structures for fairness in the elections. Third, the 1,500 police sought to 
monitor the performance of the police.
106 
In all, the UNT AG withdrew in March 1990, and is regarded a success story with the free and 
fair elections in 1989 and the withdrawal of South African Defence Forces (SADF) as the 
dominant indicators for the triumph. The Namibian success story must be seen in relation to 
two aspects of the contlict specific situation. First, with the deployment of UNAVEM 1
107 
one 
of the conflicts in Angola came to a solution.
108 
The UNA VEM I had been deployed to 
106 United Nations, "United ;\lations Transition Assistance Group (UNT AG)", in The Btue Helmets: a 
Rel'iew of United Nations Peace·keeping (New York: United Nations Publication, 1996),229. 
107 United Nations Angola Verification M.ission [ (January 1989-ivtay 1991). 
108 The US had brokered ,eltlements between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa in April 1989.Besides 











monitor the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. South Africa had perceived Cuban 
presence a threat to its interests. Next, the fact that UNTAG dealt with a case of 
decolonisation and not parties in an intra-state war, made it additionally easier. 
3.4.2 Cambodia 
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, March 1992-September 
1993) aimed to implement the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict 
(Paris Agreement 1991) that was designed to end the conflict between four parties 109 and 
establish a legitimate government with international assistance. The conflict had barked off 
during the years of French colonialism, accumulated through Pol Pot's regime (1975-79) and 
continued as a battle for controlling the government in 1980s. The peace accords gave 
UNT AC extensively power to solve any problems that had implications for the 
. 1 . 110 Imp ementatlOn. 
UNTAC's mandate was also threefold. First, the military unit of 15,547 troops and 893 
military observers sought to supervise, monitor, and verify the cease-fire. Next, the 5,979 
civilians (1,149 internationals and 4,830 local staff) executed a broad range of tasks, such as 
controlling the civil administration, a human rights component, organise and execute free and 
fair elections, repatriation, and rehabilitation. Third, UNTAC with a police force of 3,500 
supervised and controlled the police component. II I The scale and complexity of UNTAC's 
mandate marked for real a departure away from classical peace operation. 
Through short-term lenses, UNTAC's eighteen months deployment accomplished numerous 
achievements and the Security Council judged it a success that managed to hold free and fair 
(ANC) camps by Angola, the granting of independence of Namibia. and the withdrawal of SADF from the 
territory, and the withdrawal of assistance to the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). 
IllY The belligerents in the Cambodia conflict are the Phnom Penh government, the United National 
Front for an Independent. Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), the Khmer People's 
People Liberation Front (KPNLF), the Party of Democratic Campuchea (PDK, also known as the Khmer 
Rouge). and the Stale of Cambodia (SOC). 
1;0 James A. Schear. "Riding the Tiger: The United Nations and Cambodia's Struggle for Peace", in UN 
Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Ullcivil Wars of the 19905, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1996). 172-4. Although the Peace Accords gave the UN extensively amount of power that 
encouraged the use of Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council did not employ UNTAC with such a 
power. 
III United Nations, "United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (Ul'<AMIC); United Nations 
Transitional Autrhority in Cambodia (UNTAC)", in The Blue Helmets: a Review of Vlliteli Natiolls Peace-











elections in Cambodia, as well as set foundations for a peaceful society.1I2 However, the 
peace process was far from being admirable. The critical factor rests in the peacekeeping and 
peace-building process. UNTAC manages to play down the damaging role by PDK, but 
cannot handle SOC negative play with its use of violence and terror. In all, it obscures the 
peace-building process, e.g. to demobilise the armies and control the SOC civil service.
113 
SOC's electoral turnout in 1993 was low, and consequently forces UNTAC to negotiate them 
a larger role in a power-sharing. I 14 Later, the operation loses its credibility when the looser, 
SOC, in the 1997 elections ousted the winner, FUNCINPEC. 
3.4.3 EI Salvador 
The United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador (ONUSAL, July J991-April 1995) 
aimed to end the twelve-year long civil war between the government and an insurgent 
movement (the Frente Farabundo Marti para Ia Liberacion Nacional, RvlLN). It was deployed 
to implement the Mexico City Agreement between the belligerents in which the UN had 
played a central role to design. 
The mandate gave ONUSAL a wide range of responsibilities. The military element, as 
classical peacekeeping, separated forces and verified the cease-fire. Further, the 368 military 
observers sought to ensure cantonment, demobilisation, and redeployment. Second, the 
human rights division, staffed by 30 international civil servants, were mandated to verify 
human rights violations. Third, the police components, consisting of 631 police, monitored 
and supervised the newly established Salvadorian police force. An electoral division, 
consisting of 36 core observers (the number increased to 900 during the elections) observed 
h .. d I . f 'd d I' 115 t e voter reglstratlOn, an e ecttons or presl ency an par lament. 
112 Ibid., 481. However, as Ratner argues, the UNTAC had problems of establishing a peaceful society 
for elections as the operations mismanaged the process of demobilisution and cantonment, nor did it exercise the 
degree of control and supervision of competing regimes in order to ensure a neutral political environment. See 
Ratner, "Part 1Il: The Cambodia Experience", in The UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict 
After the Cold War (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 190. 
113 Micheal Doyle, "Peacebuilding in Cambodia: Legitimacy and Power", in Peacehllilding as Polilics: 
Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, eds. Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chelan Kumar with Karen Wermester 
(Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner, 200 1),99-102. 
II' Stedman. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes". 26-36. 
115 Cniled Nations, "United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNOSAL)", in The BIlle 











The Security Council judged the process to be meeting the ends of a democratic and peaceful 
nation in EI Salvador. 1 16 The impact of ONUSAL stands as a critical factor for success. The 
UN had helped to negotiate the settlement, and without its presence would likely made 
peacemaking more difficult. ONUSAL managed to keep the peace in El Salvador, 
subsequently contained the conflict, and made progress in other fields of the mandate 
possible, e.g. a thorough demobilisation process. Moreover, by supervising the 
implementation, ONUSAL assisted the parties to adhere to the settlement's terms and ensure 
that they lived up to their commitments. I 17 In sum, third party intervention was crucial in El 
Salvador. 
3.4.4 Mozambique 
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ, December 1992-December 1994) was 
deployed to implement the Rome Agreement between the conflicting parties in Mozambique 
that had ended over a decade of warfare. 
The mandate included four different elements. First, the military contingent of 6,625 
personnel sought to monitor and verify the cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, and the 
withdrawal of foreign troops. Second, the political division was responsible of the political 
guidance of the peace process, and chair in the political commission. Next, the electoral 
division with 148 international electoral officers (2,300 electoral observers during the 
election) monitored and supervised the voter registration as well as they sought to observe the 
elections for the presidency and the parliament. Four, a small number of international staff 
coordinated the humanitarian component that would serve as an instrument for reconciliation, 
and assist the return of displaced people. Although the Security Council did not give a 
mandate for a police force, the ONUMOZ consisted of 1,144 civilian police to observe the 
performance of the police in Mozambique.
li8 
116 United Nations, "Resolution 991 (1995)", Secur;" Council Document 991, 28 April 1995. 
117 Fen O. Hampson, "The Pursuit of Human Rights: The United Nations in El Salvador", in UN 
Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the /9905, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 1996),95·6. 
II, United :"lations, "United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZj", in The Bille Helmets: a 











ONUMOZ is widely regarded as a success story of UN multidimensional peace operations 
with the execution of the elections internationally acclaimed fairness. However, problems 
remain to fulfil the military mandate. 119 
The critical factors for success in Mozambique rest in conflict specific factors, as well as in 
the peacemaking and the Conflict Transformation process. Conflict specific factors such as 
the leadership styles of the local agents, lack of internal resources, and the pressure and 
commitment from external forces contribute towards success.
120 
The central participants in 
the conflict were included in the peacemaking process, and those challenging the peace 
process were dealt with constructively. 121 The comprehensive Conflict Transformation 
process contributed also to success, and will be discussed more in debt later. 
3.4.5 Angola 
In Angola, the United Nations Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II, May 1991-February 
1995) aimed at building a sustainable and democratic peace by implementing the peace 
agreement between the MPLA and the UNIT A of 1991. As the other multidimensional peace 
operations, UNA VEM II's mandate included different components. The unarmed 364 military 
officers sought to monitor and verify the cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, and the 
total withdrawal of foreign troops.122 The police unit consisting of 89 police monitored the 
neutrality of the police. The political unit (54 international civilian staff and 41 local civilian 
staff) sought to supervise elections for parliament and presidency.123 However, UNAVEM II 
119 For details see Ibid., 336-8: and Pamela L. Reed, "The Politics of Reconciliation: The United 
Nations Operation in Mozambique", in UN Peacekeeping, Americall Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 19905, 
ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 301-4. 
120 Dennis C. .lett, "Similar Histories: Different Outcomes", chapter four of Why Peacekeeping Fails 
(New York: Pal grave, 200 I). 61-6. 
121 Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes", International SeCllrity Vol. 22 No.2 
(Fall (997): 40-3. 5-53 
In UNA VEM 1 had been established in the beginning of 1989 to monitor the withdrawal of the 50,000 
Cuban troops that had supported the MPLA since independence. 
121 United Nations. "United Nations Verification Mission I, II, Ill", The Blue Helmets: a Review of 











failed to bring about a long lasting peace as UNIT A lost the first-round presidential election. 
The fear of loosing the next round made the l)NITA to take up arms.
124 
New talks between the belligerents eventuated in a new peace agreement that UNA VEM III 
sought to execute through five main features. First, the political unit offered good offices and 
mediation. Next, the military component (336 military observers and 6,576 troops) monitored 
the cease-fire, supervised, verified, and controlled cantonment and demobilisation. Third, the 
police division with 226 police officers monitored and verified the neutrality of the Angolan 
police. Four, a component assisted in humanitarian activities linked to the peace process. 
Finally, the electoral component sought to verify and monitor the entire electoral process for 
the second round of presidential elections. 125 However, UNA VEM II was not able to fulfil its 
civilian mandate as did its successor, the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola 
(MONUA).126 
Specific conflict dynamics contribute to explain the outcome of a UN intervention. The local 
leadership promoting disunity, the wealth of internal resources functioning as an incentive for 
continuation of warfare, and the lack of international attention and support are all critical 
factors making up the failure in Angola. 127 With respect to Conflict Transformation, the fact 
that de mobilisation before the elections in the UNA VEMII years did not occur, made it easier 
for UNIT A to continue fighting. 
3.4.6 Rwanda 
In Rwanda, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR l, October 1993-
April 1994) was requested to implement the Arusha Accord of 1993. As in the other cases, the 
mandate spoke for a multidimensional peace operation. The prime objective was to create a 
secure environment for the installation and subsequent operation of the transitional 
IH Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Verification Mission II", in The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping: Case Studies alld Comparative Analysis. ed. William 1. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press. 
1993),403. 
125 United Nations, "United Nations Verification Mission I, II. III". 256, 
leb Yvonne C. Lodico. "A Peace that Fell Apart: The United Nations and the War in Angola", in UN 
Peacekeepillg. American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 19905. ed. William 1. Durch (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1996). 124-6. Norrie Macqueen. "Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola", 
Journal of Modern Africall Swdies Vol. 36 No.3 (1998): 399-422. 











government. First, the military division consisting of 2,548 military personnel sought to 
monitor and verify the cease-fire, supervise an integration of the two armies, and monitor the 
overall security situation until national elections. Second, the civilian component sought to 
supervise elections for presidency and parliament. Third, the 60 civilian police monitors 
sought to monitor and verify the performance of the Rwandan police force.
128 
Finally, the 
operation would assist in coordination of humanitarian assistance activities. 
Unable to deploy its force in a timely manner, efforts to implement the agreement collapsed in 
April 1994 when Hutu extremists orchestrated a mass slaughter of Tutsi civilians and Hutu 
moderates. 129 The critical failure in Rwanda is to be found in the peacemaking process. CDR, 
a fraction within the MRDN representing the Hutu extremists, was left out of the Arusha 
peace making process, and not dealt with constructively. CDR refused any compromise with 
RPF, challenged president Habyarimana, and acted as a spoiler that sought to destroy the 
whole peace process. 130 Finally, the International Community demonstrates unwillingness. 
3.4.7 Summing Up 
The above section was tasked with presenting six different multifunctional peace operations. 
The mandate, the outcome, and the critical factors for the outcome were considered. It 
demonstrated that the various cases share similarities in the mandate. The peace operations 
were all deployed to execute multifunctional tasks and Conflict Transformation as such. For a 
comparison of these mandates, see table 3.4.7 below. The table shows that there is no clear-
cut blueprint model of a multidimensional peace operation. The various peace operations 
differ as to the functions whether it is the military, civilian, or the police functions. However, 
the table shows that the military functions vary to a lesser extent, whereas the civilian and 
police functions vary more significantly. The short exercise that identifies factors for 
effectiveness demonstrate that these aspects are both to be found in peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building, and in the conflict specific situations. 
I2H United Nations, "United Nations Observer Mission Uganda Rwanda (UNOMOR); United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)"', in The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping 
(New York: United Nations Publication. 1996),343-45. 
129 1. Matthew Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda", in 
UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncil'il Wars or the 1990s. ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1996), 399. 











Table 3.4,7: The dijJerellt jilllctions of the multifunctional peace operations 
G ",,",,;"", Military functions Political functions Police functions ---
Multidimensional C~ase-fir~ Cantonment Withdrawal Political Governmental Voter- Elections 
peal'/' opera/ioll 
Perfor- Creation of 
and of foreign Commission administration registration mallct! new force 




Monitor Monitor and Member Supervise Control Control Monitor Monitor 
il 
and verify verify and verify and verify 
------- f------ ------ ~-- -------- ------ ----- -
UNTAC Monitor, Monitor and Verify Member Control Conduct Conduct Monitor 









ONUMOZ Monitor Monitor and Monitor and Member Monitor and Monitor Monitor 
and verify verify verify verify and verify and verify 
I 
--- ----
lJNAVEMII Monitor Monitor and Verify Guest Supervise, Monitor Monitor 
and verify verify monitor, and and verify 
verify 
UNAVEMIlI Monitor Supervise, Member Monitor and Supervise, Monitor Monitor Monitor 
control, and verify monitor, and and verify and verify and verify 
verify verify 
-~----~ ---
lJNAMIR Monitor Supervise Supervise Monitor Supervise 












This chapter has examined the UN peace operations on a descriptively level. The discussion 
of the problem of the Charter demonstrates that despite explicit provision in the UN Charter 
peace operations are anchored in "Chapter-Six-and-a-Half'. A short reference to the history of 
UN peace operations was made. It shows that the objective of peace operations have evolved 
from Conflict Management to Conflict Transformation. After the Cold War, the UN has more 
intensively involved itself in conflicts by authorising mission with a comprehensive mandate. 
Based on the various different UN peace operations, a typology of four different concepts was 
made. Each of these ideal types was presented with special attention given to the 
multifunctional peace operation. An empirical example illustrated each peace operation 
concept. Then, six multifunctional peace operations were shortly discussed with respect to 
their mandate, outcome, and the critical factors determining the effectiveness. The exercise 
found that not only do the many concepts of peace operations vary in breadth and depth, but 
the multifunctional peace operations also are different in nature. 
Thus, with this background on both a theoretical and a descriptive level, it makes sense to 











Understanding the Conflicts in 
Mozambique and Rwanda 
43 
This chapter compares the Mozambican and Rwandan conflict specific situations. This is 
important as some of the critical factors determining the outcome of the UN intervention are 
to be found inherent in the conflicts. The chapter also briefly renders the peacemaking 
processes and how the UN got involved in the two countries. The purpose is to demonstrate 
that success and failure cannot be explained without a reference to the conflict specific 
situation. Different conflict situations are potential for different outcomes of multifunctional 
peace operations regardless of intervention strategy. Furthermore, the section functions as a 
background to understand the two conflicts. 
The chapter is divided in four comparative sections each answering one of the following 
questions: What were the causes of the conflicts? What were the natures of the conflicts? 
What led to the peace agreements? What led to the UN involvement in the conflicts? 
4.1 The Conflicts Emerge: the Roots 
This section considers the roots of the conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda. The purpose is 
to gain an understanding of the most important causes of the conflicts, and that these sources 
need to be addressed if resolutions of the conflicts should be found. Thus, it is necessary to 











4.1.1 Mozambique: Synthesis of Internal and External Explanations 
Frelimo, launched in 1962, heads the successful national liberation struggle against 
Portuguese colonialism.
131 
By the time of independence in 1975, Frelimo enjoys sole realistic 
ambitions of governing Mozambique and represents a formidably military and ideologically 
unity. Frelimo is subsequently transferred the authority after a short transitional period. This 
. hi' 132 Th I' 1 ' I' . . f d occurs Wit out e ectlOns. e co oma power s poor po lCles on 10 rastructure an 
education leave an independent country with a fracture and fragile national identity. Frelimo 
had developed a socialist agenda during the struggle, and two years into independence, the 
organisation adopts the Marxist-Leninist ideology prescribing the wholesale transformation of 
the Mozambican society.133 This attracts support from the USSR both financially and 
military.134 Consequently, Maputo's supports liberation movements and opposes the white 
minority regimes in Southern Africa. 
As a result, Renamo comes into play in 1976. The Rhodesian Intelligent Service establishes 
Renamo to de-stabilise Mozambique and hinder Maputo's support for the Zimbabwean 
insurgent movements. 135 At the outset, Renamo assists the Rhodesian security forces in 
intelligence gathering. The terror movement consists mainly of former Frelimo commanders 
alienated by the Maputo government with no clear political objective. The numerical strength 
1}1 In April 1974, a group of Portuguese junior officers dissatisfied with their country's colonial 
policies, including their counter-insurgency wars in the three African colonies (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and 
Mozambique), leads a military coup that topples the Portuguese fascist regime at the time. A Portuguese 
Socialist leader, Soares, holds talks with Frelimo that end in the Lusaka Agreement paving the way for 
Ylozambican independence. See Douglas Porch, The Portuguese Anned Forces and the Revolution (London: 
Croom Helm, 1977),115-21. 
132 Throughout the years of independence, a series of sections grow out of Frelimo, following splits on 
issuers such as elitism, ideology, and the ethnic composition of its leadership. For further details, see Alex Vines, 
Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique (University of York, York: Centre for Southern African Studies, 1991),5-
10. 
J'3 In the first four years of independence, Frelimo receives arms to the value of $180 million. (Robert 
D. Grey. "The Soviet Presence in Africa", The Journal of Modem African Studies Vol. 22 No.3 (September 
1984): 520). 
13-1 Mark Simpson, "Foreign and Domestic Factors in the Transformation of Frelimo", The Journal of 
/v/odern African Studies. VoL. 31 No. 2 (1993): 307-8. 309-337; Chris Alden, "Political Violence in 
~Iozambique: Past. Present and Future", 40-2. 
135 The Maputo Government supports. in particular, the ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and 
gives its military wing, ZANLA (Zimbabwe National Liberation Army). a launching pad for its offensives in the 











is about thousand members.
136 
In 1980, with the nominal black majority rule and the change 
from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, Apartheid South Africa adopts Renamo. The new patron 
substantially increases the military support Amplified operational units follow with a range 
of terror campaigns aiming for political and economical, as well as civilian targets within 
Mozambique,137 Consequently, Renamo earns the nickname the 'Khmer Rouge of Africa', 
The emergence and evolution of the insurgence movement is thus located within the broader 
context of Southern African political and security dynamics, However, as the war progresses, 
Renamo develops a distinct Mozambican identity particularly towards the central and 
northern regions.
138 
Renamo claims an anti-communist agenda aiming for political and 
. ll'b ' 'M b' 139 economic a 1 eratlOn In! ozam lque. 
In this, there are three sources of the Mozambican conflict: 0) the decolonisation process; (ii) 
subversive actions initiated from adjacent countries; and (iii) policy mistakes on behalf of 
Frelirno as the government. The balance between these sources changes as the time goes by. 
At first, it is the legacy from the decolonisation process when Frelimo is handed power 
without elections, together with the intervention from Rhodesia and South Africa that fuel the 
conflict. Later, Frelimo's policy mistakes nurture disappointments that Renamo exploits. 
4.1.2 Rwanda: Revolutionary Governance 
In Rwanda, Belgian colonisers arriving after the Second World War take notice of the already 
existing social differentiation between Hutus and Tutsis.
140 
They exploit and solidify it, 
136 The Rhodesian Intelligent services recmited disgruntled settlers who fled Mozambique. black 
Mozambique soldiers loyal to the Portuguese army, expelled members of Frelimo, and, Frelimo soldiers who had 
been sanctioned and imprisoned for crimes committed after independence. (Abiodun Alao, Brothers at War.' 
Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa (London and New York: British Academic Press, 1994). 46.) 
137 Vines, Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique, 15-31. Steven Metz, "The Mozambique National 
Resistance and South African Foreign Policy", African Affairs Vol. 85 No. 341 (October 1986): 492-6. 
138 Glenda Morgan, "Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of Renamo", lournal of 
Modern African Studies Vol. 28 No.4 (1990): 605-7; Alao, Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in 
SomIJem Africa, 48-9. 
119 In this respect, the fact that the organisation changes it name is not without significance. Until 1982, 
or so, it was usually referred to as MNR (english abbreviation for l\lozambique National Resistance). Later, it 
adopts Renamo that can be seen as an attempt of Mozambican itself. More likely, however, is this directed from 
Pretoria to give Renamo its own identity so that the links between the patron and the client becomes more 
blurred. (Tom Young. "The MRN/RENAMO: External and Internal Dynamics", African A/Jail'S Vol. 89 No. 557 
(October 1990): 501-2.) 
HO It is difficult to distinguish between individuals in Rwanda as the differences in physical stature have 











following the system of the colonial game by 'divide and rule'. Herein, the Tutsi group is 
favoured.
141 
The Belgians continue to support the Tutsi group until the mid 19505 when the 
Tutsis start to see themselves not only superior the Hutus but also equal the Belgians. By the 
time of decolonisation in 1962, the Belgians favour the Hutu group that wins the elections and 
represents the first independent republican government in Rwanda. Onwards, the Hutu 
Administration, led by Kayibanda, follows the same rule of discrimination. The identification 
cards that had previously guaranteed the Tutsi privilege serve now against them in education 
or employment. 142 The regime answers oppositional ideas with repression, and violence with 
counter violence. 
In this, there is a rapid change of social and political structures. However, this social-
revolutionary process, taking place from 1959-64, is incomplete as there is a lack of 
transformation in the race relations between the Huttis and the Tutsis. Instead, a tense 
relationship between the two groups is merging, and Hutu and Tutsi appear as political 
'd .. I k d' 1" I 143 1 entItles oc e 111 a zero-sum po lhca game. 
General Habyarimana stages a coup d'etat in 1973 and turns Rwanda into a single-party state 
under the MRND two years later. At the outset, the discrimination of the Tutsis seems to find 
an end as he "redefines" the Tutsis as indigenous people. l44 Later, however, the Tutsis see 
Hutu, or Tutsi group. They all speak the same language, sharing the same culture and religion, and living 
relatively in the same places. Two factors, however, have made identification easier, Le. (i) knowledge of 
ancestry, and (ii) the possession of an identification card that specifies by law which group an individual belongs 
to. Since 1926, the lalter has played a role in the Rwandan society and politics. Those with ten cows or more 
were classified as Tutsis, less than ten cows made a Hutu, and even less cows than a Hutu made a Twa. (Alex de 
Waal, "Genocide in Rwanda", Anthropology Today Vol. 10 NO.3 (June 1994): 1-2. 
141 Catherine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression: C/ientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda. 1860-/960 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
1.2 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 
1998). 
143 Zwelethu Jolobe, 'The Social-Revolutionary Process as a Cause of Genocide in Rwanda'; A Critical 
Interpretation on the Causes ()f Rwanda's 1994 Genocide (Master's thesis submitted at University of Cape 
Town, 2003),64-75. 
144 Throughout the post-independent Rwanda the Hamitic hypothesis plays a central in the Rwandan 
society. The hypothesis relies on anthropological theory, proposed by John Hanning Speke in 1863, saying that 
central Africa had been introduced to a taller and sharper-featured group, the Tutsis. This groups is considered to 
be a Caucasoid tribe of Ethiopian origin. The group is descended from the biblical King David, and thus a 
superior race to the native groups. It superiority belonged to the years before independence. After, the idea is 
reversed and used to discriminate the Tutsis based on xenophobia. See Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform 












themselves again excluded based on ethnicity. Rwanda, through Hutu eyes, is regarded a 
stable and peaceful society, though control is an obsession for the regime that executes 
extensively non-democratic means to sustain its position. Consequently, many Tutsis flee into 
exile. By the late 1980s, the Tutsi community in the neighbouring countries has expanded to 
600,000. 
Thus, the intra-state conflict in Rwanda that starts in October 1990 is an expression of the 
political conflict between Tutsi rebels and the Hutu led government. Through the history, 
authoritarian rule has generated Hutu and Tutsi as 'political identities'. These identities have 
in tum changed with the changing history of the Rwandan state. History of the state has made 
the bipolar identities, and fuelled the conflict.
145 
Moreover, the unfinished social-
revolutionary process following the decolonisation triggers a second revolutionary crisis that 
is the intra-state conflict. 146 
RPF launches itself in December 1987 advocating democracy, citizenship, and national 
unity.147 In October 1990, when its armed wing, Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), enters 
Rwanda it represents the Tutsi exiles that have waited 30 years to stage an offensive against 
the Hutu led government. 148 In this, Uganda supports RPF as a liberation movement that aims 
to overthrow the Hutu nationalist government. The balance of power wants it however 
otherwise. Rwandan Government Forces (RGF), with support from Belgium, France, and 
Zaire, stops RPF only 30 kilometres north of Kigali. 149 A cease-fire follows an international 
mediation in June 1992. Further international pressure for political liberalisation makes 
145 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and Genocide in 
Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),60-75. 
146 For details see lolobe, 76-115. 
147 RPF has until then existed under the acronym Ranu (Rwandan Alliance for Nation Unity) with the 
aim of establishing a socialist republic in Rwanda. With change in name, the radical agenda withers away. From 
October 1990 until July 1994, RPA grows from 5,000 to 25,000 troops. 
148 Wm. Cyrus Reed, "Exile, Reform and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front", The Journal of 
iV!odern African Studies Vol. 34 No.3 (September \996); 484-90. 
149 Human Rights Watch, Arming Rwanda: the Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan 
War, C'.Jew York: Human Rights Watch, 1994).23-4. Belgium and France send respectively 535 and 300 troops 
argued ostensibly to protect their nationals, whilst the thousand Zairian troops are deployed in direct combat with 
RPF. Later and Zaire withdraw their troops, the former due to domestic pressure, and the latter has been 
accused of looting and stealing more than executing effective military actions. France stays both physically and 
as a guarantor for military equipment and financial liability. RGF increases its number of troops from 5,200 to 











Habyarimana form a power-sharing arrangement with four opposition parties in June 1992 
without RPF representation. The arrangement turns out to be nominal as Habyarimana 
continues his strong authority. CDR 150, a conservative Hutu party, shares a position in this 
new government that pursues for extreme ideas. The parties use the truce as a window period 
to upgrade its arsenal and resume to even heavier fighting in February 1993. Following 
requests from Uganda, who wants to clean herself from accusations of supporting RPF, and 
the Kigali government with strong support from France, the Security Council authorises the 
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMOR) to verify that no military 
goods are floating from Uganda to Rwanda. 
4.1.3 Summing Up 
The above section has been tasked to give an account of the causes of the conflicts in 
Mozambique and Rwanda. It is apparent from the ahove that the situation is different in the 
tViO countries. What is the nature of the essential differences? First, in Mozambique a 
combination of the flawed Portuguese decolonisation, interventions from Mozambique's 
white minority regimes, and Frelimo's failure in the course of policy actions cause the 
conflict. By contrast, the creation of the 'political identities' through the two social-
revolutionary processes triggers the fighting in Rwanda. Second, the differences in the causes 
of the conflicts have implications for the understanding of the participants. Whilst Renarno 
from the outset is a terror movement and a puppet of Pretoria, RPF is a liberation movement. 
Compared to Renamo, RPF is a more independent movement that is inspired by, and shares 
experience from, Museveni's power conquest in Uganda. This leads to the third difference 
that is seen in the miscellaneous agendas Renamo and RPF pursue. As a terror movement, 
Renamo, at least in the beginning, seeks only to destabilise the Frelimo regime. In contrast, 
the RPF stages Rwanda to overthrow the Hutu nationalist government. In short, the causes of 
the conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda are different that have different implications on the 
agents. 
4.2 Conflict Dynamics: the Structure and the Participants 
The compositions of the conflicts are complex as they float into different levels. The section 
below differentiates between three dimensions, i.e. the internal, regional, and international 
components, regarding their nature and extent. The purpose of this section is to give an 











overview of the conflict dynamics in order to understand the structure of the conflicts and 
their participants. 
4.2.1 Mozambique: a Strong Regional Dimension 
The internal dimension of the conflict in Mozambique consists of the perceived incompatible 
goals between Frelimo and Renamo. Frelimo claims to hold the legitimate right to exercise 
the central authority. Renamo's objective, at least on the paper at the stage of peacemaking, is 
political and economical liberation. 
At the regional level, Frelimo confronts the white minority regimes in the region, first 
primarily towards Rhodesia, and later Apartheid South Africa. They perceive that the eventual 
success of a black majority-ruled government in Mozambique would hll ve a domino effect on 
South Africa and Rhodesia. Moreover, Pretoria senses the fall of white minority regimes in 
Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, together with the war in Namibia, as a strategy initiated 
from Moscow, i.e. the 'total onslaught', and is countered with the 'total strategy'. 151 Hence, 
Renamo's patrons use its client extensively to destabilise their neighbour. 
The international dimension articulates a light involvement by the Cold War's major agents, 
the Soviet Union and the US. The Soviet Union supports Frelimo both as a liberation 
movement and as a post-independence government, but its commitment is never as extensive 
as for MPLA in Angola, and Maputo could enhance an independent foreign policy.152 The 
Soviet Union rejects the Mozambican application for Comecon in 1981, and Maputo 
subsequently gradually distances itself from Moscow by flirting with the West. Washington 
does not feel flattered. The Reagan Administration keeps Renamo on an arm length distance. 
When Renamo is accused of perpetuating a massacre in July 1987, the Administration 
disassociates from the organisation, as do other Western governments. Thus, Mozambique 
never really became a battlefield for the Cold War superpowers. 153 
1;1 Rob Davies and Dan O'Meara. "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: an Analysis of South African 
Regional Policy since 1978", Joumal of So III hem Nrical1 Studies Vol. 11 No.2 (April 1985): 
152 Richard Weitz, "Continuities in Soviet Foreign Policy: the Case of Mozambique", Comparative 
Strategy Vol. II No. I (January-March 1992): 85. However, it must be noted that besides the Derg Regime in 
Ethiopia, the level of support to Frelimo, measured in aons assistance, reflects USSR's second largest 
commitment in the region next to MPLA. See Marx Webber, "Soviet Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Final 
Phase". The Journal of Model'll African SlIIdies Vol. 30 No. I (March 1992): 11-2. 
153 Chris Alden and Mark Simpson. "Mozambique: a Delicate Peace". iOllllJal of Modem Afl'ican 











Table 4.2.1: The structure and the participants in the Mozambican conflict 
Agent Represents Supported by Claim Conflict with 
Frelimo The Mozambican The USSR, Cuba, Legitimate right to Renamo, Rhodesia 
Government. Zimbabwe (from exercise the central (1976-80), South 
1980, Zimbabwean authority, and Africa (1980-88). 
freedomfighters defend its 
prior sovereignty. 
independence). 
Renamo Rhodesia (1976- Rhodesia (1976- Official: Political Frelimo. 
80), South Africa 80), South Africa and economic 
( 1980-88). (1980-88), Malawi, liberalisation 
Later, the rural Kenya Unofficial: 
popUlation of Groups in Portugal, Maximise material 
Mozambique West Germany, and - opportunistic. 
(central and the US. 
northern region). 
4.2.2 Rwanda: a Strong Internal Dimension 
The internal dimension of the Rwandan conflict portrays three main cleavages: (i) the 
conflict within the Habyarimana regime; (ii) the opposition towards the Habyarimana regime 
within Rwanda
l54
; and of prime focus here, (iii) the perceived incompatible goals between 
MRND and RPF because both parties want to control the governmental power. The latter 
wants to overthrow the former. 
The regional dimension of the conflict in Rwanda does not evolve into the same intensity as 
in Mozambique. Uganda has supported and nurtured RPF since 1987 as President Museveni 
entered Kampala with the help from Tutsi exiles one year earlier. 155 With a Ugandan 
presence, Kenyan scepticism of Kampala and Mobutu's need for French support extend the 
R d fl·· . I l' h' 156 wan an can Ict Into reglOna re atlOns IpS. 
At the international level, France becomes involved in Rwanda. The French has incorporated 
the former Belgium colonies into its sphere of influence. France supports MRND as a 
154 The internal cleavage draws on general dissatisfaction with the regime along an ethnic cleavage 
between Hutu and Tutsi, and regional or other deavages within the HulU society. 
155 The current president in Rwanda, Kagame, was Museveni's head of military intelligence in the 
National Resistance Army (NRA), which is the military wing of the National Resistant Movement (NRM). 
Many of RPA's troops deserted from NRA and took along military supplies. 
156 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Uganda's Domestic and Regional Security since the 1970s", The Journal 0/ 
Modern African Studies Vol. 31 No.2 (June 1993): 242-8; Reed, "Exile, Reform and the Rise of the Rwandan 











Francophone force, and opposes RPF with its Anglophone background. Paris perceives RPF 
as a function of the 'Anglo-Saxon' conspiracy in which Uganda also plays a role to invade the 
Francophone sphere.
157 
France sends not only weapons but also a small contingent of troops 
to help Habyarimana repel RPF.
158 
Rwanda is even further away from the Cold War 
confrontation than Mozambique, and the transformation in international relations has no 
direct effect on the backing of either side. 159 
Table 4.2.2: The SlrUCltlre and the participants in the Rwandan conflict 
I 
Agent Represents Supported by I Claim Connict with 
MRND The Hutu group, France, Kenya, Social revolution, RPF. 
mainly from the Zaire, Belgium legitimate right to 




RPF The Tutsi exiles, Uganda, Belgium Liberate Rwanda MRND,CDR. 
especially the (from 1993). with the following 
Ugandan values: national 




4.2.3 Summing Up 
! 
Considering the internal dimension, the conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda have violent 
expressions illustrating two examples of intra-state wars. Both governments are fighting 
insurgents that start their attacks from an adjacent state, and later consolidate their positions 
within their homeland. Nonetheless, there are major differences between Renamo and RPF. 
On the regional level, it seems that Mozambique is subjected to a stronger involvement from 
the neighbouring countries than the involvement of Uganda in Rwanda. In comparison, the 
South African involvement in Mozambique is more explicit than Uganda's role in Rwanda. 
Finally, even though the superpowers do not involve themselves heavily in the Mozambican 
conflict, their absence is clearer in Rwanda where France plays the central role on the 
157 Asteris C. Huliaras, "The 'anglosaxon conspiracy': French pen.:eptions of the Great Lakes crisis", 
TIle Journal of Modern AfricanS/udies Vol. 36 No.4 (December 1998): 597·600. 
ISH Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 99- \09. 
1.19 Cristopher Clapham, "Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking", The Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 











international level. Thus, the dynamics of the two conflicts share both similarities and 
dissimilarities. 
4.3 The Peacemaking Process: Negotiating Comprehensive Settlements 
The section below considers the process leading to the negotiated settlements in Mozambique 
and Rwanda. Herein, it is crucial to consider the balance of power between the belligerents 
when the peacemaking processes start. The aim is to understand how the conflicts are 
addressed before the UN is asked to implement the settlements. 
4.3.1 Mozambique: the General Peace Agreement 
The international and regional dimension of the conflict has changed substantially by the time 
Frelimo and Renamo are ready to negotiate. Pretoria's support of war has withered awayl60, 
the Soviet Union has turned inwards and demonstrates eagerness to solve regional conflicts, 
and the US appears more peaceful as the Cold War confrontation seems to settle. 161 The 
belligerents had been dependent on foreign donors during the fighting, and when this stops, 
the parties face economic exhaustion.
162 
Simultaneously, they face a mutually hurting 
stalemate, as either side contemplate neither victory nor defeat. 163 The violence continues on 
a horrific level and is of increasingly pure destruction. The conflict is ripe for resolution. 164 
160 Until 1984. when the Maputo is unable to deal with the 'total strategy' and signs the Nkomati-
agreement with Pretoria, the South African Defence Force (SADF) provides logistical support for Renamo. 
Pretoria continues to fuel its client and only culminates in an official full stop after the Songo meeting between 
the presidents of Mozambique and South Africa in 1988 (though some dissident forces within SADF continue to 
support for Renamo). 
161 Alden et al.,"Mozambique: a Delicate Peace": 113; Marina Ottaway, "Mozambique: From Symbolic 
Socialism to Symbolic Reform", The Journal of Modem Afl·jean SllIdies Vol. 26 No.2 (January 1988): 217-21. 
162 The economic situation is an important feature to the Mozambican context. It is in stark contrast to 
other intra-state wars in Africa. For the parties in Mozambique fighting was not a clear means to enrichment, and 
thus an incentive for the continuation warfare as seen in Angola, Liberia. or Sierra Leone. Mozambique's wealth 
is more potential than actual, and less immediate portable compared to that in the above countries. 
Mozambique's immediate economic prospects centre on the provision of port and transport facilities to its 
neighbours, on agriculture, and tourism. All of these require stability, long-tenn development. and prudent 
management 
163 According to Zartman, a "mutually hurting stalemate defines the moments as ripe for resolution: 
both sides are locked in a situation from which they cannot escalate the contlict with their available means at an 
acceptable cost". See L William Zartman, ed., Elusive Peace: Negotiating all End to Civil War, Washington 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995, 8. 
164 For a theoretical underpinning of this argument see I. William Zartman. Ripe for Resoltltion: COlljlict 










The parties seem to undergo a change of heart. Frelimo had abandoned its radical policy, 
created a new constitution, and called for multi-party elections.
165 
The raison d' etre for 
Renamo to continue the war swept thus away. 
Peace talks between the Mozambican parties, marked by both mutual distrust and desire to 
end the war, start in 1988 and pick up the pace in the two first years of the 1990s under 
auspices of the Catholic Church in Rome.
166 
Before this there had been initiatives towards 
peacemaking in the form of a pre-negotiation phase. The Nkomati Accord represents the first 
sign, but it fails and the war resume. 167 At the Songo meeting in 1988, Chissano and Botha 
sign an agreement in which South Africa pledges to assist in repairing a water dam, and 
which in tum would provide South Africa with 8% of its energy requirements. Pretoria, in 
need of energy supplies, insists Renamo to stay away from this project, and even supports 
Maputo with military supplies to guard the installation. In parallel to these processes, from 
1984 onwards the Mozambican churches, the Catholic and the Protestant, undertake 
initiatives that promote dialogue. 168 
However, it is not until 1988 that contact with Renamo is made, that commitments towards 
resolution take place, and that Frelimo and Renamo are willing to negotiate towards an end of 
the war. 169 In July 1989, the government makes provisions for dialogue. It circulates a twelve-
point document demanding Renamo to abandon terrorism and violence, it offers the rebels 
165 Joseph Hanlo, Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (London, Blomington, and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1991),60-5. 
166 II was two representatives from a Catholic organisation associated with the Vatican, the Sant' Egidio 
Community, together with the Italian government and Bishop Jaime Gon\=alves that mediates the talks. This 
results in a cease-fire for six months in December 1990 to a limited area in which the Zimbabwean troops would 
confine and Renamo not attack, For an account of the role that that the Sant'Egidio Community plays, see 
Andrea Bartoli, "Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant'Egidio", in Herding 
Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen 0. Hampson and Pamela Aal, 
second edition (Washington D,C: United States Insititute of Peace Press, 2001), 247-71. 
167 This is an agreement between Maputo and Pretoria, Renamo is left out of the discussion, because 
Frelimo makes the analysis that from an agreement with the patron follows the end of the client's existence 
basis. See John S. Saul, "On War and Peace in Africa: The Mozambican Case", chapter four in MiIlenllial 
Africa: Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy, John S. Saul (Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press, 2001), 115; 
Baptista Lundin and Da Costa Gaspar, "Mozambique: Making Peace The Roots of the Conflict and the Way 
Forward", in Through Fire with Water: The Roots of Division and the Potential for Reconciliation, eds. Eric 
Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio (Claremont: New Africa Books, 2003). 314-5. For details of the Nkomati 
text see Accord of Nkomati [Available online I 
http://www .incore, ulsLac.ukiservices/cds/agreements/pdf/moz 1. pdf [ 18.05.2004]. 
;63 Vines, Renamo: Terrorism illlvlozambique, 28. 











amnesty, as well as promIses of reintegration into society.l70 In response, Renamo rejects 
Frelimo's demands and would only renounce violence under certain conditions, such as to be 
acknowledged as a political force in Mozambique; accept to draw up a new constitution 
jointly with Renamo; withdrawal of foreign troops; and commitment to reconciliation. 171 
Then, President Chissano prepares for a negotiated outcome. Later, Frelimo creates a new 
constitution, and calls for multi-party elections. Thus, Renamo's objective to continue warfare 
sweeps away and the organisation faces instead incentives to find a political solution. 
Dhlakamo, Renamo's leader, makes organisational changes and transforms the insurgency 
from a terror movement to that of a politico-military organisation. I72 Moreover, Renamo's 
leadership changes the dressing from military uniform to that of negotiation costume. On the 
part of Frelimo, peace is a necessity to become a trading partner with the West. Later, the 
drought in the beginning of the 1990s pressure Renamo towards working for peace, as it no 
longer could sustain itself in the rural areas.173 In addition, external pressure helps towards 
negotiations. The first direct talks between officials from Frelimo and Renamo take place in 
July 1990 in Rome. The process eventuates in the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 
October 1992. 
Based on Cameron Hume's account for the peacemaking process between Frelimo and 
Renamo it is possible to differentiate between five phases: (i) starting a dialogue; (ii) 
identification of the vital issues; (iii) political questions; (iv) discussion about humanitarian 
issues; and (v) discussion about military issues. 174 The section below briefly renders the 
developments made in each of these phases. 175 
1"0 See "Twelve Principles for Peace of the Mozambican Government"' <http://www.c-
r.org/accord/r;]oziaccord3/nairobi.shtml > (18.05.2004). 
171 See "Sixteen Point Declaration of the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo)" <http://www.c-
r.orglaccord/moziaccord3/nairobi.shtml > (18.05.2004). 
172 Alden et al.: 113-6. 
17J Saul, 116-7. 
174 Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: the Role of Mediation and Cood Offices (Washington 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994). 
175 The following is drawn from Alden et al.: I 18-22, United Nations, The United Nations and 
Mozambique 1992-95 (New York: Department of Public Information United Nations, 1996), 14-22; Hume, 25-
139; Saul: 117-29: Andrea Bartoli, "Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of 











In the first phase (October 1988-Decemberl990), no substantial agreement is met, but is still 
significant to the broader resolution perspective. A direct dialogue between Frelimo and 
Renamo commences and they commit themselves to a peaceful future. 176 Representatives 
from the Kenyan, Malawian, and Zimbabwean governments facilitate, and later Sant'Egidio 
takes over the role. External pressure, especially from the US and South Africa, persuades 
Renamo to continue the talks and acknowledge Frelimo as the partner in peace. A partial 
cease-fire is reacbed. 177 Zimbabwe ought to withdraw its troops from the Beira and Limpopo 
corridor, whilst Renamo would not launch attack in these trade routes. 
In the next phase (January 1990-0ctober 1991), the two parties identify the central issues and 
reach an agreement upon the procedure to be followed. A systematic step-by-step approach is 
chosen that prescribes that an agreement is signed on a particular issue before the discussion 
of any new issues. Mutual distrust leads to a deadlock, but still the parties agree to an agenda 
specifying six areas requiring agreement: the law on political parties, the electoral system, 
military issues, guarantees, a cease-fire, and a donors conference. Furthermore, the parties 
endorse mutual recognition that opens for further discussions. 
Nonetheless, it is not until the third phase (October 1991-March 1992) that serious negotiation 
concerning a real resolution of the conflict takes place in Rome. The parties agree upon 
electoral procedure and the holding of free and fair elections. The President would be elected 
based on a simple majority for a term of five years. The 250 parliamentarians are to be elected 
for equally five years based on proportional representation. At the same time, violence 
continues in Mozambique. Renamo has taken an upper hand and is tempted to have 
confidence in further warfare. Convinced by the US, the USSR, and Italy, Renamo agrees to 
continue by political means and signs a cease-fire. In return, Frelimo promises not to 
unilaterally introduce any new laws. 178 
Hampson, and Pamela Aal. Second Edition (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 
257-71. 
176 See "joint Communique of 10 July" 
<http://www .incore.ulsLac. uk/services/cds/agreements/pdflmoz5 .pdf> (18.05.2004). 
171 The truce is agreed upon 9 November 1990, see "Agreement on a Partial Ceasefire" 
<http://www.incore.ulst.ac .uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/moz6. pdf> (\8.05.2004). 











The fourth phase (March-August 1992) is characterised by the discussion of humanitarian 
issues and the start of the military issues. 179 A severe drought has tremendous impact on the 
humanitarian situation not only in Mozambique, but also in neighbouring countries. 
Consequently, the parties find no support for continuation of the war, and rather encounter 
international and regional pressure to negotiate an end. The "observer governments", France, 
Portugal, the UK, and the US, enter the stage together with the United Nations (UN). It is 
under these circumstances that Dhlakama and Chissano meet for the first time, ratify the 
progress, and set a final date as a target for finalising the peace accord. They agree that UN 
would playa role in the peace assistance. 
In the final phase (August-October 1992), an agreement on military issues is made. Among 
the central issues are the demobilisation on both sides, the creation of a new national armed 
force, and reform in the police and in the security service. The GPA is signed in Rome on 4 
October 1992. However, the document is flawed, much remaining to be spelled out in 
practice. 180 Moreover, the conflict has only found a solution on the paper, and the GPA needs 
to be materialised. To do so, the parties agree that the UN would supervise its 
implementation. They share the fare that without help from a third party, the comprehensive 
peace process might be set back and violence would resume. 
The conclusion is a comprehensive negotiated settlement consisting of six areas: the law of 
political parties, the electoral system, military issues, guarantees, a cease-fire, and a donor 
conference. 
4.3.2 Rwanda: the Arusha Peace Agreement 
The internal dimension of the conflict in Rwanda changes and makes negotiations possible. 
First, the newly included parties in Habyarimana's government are at some point closer to the 
RPF than its coalition partner. Sections within the multi-party government, despite that CDR 
opposes, because it sees it as a betrayal of the Hutu cause, are willing to talk and make 
negotiations possible between the Rwandan government and RPF. Second, the two waves of 
RPF military invention, the first conventional warfare and the second guerrilla tactics, has 
proven RPF a threatening force and subsequently gives it increased bargaining power vis-a-
179 See "Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance" 
<http://www.incore.ulst.ac . uk/services/cds/agreements/pdflmoz3 .pdf> ( 18.05.2004). 
1'0 For details of the text see "General Peace Agreement for Mozambique", 











vis the Kigali government. It enabled the RPF to shift from rebels to a legitimate participant 
in the domestic political process.
181 
RPF has an ascendancy over the nationalist Hutu 
government. Further military raids would raise international scepticism, and a political 
solution through negotiations could enhance RPF's cause. 
Moreover, the Kigali government is challenged in economical terms. The war had disrupted 
the agricultural situation as well as the import corridor to Mombasa leading to a food crisis. 
The military expenditure had risen from 15% in 1990 of the GNP to 70% three years later. 
From June 1992, Tanzanian officials facilitate the peacemaking process between RPF and the 
Kigali government under international auspices. 182 There had been different stages, a pre-
negotiation phase, in the peacemaking process leading up to the formal talks. In February 
1991, Habyarimana offered amnesty and cease-fire as he joined talks with Museveni under 
the leadership of the Tanzanian government. In June, the OAU holds a mini-summit that 
opens for the first official talks between the Rwandan government and RPF. 183 However, 
neither of the sides demonstrates willingness to reach a settlement as they both are confident 
that they could gain an upper hand military. Then in March 1992 Habyarimana gives his 
words for political liberalisation after international pressure. RPF enables to attain a position 
as a legitimate participant in the domestic political process. In essence, this leads to 
preparatory talks three months later, and the stage was set for official negotiations in July 
1992. 184 
181 The ethnic arithmetic figures had not been in favour of RPF, and the movement had consequently to 
reaftirm itself as a national movement. Gradually it established its national credentials through internal discipline 
and good governance in the areas of its control. The international community, the OAU and the US, 
acknowledged this officially. (Clapham, "Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking": 201-2.) 
112 The Organisation of African Unity, the UN, Belgium, France, Germany, Nigeria, and the US 
participated. 
IHl For an overview of the role that the OAU plays in the peacemaking process see Amare Tekle, "The 
OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution", in The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from 
Uganda to Zaire, eds. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 
2000), 111-29. 











The Arusha Peace Agreement is negotiated through six phases: (i) cease fire; (ii) rule of law; 
(iii) power-sharing; (iv) granting of power to the transitional institutions; (v) composition of 
the transitional institutions; and (vi) refugees and security. ISS 
[n the first phase (12-14 July 1992), the parties agree to call for a cease fire. The parties also 
agree to set up a joint political military commission (JPMC). The JPMC would be composed 
of five representatives from the Rwandese government and five representatives from RPF. 
The commission would be tasked to ensure the implementation of the cease fire and the peace 
agreement including the conclusion of the negotiations. The opposition politicians dominate 
the government negotiation delegation. 
The next phase (August 1992) evolves naturally from the first. The rule of law is on the 
agenda. The agreement states that no one should be above the rule of law, it advocates the 
separation of powers, condemns ethnic discrimination and states that the return of Rwanda's 
refugees was their "inalienable right". RPF challenges Habyarimana's position as president, 
but finally agrees that he would be the transitional president. 
The parties can easily conclude on this matter as they leave out the issues of controversy such 
as the composition of the transitional government. 
The third phase (7-8 September 1992) sees the parties discussing power-sharing, unification, 
and political cooperation without any conclusion. One of the main reasons to the failure is that 
Habyarimana's men negotiated without a mandate. 
In the fourth phase (6-12 October 1992), the parties determine that a Broad Based 
Transitional Government (BBTG) would function as a transitional government for 22 months. 
The end of the transitional phase would be marked by elections to determine the new 
government. The parties settle that the power of the president would diminish in favour of 
having a strong parliament. The Transitional National Assembly (TNA) would be granted 
substantial power, e.g. elect the heads of the Supreme Court. However, the Protocol does not 
resolve the issue of the distribution over seats in the transitional institutions. 
In the fifth phase (25 November 1992 - 10 January 1993), the parties reach an agreement over 
the precise composition in the BBTG and the TNA. The MRND secures for itself the crucial 
IRS The following is taken from Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process': 131-53; Clapham, "Rwanda: The 











positions of the president and minister of defence, but fails in its bid to have the CDR 
included in government. 186 Nonetheless, when the Protocol is signed the Habyarimana's 
regime is marginalised, and the conclusion is victorious for the RPF. 
The final round (23 February 4 August 1993) deals with two sets of issues: refugees and 
security. The first is settled quickly. The security question proves more difficult as it involves 
the composition of a neutral military force, integration of the armed forces, and the 
composition of the army command structure. Herein, the two latter components raise most 
concern as they would determine the new military dispensation. After many rounds, the 
parties agree that the command level is to be split 50-50, and the forces are to be drawn 60-40 
in favour of the government. The government delegation brings the putative agreement to 
Habyarimana who rejects its content. It took heavy influence by the Tanzanian, French, and 
American teams to convince the two sides of the agreement. 
The Arusha Accords are now completed and are signed on 4 August 1993. This is a 
comprehensive agreement in which the following issues are agreed upon: the establishment of 
the rule of law and a culture of human rights, power-sharing in all public institutions, the 
transitional arrangements that would lead to elections, repatriation of refugees, the 
resettlement of internally displaced persons, and the integration of the armies. 187 
4.3.3 Summing Up 
Both the Mozambican and the Rwandan conflict changed in nature by the time the parties 
were willing to negotiate that made peacemaking possible. In Mozambique, changes at the 
regional and international level dried up the external support together with economic 
exhaustion and military stalemate paved the way for negotiations. Internal changes in 
Rwanda, combined with international pressure, led to the Arusha peace talks. The two 
conflicts are at a different stage when peacemaking starts. Whilst the Mozambican parties 
face a hurting stalemate, it is not a stalemate in Rwanda. The balance of power is as such that 
RPF has an upper hand in conflict, and could possibly have overthrown the nationalist Hutu 
led Kigali government. Nonetheless, the outcome of the two negotiations processes is two 
186 Both France and Tanzania support the idea of including the CDR in the BBTG. They argue that it 
would be easier to control the extremist voices within the government compared 10 having them outside. 
1P For details of the text see The Arusha Accords: Peace Agreemellf between the Go\,emment of the 
Republic of Rh'anda and the RWCllldese Patriotic Front (A vailable online I 











comprehensive settlements. Now the agreements need to be materialised. The UN would play 
a central role in this process. 
4.4 Initiatives towards UN Involvement: Two Multifunctional Peace Operations 
The outcomes of the peacemaking processes are two comprehensive settlements. These 
agreements need to be put into practice. Parties on both sides in each conflict agree that the 
UN would playa central role in this process. This section aims to answer the question of what 
led to the UN involvement in the conflicts, and examines the two multifunctional peace 
operations' mandates as authorised by the Security CounciL Herein, the purpose is to examine 
how the UN analyses the two conflicts and the resolution of them. Moreover, define the 
qualitative nature of the two mandates, and build an understanding of the two interventions 
that serves as a backdrop for the following chapters. 
4.4.1 Mozambique: ONUMOZ 
The UN involvement in Mozambique grows directly out of the peace agreement. Frelimo and 
Renamo sign a document on Fundamental Principles on 18 October 1991, which calls for the 
UN to supervise the implementation of the peace agreement. The UN had been an official 
observer throughout the negotiations. The GPA comes into effect on 15 October 1992 when 
the Mozambican National Assembly ratifies it.
188 
Two months later. on 16 December 1992, 
the Security Council authorises the deployment of ONUMOZ by its resolution 782 after being 
recommended by the Secretary-General.
189 
The Security Council, in accordance with the 
GPA, mandates ONUMOZ with four distinct, but interdependent objectives, i.e. military, 
political, electoral, and humanitarian. Thus, by recalling the balance of power, the UN 
deploys a peace operation to implement a settlement agreed to by two parties in a hurting 
stalemate. 
The UN intervenes to end fourteen years of civil war in Mozambique by establishing 
ONUMOZ. The purpose of the operation is to assist in the implementation of the GPA by 
monitoring and verifying the process, and establish the necessary conditions for the holding of 
elections. The mandate includes four different elements. First, the military contingent of 6,625 
1,8 Reed, "The Politics of Reconciliation: the UN in Mozambique", 281. 
189 United Nations, Report of tlie Secretary-General OIl the Uniled Nalions Operation ill 114owm/Jique. 
Security Council Document S124892, 3 December 1992: paragraph 3: United :-<ations. "Resolution 792 (1992), 











personnel would monitor and verify the cease-fire, cantonment and demobilisation, the 
withdrawal of foreign troops, as well as integration of the armed forces. Second. the political 
division would be responsible of the political guidance of the peace process, and chair in the 
political commission. Next. the electoral division with 148 international electoral officers 
(2,300 electoral observers during the election) would monitor and supervise the voter 
registration as well as observe the elections for the presidency and the parliament. Four, a 
small number of international staff would coordinate the humanitarian component that would 
serve as an instrument for reconciliation, and assist the return of displaced people. Although 
the Security Council does not give a mandate for a police force, the ONUMOZ consisted of 
1,144 civilian police to observe the performance of the police in Mozambique. 190 It is a 
comprehensive mandate with various sub-goals that taken together would serve to end the 
Mozambican conflict. It is clear that the UN commit itself to fulfil tasks that go beyond 
classical peace operation. 
4.4.2 Rwanda: UNAMIR 
Habyarimana and the chairperson of RPF signed the comprehensive peace accord 4th of 
August 1993 in Arusha. Two months earlier, the Kigali government and the RPF had asked 
the UN to deploy a peace operation by the time that the negotiations had ended. This was 
included in the Accord.
191 
Before the signing, the UN had sent a 'goodwill mission' to the 
region and adopted a resolution calling for comprehensive negotiations. 192 Following the 
signing of the agreement, the Security Council approves the establishment of UNAMIR. It 
would be a two-year operation planned in four phases. 193 The UNAMIR operation is tasked to 
implement an agreement between two parties that share an imbalance of power. The RPF is 
the strongest part. 
~-----~~~~-------
190 United Nations, "United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)", in The Blue Helmets: a 
Review of United Nations Peace~keeping (New York: United Nations Publication. 1996), 323-5. 
191 United Nations, Special Report (~r the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance for 
Rwanda, Security Council Document 5/25951, 
192 United Nations, "Resolution 812 (1993)", Security Council Document 812, 12 March 1993. 
19.1 The end of phase one would be marked by the instalment of the transitional government; phase two 
would involve the demobilisation of armed forces and the integration of a new national army: phase three would 
include the establishment of a new demilitarised zone and the integration of police force; the final phase would 
cover supervision of the final stages leading to the elections. See United Nations. Special Report of the 












Hence, the UN intervenes to end three years of fighting, and thirty years of institutionalised 
discrimination with the deployment of the U:.fAMIR operation. The purpose of the operation 
is to assist in implementing the Arusha Accord. The prime objective is to create a secure 
environment for the installation and subsequent operation of the transitional institutions in the 
transitional phase, which would end by the holding of elections after 22-months. Its tasks are 
manifold, but fall in under the following interdependent components: military, civilian, 
police, and humanitarian. First, the military division consisting of 2,548 military personnel 
would monitor and verify the cease-fire, supervise an integration of the two armies, and 
monitor the security situation in Kigali until national elections. Second, the civilian 
component would supervise elections for presidency and pi.'Jliament. Third, the 60 civilian 
police observers would monitor ,(lnd verify the performance of the Rwandan police force.
194 
Finally, the operation would assist in coordination of humanitarian assistance activities. 
Although many UN officials perceive that UNAMIR would be a "success story", the mandate 
is limited by political and economical considerations and explains the low number of UN 
personnel. 
4.4.3 Summing Up 
The origins of the UN involvement in the two conflicts are relative similar. The UN is not 
directly involved at the stage of peacemaking. Rather, the UN becomes drawn in at the stage 
of peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building. Moreover, the UN shows its interest to 
solve the conflicts by sending a reconnaissance mission to each country; the parties invite the 
UN to supervise the implementation of the settlements; and, the Security Council authorises 
multifunctional peace operations, i.e. ONUMOZ and UNAMIR. Herein, remember the 
differences in the balance of power between the parties in each conflict. When ONUMOZ 
arrives, it does so to s'Jlve a conflict that has reached a hurting stalemate. UNAMIR, on the 
other hand, is deployed to end a conflict in which one of the parties has a stronger hold. 
Whilst the UN succeeds to read the conflict in Mozambique, the organisation proves illiterate 
with respect to the Rwandan conflict. 
Furthermore, it is apparent from the above presentation that ONUMOZ's and UNAl\1IR's 
mandate are both comprehensive and design multifunctional peace operations. The mandates 
194 United Nations, "United Nations Observer Mission Uganda Rv.'anda (UNOMOR); United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)", in The Blue Helmets,' a Review of United Nari()JlS Peace·keeping 











speak of distinct, but interlocking, sets of objectives. However, the nature of this scope varies 
between ONUMOZ and UNAMIR. In general, when it comes to the number of UN personnel 
deployed it is larger for ONUMOZ than for UNAMIR. There are more human resources 
within the ONUMOZ operation to ensure the implementation of the mandate. A comparison 
of the mandates follows. First, the military components share similarities in that they would 
execute comparable tasks, but that the nature of involvement is deeper for ONUMOZ than for 
UNAMIR. Second, whilst ONUMOZ does have a clear political role, it is not explicitly 
defined in UNAMIR's mandate. ONUMOZ political leadership would lead the political 
commission for guidance of the peace process. The parties themselves in Rwanda would care 
for this function only to be accompanied with support from the Secretary-General's good 
offices. UNAMIR's role would be to provide a stabilising presence that would facilitate 
implementation of the Arusha Accord, whilst ONUMOZ would conduct some of the 
implementation. Third, the electoral components share similatities. Both are designed to assist 
in the electoral process marking the end of the implementation phase, and the end of the 
transition from war to peace. Fourth, whilst ONUMOZ's mandate does not provide for a 
police component, UNAMIR does. However, ONUMOZ would include this later that also is 
substantially bigger than UNAMlR's component. Finally, both peace operations are designed 
with a humanitarian component that would coordinate humanitatian assistance. In short, 
comparing the degree of involvement, the UN participation in Mozambique is heavier than in 
Rwanda. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Aimed at providing an overview of the conflict specific situations in Mozambique and 
Rwanda, four different questions regarding the causes, the nature, the resolution of the 
conflicts and the UN intervention were considered in this chapter. The following recalls the 
outline of the nature of the essential differences. 
First, the causes of the Mozambican conflict start with the flawed decolonisation process, then 
to be stimulated by the intervention by the adjacent white minority regimes, and later by 
policy mistakes on behalf of Frelimo. In contrast, in Rwanda the incomplete social-
revolutionary process immediately after independence leads to the second social-
revolutionary process that is the intra-state war in the 1990s. Whilst Renamo as a terror 
movement wants to destabilise the Frelimo regime, RPF as a liberation movement aims to 
depose the Hutu led nationalist government in Kigali. In short, there is a difference in what 










Second, the differences in the causes of the conflicts have implications for the conflict 
dynamics, At the domestic level, there is perceived incompatible goals both between Frelimo 
and Renamo, and between the Habyarimana regime and RPF. The regional dimension of the 
Mozambican conflict is more transparent than the Rwandan conflict. Pretoria determines 
Renamo's agenda more than Kampala does for RPF. Instead, NRM inspires RPF to take 
similar actions. Museveni's approach demonstrates a good recipe to gain political control. 
Neither of the conflicts attracts the superpowers of the Cold War, but they are more involved 
in Mozambique than in Rwanda. France plays a role at the international level in the latter. 
Third, changes in the conflict specific situation pave the way for the peacemaking processes. 
However, there is a crucial difference in the balance of power in the two cases. Whilst the 
Mozambican parties reach a hurting stalemate, this is not the case in Rwanda. RPF gains 
superiority that could have forced the Habyarmina regime to step down. The outcome of the 
peacemaking processes is nevertheless two comprehensive negotiated settlements aimed to 
prescribe new political dispensations. 
Finaliy, the process of involving the UN share similarities both compared to each other, but 
also to the typical way of resolving conflicts after the Cold War, i.e. to ask the UN to monitor, 
verify, or supervise the implementation of the settlements. The Security Council tben 
authorises multifunctional peace operations, as distinct from other peace operations, to 
accomplish the separate, but interconnected, tasks. Thus, the UN deploys two peace 
operations of relative similar scope to solve conflicts that differ in nature. 
This outline of the conflicts in the two cases functions as a backdrop for the further 











Assessing Conflict Transformation in 
Mozambique and Rwanda 
65 
This chapter assesses the UN interventions to secure a self-sustaining peace in Mozambique 
and Rwanda and then place the conflicts on a peaceful footing. The effectiveness is analysed 
by the ability of the multifunctional peace operations to accomplish their sub-goals. The 
chapter considers four sub-goals that prove importance for a successful conclusion of the 
peace processes: political leadership of the peace pro;;ess, demilitarisation, reform of the 
security sector, and post-conflict elections. 
The chapter considers the sub-goals in separate sections. Each section follows the same 
outline that compares ONUMOZ and UNAMIR in two parts: 0) the sub-goal as conceived in 
the peace agreements and as mandated by the Security Council; and (ii) the record of 
implementation. The sub-goals are considered in the following order: the political component, 
the military component, the police component, and the electoral component. Each section 
starts with a discussion that seeks to explain why the particular sub-goal has a relevancy for 
Conflict Transformation. 
5.1 The Political Guidance of the Peace Operations 
This section emphasises the political component of the two multifunctional peace operations 
to facilitate Conflict Transformation. Central to this is to assess whether ONUMOZ and 
UNAMIR proves effective to take the leadership of the peace processes in the two countries. 
This must be seen in relation to the mandate given from the peace agreements and the 
authorisation from the Security Council. The section compares the role of a political 












The political component of a multifunctional peace operation seeks to lead the political 
process from violent conflict to a self-sustaining peace. The component governs how the 
peace operation is exercised, and functions as catalyst for change and the guarantor for peace. 
Herein, the political component can take a strong lead and establish a channel in which 
tensions can be addressed and obstacles overcome. To guide the peace process successfully, 
political guidan:::e needs to entail three components. First, the leadership of the component 
needs to be composed of people who are committed to Conflict Transformation. Second, to 
secure political guidance the political component must be designed a mandate that prescribes 
them with good working conditions and the right goals. Third, it needs to include the right 
institutional framework. The aim is to reconcile differences and find solutions to urgent 
problems on the path to positive peace. Thus, political guidance has a relevancy for Conflict 
Transformation. 
5.1.1 Political Guidance in the Peace Agreements and the Mandates: Political 
Commission and Transitional Arrangement 
The following sub-section considers the political component in the peace agreements and the 
mandates. 
5.1.1.1 Mozambique: Political Commission 
In Mozambique, Protocol V of the GPA considers detailed guarantees for the transitional 
period between the cease-fires and the holding of the elections. In this phase, the Supervisory 
and Monitoring Commission (CSC) is assigned the important role to oversee the entire peace 
process. The CSC would be empowered to replace the government in any matters related to 
the implementation of the Rome agreement. Representatives of the Mozambican parties, the 
UN, the OAU, and countries to be agreed upon would compose the Commission. The UN 
would chair the CSc.195 The following six subsidiary commissions would assist the CSC in 
specific aspects of the GPA: 
195 "Protocol I Basic Principles", in The General Peace Agreement for Alo:(lmiJiquf [Available Online J 










Table 5. },}.1: The Six Subsidiary Commissions to Assist the CSC196 
Commission Task 
The Cease-Fire Commission (CFe) Plan, verify. and monitor the cessation of the armed 
conflict, including the demobilisation process. 
The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Supervise the establishment of FADM, 
Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM) 
The Reintegration Commission (CORE) Monitor, verify, and conduct the economic and 
social reintegration of demobilised soldiers. 
The National Election Commission (CNE) Conduct the electoral process. 
The National Police Affairs Commission (COM POL) Monitor and verify the performance of the police. 
IThl Commission for State Affairs (CNA) Conduct the relation3hip between areas held by the 
government and Renamo. 
The public administration in Mozambique would seek to ensure the maintenance of peace and 
the creation of the necessary climate for the holding of free and fair elections. The GPA 
denies a power-sharing arrangement. Instead, Frelimo and Renamo would separately govern 
the territories they claimed at the signing of the peace agreement. Both parties would respect 
the other's governance without interference. 197 The CSC would function as a bridge between 
the two administrations. The Commission would seek to settle disputes between the 
Mozambican parties. It would also seek to reconcile any differences in the interpretation of 
the GPA. Finally, the CSC has a coordinating role for the subsidiary commissions to be 
established to deal with the demilitarisation of the conflict. 198 
ONUMOZ's mandate is clearly influenced by the GPA. The mandate says that the Special 
Representative would be responsible for the political guidance of the peace process. The 
chairmanship of the CSC would be a central part of this role. The key responsibility is to 
create an environment in which the election process and its outcome would be accredited 
international fairness. The Commission would seek to settle any disputes that would be 
brought to the surface, and urge compliance upon the parties. However, an important notice is 
that the SRSG is not authorised to compel the parties to implement the GPA completely. 199 
196 "Protocol V Guarantees" in The General Peace Agreement for Mozambique [Available Onlinel 
.http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uklcds/agreements/pdf/moz4.pdf.118 ,05.20041. 
197 The GPA tasks the parties to reintegrate the areas under a single administration. See ibid. 
19~ "Protocol V Guarantees". 
199 United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on O:'-lUJ\10Z". Security Council Document 











5.1.1.2 Rwanda: Transitional Institutions 
The protocol on power sharing defines the transitional arrangement in Rwanda. A Multi-Party 
Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) and a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) 
would govern Rwanda during its 22 month-long transition. These institutions would come 
into life thirty-seven days after the signing of the agreement. Until then, Habyarimana's 
government would retain power. The 1991 constitution and the Arusha Peace Agreement 
would form "indissolubly" the Fundamental Law, and in cases of conflict, the latter would be 
superior.200 The rationale for the BBTG is similar to that of the CSc. The BBTG is the media 
in which to address problems arising during the implementation. 
The Security Council mandates UNAMIR to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali 
from deployment until the holding of elections. The Arusha Accord makes no provisions for a 
political cornmh;sion. The BBTG would care for this function. Thus, it is left for the parties 
themselves to create an environment that could lead to elections. UNAMIR does not have a 
clear political role. Nonetheless, a SRSG would be assigned the political leadership of 
UNAM[R. 201 
5.2.1.3 Summing Up 
The above section has been aimed to compare the provisions for a political component in the 
two peace agreements and the mandates. The exercise finds that the two peace agreements in 
Mozambique and Rwanda portray different transitional arrangements, and define different 
roles for the UN peace operations as the guarantor for peace and Conflict Transformation. The 
fundamental difference between the two cases is found in the nature of the role the UN would 
play with respect to the transitional authority. In Mozambique, both the agreement and the 
mandate make provisions for a political commission, an administrative authority, to supervise 
the implementation. In Rwanda, neither the Arusha Agreement nor the mandate provides 
UNAMIR's political component to take a lead in a political commission. Instead, the role of 
UNAMIR would be to monitor the implementation of the Arusha Accords. Whilst the 
2Ut! "Protocol on Power-Sharing within the framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government 
between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front", The Arusha Agreement 
[Available Online J <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk!cds/agreements/pdf/rwan Lpdf, [ 18.05.20041. 
201 United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda. requesting establishment of a United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the integration of UNOMOR into UNAMIR". Security 











belligerents in Mozambique agree to control separate areas, the Rwandan parties would 
govern together in the BBTG. Finally, the already existing Jaw would prevail in Mozambique, 
whereas the peace agreement together with the 1991 constitution would be the law to obey to 
in Rwanda. 
5.1.2 Implementing the Political Components 
The following section aims to examine ONUMOZ's and UNAMIR's record of 
implementation with respect to the political components. 
5.1.2.1 Mozambique: Surmounting the Differences 
The political component of ONUMOZ provides leadership to the implementation of the GP A. 
The political component does so in two ways: first, through active mediation and diplomacy; 
and second, through the chairs of the commissions set up under the GPA structure. After the 
lengthy war, the overarching aim confronting ONUMOZ is a political issue. The political 
component of ONUMOZ has to foster a new spirit of trust between Frelimo and Renamo. 
Only under these circumstances can the peace accord be materialised. The section below 
examines the two interlinked leadership mechanisms. 
The Secretary-General expedites Aldo Ajello as his Special Representative in Mozambique. 
He arrives in Mozambique mid October 1992 with military observers and works to set up the 
apparatus for the forthcoming implementation. However, it would take six months after the 
resolution mandating the operation before the force comes up to its full strength. There are a 
number of reasons for this. The UN member states express concerns about the costs. 
Moreover, with the deployments in Cambodia, Somalia, and Former Yugoslavia, the UN has 
already deployed a number of operations around the globe. Most worryingly, UNA VEM 1I 
remains in place in Angola after the collapse of the peace process there. The project in Angola 
is very similar to that now proposed for Mozambique.202 The financial concern becomes a 
recurring issue in the Security Council only to be solved well into 1993. 
The SRSG and his team encounter several tests that have forced the UN elsewhere to 
withdraw. However, in Mozambique Ajello plays a leading role executing his political skills 
to contrive the indifferences through flurry diplomatic activity and mediation. The first test 
comes at the outset. Renamo refuses to relocate its headquarter from Gorongosa (central 











Mozambique) to Maputo. In his right, Dhlakama argues that he neither has the resources nor 
the guaranteed safety to do so. He approaches the government to provide logistical support, 
but Frelimo claims the lack of the sufficient means. These setbacks make it impossible to set 
up the monitoring and verification machinery that the GPA prescribes. Ajello reconciles the 
differences when he facilitates a meeting between the parties. It proves decisive and 
eventuates in the first assembly for the esc taking place in the beginning of November 
1992.203 
A timely intervention by Ajello is also instrumental to resolve two cease fire violations. The 
first comes in June 1993 when Renamo detains 27 people alleged of poaching in its controlled 
area. Frelimo owns responsibility for the second when the government claims four villages 
considered rightfully under its contro1.204 In this, the SRSG takes advantage of the CFC and 
solves the problems. 
A third test comes when the Security Council considers the report on progress of the 
implementation after six months. ONUMOZ informs the Security Council that the timetable 
is unrealistic and needs to be reviewed.2os The Secretary-General arrives in Maputo and states 
that unless the impasse is broken withdrawal of ONUMOZ would follow.206 The parties 
express commitment and settle outstanding issues.207 Then, the Security Council authorises a 
renewal of the mandate first for six months and then in May 1994 until November the same 
year.208 
20} Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Mozambique. /992-/995,24. 
204 United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-GeneraL on ONUMOZ", Security Council Document 
S126385, 30 August 1993: paragraph 10; Joseph Hanlon, Rachel Waterhouse, and Gil Lauriciano, "Few Cease-
Fire Violations", in Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin Issue 4 (June 1993): 4. 
205 United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General in ONUMOZ", Security Council Document 
S/26034, 30 June 1993: paragraphs 21-3. 
2% United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ". Securit)' Council Document 
S/26666, I November 1993: paragraphs 45-51. 
207 The assembly and demobilisation of both parties' troops; disarmament of miLitias; the composition of 
the NEC: the system and timetable for the new eLectoral law; and new arrangements are devised for the 
leadership of the Commission of Administration and the National Police Affairs and Information. 
2"; United Nations, "Resolution 882 (1993)". Security Coullcil Ducument SIRESI882, 5 November 1993; 











Herein, the manoeuvres Ajello takes in relation to Dhlakama are essential. Ajello, according 
to himself, succeeds to convince Dhlakama of three important things: that (i) Renamo stands a 
better chance as a political party; (ii) the international community is willing to assist 
Renamo's transformation if clear commitment to the peace and the elections are held; and (iii) 
that the presence of UN is a guarantor for free and fair elections.209 Thus, Ajello succeeds to 
ensure Dhlakama's commitment to the peace process by applying carrots and sticks. 
In addition, the political component carries its leadership through the various commissions. 
Moreover, the close affiliation between the SRSG and the international community, the 
member states of the esc in particular, represents another cornerstone to stir the peace 
process. Frelimo and Renamo delegations along with representatives from Italy, Britain, 
Portugal, the US and the OAU make up the Commission. The ese enjoys the overall 
responsibility for the implementation of the GPA. It is the vehicle to di"ive the peace process 
forward. Later, Ajello argues that the composition of the esc makes it possible to coordinate 
the process and act in real time to avoid exploration of differences.210 Moreover, as Boutros-
Ghali argues: 
As provided in the General Peace Agreement, the Supervisory and Monitoring 
Commission (CSC) became the key mechanism for sustaining both the momentum 
and the involvement of the international community. The United Nations 
chairmanship of the CSC and the other commissions charged with implementing the 
accords greatly facilitated rapid, objective problem-solving. Whenever difficulties 
were encountered, the CSC was able to convene negotiations that succeeded in 
persuading the parties to adhere to their commitments. This form of collective 
oversight, involving the two parties, the United Nations, the Organisation of African 
Unity and ambassadors of Mozambique's donor countries allowed for t1exible 
management and for adjustments to the time-table when such recourse became 
unavoidable.2Il 
However, observers are critical to the role of the countries represented in the CSC. These 
comments come from different angels. Saul conceptualises the process as an 
"institutionalising of the Westernisation". 212 He is critical to the gradual expanding role that 
209 Aldo Aje\lo. "Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement", in Herding Cats: 
Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World. eds, Chester A Crocker. Fen Osler Hampson. and Pamela Aall 
(Washington D,C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 625-8, 
2lU Moises Venancio, "Can Peace-Keeping be Said to have Worked in Mozambique? (Bye Bye 
ONUMOZ)". in War and Peace in Mowmbique, eds, Stephen Chan and :Vloises Venancio (New York: SI. 
Martin's Press. 1998),99-100, 
211 Boutros-Ghali. The United Nations and Mu"amiJiqlll!, 1992-95, 67, 










the Western powers take during the negotiations, and the more intense pOSltlOn in the 
implementation process.213 As an extension of this critique, Hanlon concludes that ONUMOZ 
accomplishes the Post-Cold War goals of the US rather than the more balanced directives 
from the UN. 214 They are both negative to the strong lead that the West take. 
On the other hand, it is worthwhile to refer to Ajello. He admits that he decided only to act 
after regular consultation with the ambassadors of the major powers and to act on their 
authority rather than that of the headquarters in New York.215 Moreover, the then US 
ambassador to Mozambique Dennis Jett supports Ajello. The Ambassador states that the 
western authorities "dogged the process daily, participating in virtually every decision made 
rffi . 1Mb' .." 216 a ectmg t le ozam Ican tranSitIOn . 
Thus, there are reasons to be sceptical of the role that the Western countries play although the 
Secretary-General defines their role to be crucial for a peaceful conclusion of the 
Mozambican conflict.217 The "Core Group" of ambassadors plays an important role as a 
source of strategic coordination among bilateral actors and means by which SRSG can bolster 
h . 218 aut onty. 
Despite these institutional arrangements and the susceptibility of both parties to international 
pressure, the peace process starts to lose impetus in March 1993. Again, Renamo alleges 
logistical and financial complaints. Consequently, Dhlakama withdraws his organisation from 
Maputo and paralyses the work of the commissions. At the same time, the process of 
213 [bid. 
21~ Joseph Hanlon, African Agenda Vol. 1 No.5 (I995): 15-6. 
m Aldo Ajello, "Introductory Statement", in International Workshop on the Successful Conclusion of 
the Ullited Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), ed. Winrich KUhne. Organised by the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation (New York Office) and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Ebenhausen (Germany) New 
York (March 271995): 12. 
216 Dennis Jett, "Lessons Unlearned - Or Why Mozambique's Successful Peacekeeping Operation Might 
Not Be Replicated Elsewhere", Journal of Humanitarian AS.lis/allce (1995)<hnp:l/www.jha.ac/Ref/aar008.hlm> 
(20.ApriI2004). 
217 For an emphasised argument, in general terms, on this point see Roland Paris, "Intemational 
peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice''', Review ofJnternaliona/ Studies, Vol. 28 No.4 (2002): 637-56. 
~I' Bruce D. Jones, "The Challenges of Strategic Coordination", in Ending Civil Wars: The 
Implementation of Civil Wars, cds, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rotchild, and Elizabeth ;';1, Cousens (Boulder 











demilitarisation stalls as well as discussions on the electoral law (see below sections).219 
Renamo insists that without financial assistance there can be no democracy?20 Ajello 
understands the game and identifies the currency needed for the process to get on track again; 
pressure from the UN and the international community together with the availability of US$ 
17,5 million is the solution for Renamo to retake office in Maputo. Aware of this situation, 
Ajello argues that the international community has to pay the prize despite its 'political 
incorrectness' ,221 Furthermore, the international community acknowledges that Renamo as a 
viable political force in the peace process is needed for a successful conclusion?22 The Trust 
Fund would help Renamo to transform into a political party as much as the the Renamo 
officials could sustain themselves in a civilian life, Assistance is also provided to socialise 
Renamo into a democratic tradition, and to make its legitimacy contingent upon 
accomplishing its commitment to peace,223 In short, ONUMOZ's political leadership manages 
to address the spoiler problem effectively, 
In this, the UN and a few committed individuals representing the international community 
demonstrate clear sensitivity to the political reality in the Mozambican peace process in two 
different ways. First, the Trust Fund provides substantial financial support for Renamo to 
translate from an insurgency to that of a political party, The Fund provides Renamo to 
exercise an electoral campaign, as well as it makes Dhlakama capable to reward and assist 
Renamo's leadership in adjusting to a new civilian costume, Second, the Security Council 
authorises an extension of the mandate that proves its sensitivity to the context. However, 
certain conditions have to be met, most importantly a commitment by the parties to continue, 
In short, by ensuring the political guidance through diplomacy and mediation together with 
chairing the CSC the political component of ONUMOZ proves effective. 
2IY Boutros-Ghali, The UniTed Nations and Mozambique, 1992,1995,28-9. 
ll() Vines, Rellamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in lvlozambique?, 146. 
221 "Mozambique: Funding for Peace", Africa COl1jidel1liai VoL 34 No. 10 (!\1ay 14, \993): 4. 
222 Came Manning, "Constructing Opposition in tvlozambique: Renamo as Political Party", Journal of 
Sowhem African Studies Vol. 24 No. I (March 1998): 161-90. 











5.1.2.2 Rwanda: the Politics of Genocide 
The situation in Rwanda is different. UNAMIR struggles to take the intluentiallead. With the 
absence of a political commission such as the CSC, the Special Representative, Booh-Booh, is 
contingent on mediation and diplomacy only to stir the peace process. UNAMIR is not 
provided to play the central role with respect to a transitional authority. This is despite that the 
Arusha Accords plea for a strong third party to function as a guarantor for the 
implementation. Instead, much is left for the Rwandan parties themselves to secure a peaceful 
outcome. It represents a challenge. The belligerents previously fighting each other are now 
supposed to reconcile. The spoilers in Rwanda are not susceptible to financial resources. 
Instead, they pursue an extremist almost ideological agenda of ethnic cleansing that must be 
seen in relation to the zero-sum nature of conflict. In short, it represents a formidable 
challenge to defeat. 
In Rwanda, the parties use the time of the UN deployment to obstruct the process by 
subjecting evei"Y issue for discussion. Thus, either UNAMIR or forces within the Rwandan 
political system manage to accomplish the mandate given from the Arusha Accord. In 
particular, problems arise concerning the installation of the transitional institutions that 
challenges the existence of the UN presence in Rwanda. To give explanations to the failure of 
UNAMIR it is necessary to examine these challenges. 
When the Security Council endorses the plan of the reconnaissance mission led by General 
Dallaire in October 1993, it is already twenty-one days after the BBTG should have been 
inaugurated. The mandate explicitly assumes cooperation as insurance for further UN 
deployment.224 Boutros-Ghali asks his old friend and Cameroon's former Foreign Minister, 
Jaques-Roger Booh-Booh to serve as his Special Representative in Rwanda. Until his arrival, 
the Force Commander, General Dallaire. functions as the SRSG. As UN member countries 
have been demonstrating reluctance to deploy peace operations, so are they sceptical towards 
UNAMIR. 
The first test occurs even before UNAMIR comes operational in December 1993. 
Assassination of the first democratically elected president in the neighbouring Burundi, the 
Hutu Melchior Ndadaye, in October affects the peace process in Rwanda seriously.225 
224 United Nations, SeCltrity COllllcil Docllmellt S126488: paragraphs 21-30. 
225 Although the Hutus are the majority group in Burundi, as in Rwanda, the Burundian Tutsi Elite rules 











Prospects for power sharing sweep away and fuel the Hutu hardliners to feel threatened by the 
Tutsis.
226 
At the same time, UNAMIR notes that a "well-armed and reportedly ruthless 
group" tries to disrupt the peace process?27 Nonetheless, the SRSG wins assurance from the 
Kigali government and RPF that they will cooperate and install the transitional government 
by the end of December.228 UNAMIR escorts RPF civilian leaders to Kigali that is the first 
move to establish the BBTG.229 The Secretary-General reports of no cease-fire violations, but 
identifies the potential danger after the Burundian crisis. However, he states that a reduction 
of the UNAMIR contingent would have a negative effect. 23o The Security Council supports 
h· 211 IS argument. -
The splints in the opposition parties occur that cause a stalemate in the process of installing 
the BBTG. This is the second test for UNAMIR. According to Jones, the fragmentation is a 
part of a three-pronged strategy processed by extremist forces. First, a process of 
demonisation substantially increases propaganda ag2.inst the Tutsis and the RPF; second, the 
process of mobilisation sees the establishment of an anned opposition to the RPF, especially 
by the interahamwe militia; and third, the polarisation attracts the political centre to take 
refugee in either of the wings.232 Consequently, the emergence of fractions plays havoc with 
the math used in the distribution of seats at Arusha. 233 Habyarimana, on the rejections of RPF, 
demands positions for the CDR in the TNA. Although Habyarimana is sworn in as interim 
sharing and Government of National Unity. However, elements within the Tutsi dominated army want it 
otherwise and launch a military coup. The assassination follows that triggers acts of genocide. Between 50,000 
and 100,000 people are killed. Mainly Hutus are attacked. Moreover, the ensuing instability drives almost 
400,000 Burundians into Rwanda. 
226 Alison Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story": Genocide in Rwanda (New York, Washington, 
London. and Brussels: Human Rights Watch, 1999). 134-40. 
227 United Nations. Security Council Document S126927. 30 December 1993: paragraph 18. 
228 Ibid.: paragraphs 4-6. 
229 Six hundred RPF troops are also transpotted to Kigali to offer protection to their civilian leaders. 
210 United Nations, Security Council Document 5126927: paragraph 30. 
m United Nations. "Resolution 893 (l994)", Security Council Document SIRES/893, 6 January 1994. 
m Bruce D. Jones. "UN Peacekeeping and the Collapse of Arusha: Implementation Efforts" chapter 
five in Peacemaking in RHanJa: The Dynamics of Failure (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 32-41, 
111-3. 
2J1 rOf details of the proposed composition of the BBTG see "Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing 











president 5 January 1994, the peace process stalls as the remaining transitional institutions are 
b · 11 d 234 yet to e Insta e . 
In this, Booh-Booh demonstrates lack of strength. Observers have critically assessed Booh-
Booh's bearing. Central in this critique is the argument that the SRSG downplays the 
magnitude of the information Dallaire provides him with. Consequently, DPKO is fed with 
different information from two sources in the same operation. Moreover, that Booh-Booh is 
biased to the Government and opts for RPF to accept CDR as a member in the BBTG.235 
General Dallaire raises a critical voice as wel1.236 On the other hand, Prunier argues that the 
SRSG does his best to avoid being partial. In his argument, he shows that Booh-Booh takes 
issues with both sides. 237 
Already as a leader of the reconnaissance mission to Rwanda, General Dallaire made 
conclusions that a strong force of some 5,000 men is necessary to address the situation in 
Rwanda, and makes him later claim that this force could have staved off the genocide. 
Nonetheless, General Dallaire as the Force Commander could have addressed the situation 
differently. It is possibly to think of another scenario. The Force Commander could have 
approached the extremist spoilers in Rwanda with deterrence. In some ways, the spoilers need 
to be managed in the same way as they threaten the peace process. However, this is 
problematic for UNAMIR. The credibility of such threats would have been questioned by 
UNAMIR's few and light weighted resources. Moreover, the operation could have 
encountered a situation where it clashed with the spoilers and thus damaged its own interests 
of being neutraL However, Ajello illustrates that being partial sometimes helps the overall 
process. The point to make is that General Dallaire's humanitarian face functions to be too 
soft in the meeting with the spoilers. Moreover, to help this cause, the Security Council could 
have provided him with Chapter VII provisions. 
m Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-96 (New York: United Nations 
Department of Public Information, 1996),31-5. 
".\5 Melvern. A People Betrayed: The Role of the We.)' in Rwanda's Genocide. 93-4; Des Forges. "Leave 
NOlie to Tell the Story": Genocide ill Rwanda. 173. 
,:Ifi See Lieutenant-General Dallaire, Shake Hands With the Del'il: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. 
118-9. 149. 











Moreover, the UNMllR operation, according to Stedman, fails to strategically address the 
spoiler problem. As the political leadership of the UNAtVlIR operation applies the threat of 
withdrawal as primarily strategy it fails to punish the CDR as the total spoiler. When this is 
said, UNAMIR fails to facilitate a unified international approach to manage the spoiler 
problem. Moreover, UNAMIR targets Habyarmina as the main spoiler when CDR 
demonstrates to be the real problem?38 However, management of the CDR as the total spoiler 
might have avoided the tragic outcome in April 1994. In this, military threats might have been 
the only language CDR would have understood. 
UNAMIR encounters, however, not only a spoiler problem. Another set of problems are in 
the provisions as defined in the Arusha Accords. The armed forces are not included in the 
peace agreement. This signifies that parts of the conflict are not resolved, and can thus neither 
be transformed. The peace agreement is naIve. It does not include the powerful people, i.e. the 
'Hutu Power' ?39 
Observers are additionally critical to the international community. General Dallaire, 
bypassing Booh-Booh, attempts to bring attention from New York without any success. 
Infonnation of possibly extennination of Tutsis and stockpiling of arms fell on deaf ears 
although it is passed on from a close confidant to Habyarimana?40 More worrying, Melvern 
argues that the wamings from General Dallaire are not presented to the members of the 
Security Council. The Security Council is not made aware of the situation, and could 
therefore not make decisions in accordance with Dallaire's notification. According to 
Melvem, the Security Council sees Rwanda "not as the smouldering volcano that it really 
was, but rather as a small civil war".241 However, Paris and Washington have gathered 
intelligence information on their own portraying genocidal activities, but keep the knowledge 
to their chests without notifying the non-permanent members of the Councilor UNAMIR.242 
Kupennan denies the possibility that the Clinton administration possesses this kind of 
m Stedman. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes"; 20-6, 
".19 The concept of 'Butu Power' is borrowed from Gourevitch. 
240 Lieutenant.General Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands With the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in 
Rwanda (Toronto: Random House. 2003), 141-51, 














In response, des Forges takes side with Melvern, and argues that US officials 
know of a possibly genocide?44 
Moreover, not only supporting the argument of the American knowledge, Power designates 
the US to own a special responsibility to the failure of boosting UNAMIR's mandate. 
Washington and London oppose to exceed the original mandate. For them, the costs and risks 
of an enlargement are too high. The Clinton Administration is impatient with the Rwanda 
problem. It is accountable to an anti-UN Congress and has to prove to be selective when it 
comes to involvement in peace operations. The deaths of US soldiers in Somalia the year 
before together with the difficult interventions in Haiti and Bosnia dissuade the US 
Administration from taking more responsibility.245 In fact, the death of the 18 Americans in 
Somalia triggers a major US reassessment of the validity of peace operations.246 Then there is 
the incident when Hutu attackers kill the ten Belgium soldiers. With Somalia fresh in 
memory, the Hutu elite analyses that such a massacre would prompt Belgium withdrawa1.247 
Their analysi<; proves correct. Belgian authorities make the decision to pull out, and with that 
goes UNAMIR's third largest contingent.248 Moreover, the incident confirms the US officials' 
as<;1Jmplion that Rwanda is Somalia's "twin sister,,?49 It is clear that the international 
community is not willing to make commitments to secure a peaceful outcome in Rwanda. 
A third test comes when Habyarimana and his allies take advantage of the UN debates 
whether or not to boost UNAMIR's mandate. Thus, as an attempt to win time, Habyarimana 
lH See Alan J. Kuperman. "Rwanda in Retrospect", Foreign Affairs Vol. 79 No.1 (January/February 
2000): 94-118. 
,~. Alison des Forges, "Shame: Rationalizing Western Apathy on Rwanda", Foreign Ajfairs Vol. 79 Nu. 
3 (May/June 2000): 141-2. 
2-1) Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States let the Rwandan Tragedy 
Happen", The Atlantic Monthly (September 2001) <www.theatlantic.com/issues/200If09fpower.htm> 
(30.04.2004 ). 
2~6 Harry Summers, The NeH' World Strategy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 186-9. 
,'7 Samantha Power, "Rwanda: "Mostly in Listening Moue", chapter ten in "A Problem from Hell". 
America and the Age afGenocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 332. 
2~8 Astri Suhrke, "Pacing Genocide: The Record of the Belgian Battalion in Rwanda", Security 
Dialogue Vol. 29 No. 1(1998): 39-43. 
2"9 Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg. "Back 10 the Future: UN Peacekeeping in Africa", 











is late to set up the BBTG only to apply manipulation and postponements.2SO Again, the 
SRSG arranges multiparty negotiations to diminish the differences between the parties in 
February. Using the only leverage availa!:lle, Booh-Booh threatens of withdrawal. MRDN 
obstructs the compromise, and those to come. Instead, outbreak of violence occurs throughout 
Rwanda. RPF and other opposition parties boycott final attempts to install the BTGG in the 
end of the same month,zSI Then, Tanzanian officials enter the stage and broker a new list of 
individuals for government positions. Habyarmina rejects the list and renews the demand to 
include CDR in the TNA. RPF insists that only subscribers to the Arusha process can take up 
seats. Then, when CDR pledges its support to the peace process the opposition parties 
question the honesty,z52 Neither an appeal from the international diplomatic corps manages to 
break the impasse. 
Facing the impeding expiration of the UNAMIR mandate, human rights organisations and 
other NGOs make pleas with the Security Council. Withdrawal would cause more harm than 
good, goes the argument. The Secretary-General recommends the extension of UNAMIR's 
mandate with the, by now, usually bold statement that the Security Council would review the 
situation and the UN role if the transitional institutions are not established?53 Within the 
Security Council, a compromise is reached 5 April and the Council renews the mandate for 
three new months. Habyarimana, in front of his counterparts at a regional summit in Dar es 
Salaam, guarantees his commitment to the peace process. Other forces want it otherwise, 
however, and his plane is shot down as it is to land in Kigali in the morning 7 Apri1. 254 A test 
the UN cannot overcome and virtually proves to be the starting shot for the following 
genocide. 
Two weeks into the genocide, the Secretary-General presents three options for the Security 
Council concerning the future of UNAMIR: (i) boost UNAMIR's mandate with extended 
250 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 208. 
2)1 United Nations, Security Council Document S1I9941360: paragraphs 12-22. 
252 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: HislOry ofa Genocide, 208. 
,5.1 United Nations, "Second progress report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR for the period from 
30 December to 30 March 1994, requesting an extension of its mandate for a period of six months". Security 
COllneil Document S119941360, 30 March 1994: paragraph 47. 
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authority under Chapter VII provision to pressure the parties to a cease-fire; (ii) reduce the 
operation to 270 personnel to act as an intennediary to seek an agreement on a cease-fire; or, 
(iii) complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.255 Then, the Security Council on 21 April adjusts the 
mandate according to the second altemative. 256 With this decision, the message to the 
extremist forces is clear; they could now wage their genocide. 
In short, as Khadiagala correctly notes, the peace process in Rwanda demonstrates that there 
is a gap between the expectations defined in the Accords and the UN's decision-making 
system. First, the peace process is hostage to an unrealistic timetable. Only thirty-seven days 
are set aside for the establishment of the transitional institutions. The second gap represents 
the difference in the nature of resources committed. In generaL with the Amsha Accord the 
parties apply for more resources than the Security Council is willing to set aside. 257 
Consequently, lTNAMIR proves ineffective. 
5.1.2.3 Summing Up 
This section has been tasked to examine the record of implementation concerning the political 
leadership of the peace operations. The records of implementation vary between ONUMOZ 
and UNAMlR. 
In Mozambique, the political component manages to guide the peace process effectively. 
First, the component's leadership is composed of people who are corrullitted to Conflict 
Transfonnation. In this, there are two cmcial factors contributing to effectiveness: (i) Ajello's 
interpretation and manoeuvring skills, and (ii) a few powerful people who care deeply about 
Mozambique and who are able to set Mozambique on the agenda in the right fomms. Second, 
the interim institutions represent the necessary institutional framework in which some of the 
legacies of the civil war can be overcome, and thereby promote Conflict Transfonnation. 
Third, both the GPA and ONUMOZ's mandate give prescriptions for healthy working 
m United Nations, "Special Report of the Secretary-General on UNAM1R, containing a summary of the 
developing crisis in Rwanda and proposing three options for the role of the United Nations in Rwanda"', Security 
COllllcil Documem SI/9941470, 20 April 1994: paragraphs 8-\9, 
256 United Nations, "Resolution 912 (1994)", Security Council Doclllnem SIRESI912, 21 April 1994. 
257 Gilben M. Khadiagal<J., "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda", in f:nding Civil 
Wars: The Implell/entation oj Civil Wars, eds, Stephen John Stedman. Donald Rotchild, and Elizabeth M. 











conditions and the right goals so that the political component is given the authority to place 
the conflict on a peaceful footing. 
In Rwanda, UNAMIR's political component proves ineffective in taking the same influential 
lead and fails to foster a new spirit of trust between the parties. There are many reasons 
explaining the lack of effectiveness in Rwanda. First, neither Dallaire nor Booh-Booh could 
demonstrate the same personal qualities as did Ajello. Booh-Booh appears less committed to 
the peace process. Dallaire performs with good intentions, but lacks however the 
indispensable strong hand to make the Rwandan parties adhere to the peace agreement. 
Second, the UN team in Rwanda is not in possession of the same opportunities that the 
systems of commissions that ONUMOZ could unravel. UNAMIR would not chair a political 
commission or the like. The Rwandan belligerents are left to themselves to kiss and make up 
without the Special Representative as the strong leading friend. UNAMIR illustrates that 
ineffective implementation can hinder transitional arrangements to build the confidence, 
norms, or institutions that are associated with power-sharing and well-managed transition. 
Third, UNAMlR's political component is not allocated a mandate that prescribes them with 
good working conditions and the right goals. 
In short, ONUMOZ's political component manages to take control over the peace process, 
and UNAlvlIR's political component fails to take the same strong lead. 
5.2 Demilitarisation of Combatants: Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Army 
Mergence 
This section examines demilitarisation as an aspect of the Conflict Transformation project in 
Mozambique and Rwanda. The aim is to compare demilitarisation as prescribed in the two 
peace-agreements, in the UN mandates, and the processes of implementation. The purpose of 
this is to demonstrate that demilitarisation is a pivotal aspect of the Conflict Transformation 
process, and if not secured properly relapse to violence is likely. Whilst examining the two 
cases, the critical factors for either success or failure appear. 
Demilitarisation of combatants is a pertinent aspect of the political dimension of Conflict 
Transformation. The objective is to exchange military capacity for political benefits.258 The 
Annika S. Hansen and Brynjar Lia, "The Role of International Security Assistance in Support of 
Peace Agreements in War-Torn Societies", FFI Report No 9Ri05291 (Kjeller, Norway: rorsvarets 











concept of demilitarisation is broad and encompasses both the practices of demobilisation and 
disarmament, as well as the integration of former belligerents to unified anned forces. Thus, 
the section examines some of the military functions of ONUMOZ and UNAMIR. 
The nature of the disannament process can take two different forms. Clear victors in wars or 
interventionist forces execute coercive disarmament. Cooperative disannament is common in 
situations where negotiated solutions terminate violent conflicts rather than a clear winner. 
The following section contemplates the latter, but acknowledges that the distinction is blurred 
both by peace agreements and through practice. Disarmament is relevant to conflict 
tennination of two reasons: (i) it provides a secure removal of the means to continue warfare; 
and (ii) it creates a stable environment.259 
Demobilisation is the process of complete disbanding or reduction of military units. Berdal 
suggests that dernobilisation takes places at two levels. At the structural level, it disbands 
military fonnations, and at the individual level, it releases combatants from a mobilised 
260 slale. Reintegration of fonner combatants to society is a very important aspect of 
de mobilisation. It helps to break the ties to the fighting unit for the ex-soldiers, and 
incorporates them to the attainment of financial independence through involvement in 
productive activities in a civilian costume. The demobilisation and reintegration process 
involves a range of sequential activities: identifying and discharging ex-combatants; 
assembling them in cantonment areas; transporting them to their communities of origin; 
providing benefit packages; providing training; and facilitate transition to civilian life.261 
integrathn of fonner belligerents in common anned forces is another vital feature of 
demilitarisation. Provisions for such integration are often made clear in the peace agreement, 
as is its composition. Nonetheless, if not secured aptly, sections of the armies could feel 
alienated and resume to violence. 
259 Joanna Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilisation", in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of 
Peace Agreements, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rotchild, end Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 141. 
260 1\lads Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil War". Adelphi Paper no 303 (London: 
IISS and Oxford University Press, 1996),39. 
26J Nicole Ball, "'Demobilizing and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa", in Rebuildillg 
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Successful demilitarisation enhances the chances for mutual trust and reduces the risks of 
renewed hostilities. Demilitarisation, if executed properly, functions to secure the peace 
process. The experience of war-tom societies indicates that when effective demilitarisation 
has not or could not occur, fragile peace agreements could be jeopardised and conflicts 
reign.262 However, demilitarisation is not a straightforward process. Assistance from a third 
party would help to exercise the task of verification. Thus, secure the chances for properly and 
equally implementation of the demilitarisation programme. Finally, verification plays the role 
to determine compliance or non-compliance, deter cheating, and build confidence between the 
. 263 
partles. 
In short, disarmament, demobilisation, and integration of anned forces are factors necessary 
to demilitarise politics and thus contribute to Conflict Transformation. 
5.2.1 Demilitarisation in the Peace Agreements and in the Mandates 
The section examines and compares the issue of demilitarisation as conceived in the peace 
agreements, and how the UN organises demilitarisation programmes as a specific aspect of 
the peace processes. In both cases, successful demilitarisation is set out as a precondition for 
the holding of elections that would mark the end of the peace operations. 
S.2.1.1 Mozambiqlle 
Protocol IV of the GPA considers demilitarisation in Mozambique. The parties agree to 
demobilise both of the parties' armed forces and reintegrate ex-combatants to a civilian life; 
collect all individual and collective weapons; and establish a new 30,OOO-strong army equally 
divided between the parties. The GPA demands the withdrawal of the Zimbabwean and 
Malawian troops for the process of demobilisation to start. To accomplish the programme, the 
following three commissions would oversee specific processes: the CCF, the CORE, and the 
CCFADM.264 
262 Spear. 142-4. 
263 Trevor findlay, "Post Conllict Demilitarization: The Role of Verification". paper presented to the 
MacArthur Seminar on Regional Security in a Global Context. Department of War Studies, King's 
London, february 2. 1999. 
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However, the GPA is problematic. The parties do not define the numbers of soldiers that 
would be demobilised, and neither the number that would be demobilised before the 
ONUMOZ operation would be deployed. The OPA is additionally silent on the issues of 
govemment militia and the police. The parties do not define the content of the disarmament 
concept, and thus leave it to the implementers to decide. 
ONUMOZ's demilitarisation programme grows out of the GPA. The mandate defines the task 
of the military component to monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and 
concentration of the FAM and Rcnamo's forces in assembly areas; their demobilisation; and 
the collection, storage, and destruction of weapons; the complete withdrawal of foreign 
troops; and the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups,z65 The GPA does not 
foresee a role for the UN in the formation of the new army, but the Security Council, on the 
request by the parties, involves ONUMOZ to chair the CCFADM.266 
Therefore, the ONUMOZ operation is tasked to execute a demilitarisation program including 
both the process of demobilisation, disarmament, and formation of the new Armed Forces for 
Defence of Mozambique (FADM). 
5.2.1.2 Rwanda 
In Rwanda, the Arusha Accord contains settlements on military issues. The parties agree to 
demobilise and reintegrate the estimated 35,000 soldiers from both armies, but ignores the 
problem of financing the ex-combatants; formation of a new 19,000-strong army on a 60-40 
percent in favour of the government; establish a gendarmerie; and disengage troops. The 
parties request a Neutral International Force (NlF) to conduct the demobilisation, supervise 
the disengagement of forces, and train the new armed forces?67 
Consequently, the UNAMIR's mandate is heavily influenced by the Accord. However, the 
Security Council restricts the mandate in two ways. First, UNAivIlR would only provide 
security in Kigali and not in the entire countD} as the Arusha Accord prescribes, and second 
UNAMIR would not sanction a seizure of arms. Further, the mandate authorises UNAMIR to 
monitor the cease-fire, including the establishment of the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) and the 
255 United Nations. Security Cmmcil Document 5124892: paragraph 21. 
206 United Nations, "Resolution 850 (1993)", Security COlllICii Document 850, 9 July 1993. 
20' "Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties", The Amsha Accord !Available 











demobilisation procedures; and supervise the integration of the Armed Forces and 
Gendarmerie. 268 The demilitarisation process will start in phase two and fully be conducted in 
phase three. In short, the military component of UNAMIR is authorised to monitor a restricted 
demilitarisation programme. 
5.2.1.3 Summing Up 
The aim of the above section has been to compare the two demilitarisation programmes as 
prescribed in the negotiated settlements and in the mandates. It is apparent from the exercise 
that the GPA and the Arusha Accord portray demilitarisation as a vital aspect of the peace 
process, as do the two different mandates. In both cases, the day that the cease-fire comes into 
effect marks the beginning of the demilitarisation process and when troop cantonment will 
corr,mence. Later, demobilisation and creation of the new armies will take place. In both 
cases, the holding of elections requires the accomplishment of the demilitarisation. Table 
5.2.1.3 summarises these findings, and portrays the time schedule for demilitarisation as a 
function of Conflict Transformation in Mozambique and Rwanda. There are minor 
differences. Whilst withdrawal of foreign troops is an important aspect to get the process 
going in Mozambique, this is not an issue in Rwanda. The concept of disarmament is applied 
in Mozambique, and disengagement in Rwanda. The latter is a weaker and more blurred 
concept. Disengagement refers to the positioning of the opposing military forces beyond 
artillery range. Moreover, the Arusha Accord estimates the number of soldiers that would run 
through the demobilisation program. The GPA is silent on this issue. Finally, the Security 
restricts UNAMIR's mandate comparing it to the Arusha Accord. ONUMOZ is not exposed 
to such a limitation. 










Table 5.2.1.3: Timetable for Demilitarisation as afunction of Conflict Transformation in Mozambique and 
Rwanda 
: Steps to be taken Mozambique Rwanda 
Cease-fire I E-Day269 D-Day270 
: Troop Cantonment E-Day D-Day 
i Formation of the new army IE-Day D-Day 
! Withdrawal of foreign troops E-Day + 6 (until day 30) Not applicable 
! Demobilisation E-Day + 30 (until day ISO) D-Day + 90 (until day 360) 
i DisarmamentIDisengagement E-Day+3\ D-Day + 90 (until day 360) 
86 
ions Between E-Day and E-Day + 365 Between D-Day + 360 and D-Day + 660 
5.2.2 Implementation of the Demilitarisation Programs 
The section below examines the processes of implementing the two different demilitarisation 
programmes. 
5.2.2.1 Mozambique: Giving away the Military Option 
II 
To achieve demobilisation the ONUMOZ operation develops a comprehensive program, 
which combines the shOlt-term goal of troop demobilisation with the long-term goal of social 
reintegration. To accomplish the former aim, the parties would order their troops to gather in 
separate assembly areas throughout the country (20 allocated for Renam(l and 29 for Frelimo). 
A team of three military officers and one civilian would register the soldiers, arrange for 
disarmament and storage of their weaponry, process selected soldiers for the new national 
army, and finally the team would oversee the formal demobilisation and transport of ex-
soldiers. According to the plan, it would take two months to process a soldier. The 
reintegration program, facilitated by CORE, provides grants to employ ex-soldiers and assists 
them in participation in community-based economies. Soldiers are additionally offered an 18-
month subsidy in addition to their six-month demobilisation payment. They are also given 
career counselling and problem-solving services?71 Thus, this is a programme that 
constructively would assist the peace process in Mozambique. 
269 E-Day is the day on which the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique adopts the General Peace 
Agreement, i.e. 15 October 1992. 
D-Day is the day on which the Transitional Government is to be in;;talled. 











As seen above in table 5.2.1.3, the demilitarisation process is intended to start in November 
1992 and end in April 1993. However, a slow beginning forces the Security Council to extend 
the mandate a year, and determines the elections to be held no later than October 1994.272 
With the reviewed timetable, the assembly areas in which the demobilisation will occur are 
set up and function as from February 1994?73 The actual demobilisation process starts March 
1994 and ends five months later, and then the demobilisation accounts for a total of 80,769 
Frelimo and 24,649 Renamo soldiers. However, it is not until July that the de mobilisation 
process in fact picks up the pace. There are two main reasons to this. The late deployment of 
ONUMOZ and the lack of political will by Frelimo and Renamo. To understand the 
demobilisation process it is necessary to examine these factors more thoroughly. 
The problems around deployment have consequences for the progress that must be examined 
in relation to the withdrawal of the foreign troops. At this stage, th~ Malawian and 
Zimbabwean troops function as peacekeepers along vital transport corridors.274 The UN 
assumes their withdrawal could jeopardise the peace project before the UN has been fully 
deployed. Renamo argues that absence of these biased peacekeepers is a necessity to start the 
demobilisation. At first, Renamo expresses mistrust to their presence, but the SRSG assures 
Dhlakama that they are fulfilling an important task until the ONUMOZ operation arrives. 
Renamo, in return, proclaims that demobilisation would commence when sufficient UN 
. . 'bl 275 presence IS VISI e. 
The parties' lack of political will represents the second explanation of the slow pace. The 
tensions from the violent conflict are still prevalent and the parties share a mutually distrust. 
Frelimo and Renamo take turns to use the participation in the demobilisation process as an 
opportunity to negotiate and delay the peace project. Once Renamo stops obstructing the 
demobilisation process, Frelimo begins to do so. Moreover, the missing political wills take 
m United Nations, "Resolution 850 (1993)", Security COllneil Document SIRESI850, 9 July 1993. 
United Nations, Security COl/l1eil Dowment S126666: paragraphs 5-12; United Nations, "Report of 
the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", Security Council Documellt 5119941511,28 April 1994: paragraph 5. 
Z'1 The foreign troops had been and eontinue to be deployed along the Beira, Nacala. Tete, and Limpopo 
corridors. 
m for Renamo, sufficient UN presence means 6S percent of the intended deployment. See Afonso 
Dhlakama, "Letter dated 7 January 1993 from Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama to the Secretary-General 
requesting urgent deployment of United Nations troops to ~l11Lan1bique", in The United Nminns alld 











different expressions that have consequences at the operational level. This issue needs also a 
comprehensive examination. 
From the outset, Frelimo and Renamo locate the assembly areas after strategic concerns rather 
than presuming logistical precautions. Neither party wants to give the other strategic 
advantages?76 The issue of accessibility has serious consequences both for the humanitarian 
situation in the cantonments and for the demobilisation procedure. Continuing disagreements 
cause delay in the opening of the assembly areas. By the end of November 1993, only 20 out 
of 49 assembly areas have been agreed to. Ajello intervenes and brokers agreement over the 
assembly areas, and the remaining areas function from February 1994.277 Thus, the 
cantonment starts a half-year after the full UN deployment, and year after the originally 
mandated plan. 
In general. Dhlakama withholds his troops in order to preserve his bargaining power with 
Frelimo. He plays the military and political card simultaneously. Ajello arranges for the Trust 
Fund. Consequently, he is ready to initiate demobilisation. Then, the FAM is reluctant to 
demobilise although President Chissano gives impression of wanting it. The president lacks 
sufficient power over the armed forces. Pressure from the international community helps to 
give President Chissano the space he needs to conduct his mediation and convince the army to 
demobilise.278 
Thus, the demobilisation process commences four months after troops had begun arriving at 
assembly points. Once started for real, the process is slow due to the problem in accurate 
troop statistic. The UN estimates that 81,000 FreHmo troops and 20,000 Renamo troops 
would be demobilised.279 The lists provided by the parties are however incorrect and 
270 United Nations, "Report of the Secretary·General on ONUMOZ", Security Council Document 
5126666: paragraphs 5·6. 
m Alden, "Political Violence in Mozambique: Past. Present, and Future": 47·8. 
278 Ajello, "Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement", 628·34. 
Roughly 14.000 Frelimo troops and 1,000 Renamo troops would assembly at their normal bases for 
demobilisation, and 38,000 and 19,000 respectively lVoLlld register in the assembly areas, Boutros·Ghali, The 











unreliable. Frelimo and Renamo exercise underreporting that increases mutual distrust, and 
they consequently suspect each other of holding back troops.280 
In July 1994, slow progress eventuates in a crisis and the Security Council expresses worries 
of further delay.281 The parties lack full control over their troops that proves to have positive 
consequences. The lengthened stay, together with the remote locations of the cantonments, 
contributes to overcrowding and food shortages. Consequently, the situation provokes unrest 
that is sometimes spilled outside the assembly areas.282 Troops on both sides conceive the 
demobilisation as an incentive rather than to continue an armed career in the FADM. Ninety-
seven percent of the troops want demobilisation once cash payment is known.283 They protest 
by various means and demand demobilisation. The worsening situation in the assembly areas 
increases the unrest. Nonetheless, at the top level both parties demonstrate reluctance to 
assembly and demobilise troops. They are still holding back their trusted troops from the 
central region. Those troops receiving green light first from their superiors are those from less 
vital units. 284 The crisis in both armies gradually brings Frelimo and Renamo to find a 
common solution. Both endorse the principle saying that recruitment for the FADM would 
occur on a volunteer basis.285 Unsurprisingly, most soldiers choose the civilian life. The 
parties agree to 15 August as the final date for completion of demobilisation. The pace 
increases, but due to the amount of troops choosing demobilisation the process is concluded a 
week later.286 Table 5.2.2.la shows the demobilisation figures. 
cRO Richard Synge, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Actioll [Washington D,C.: United States Institute 
of Peace Press. 1997), 95-8; Assis Malaquias, "The UN in Mozambique and Angola: Lessons Learned", 
International Peacekeeping Vol. 3 No.2 (Summer 1996): 96, 
28 I United Nations, "Statement by the President of the Security Council 35 (1994)" Security COllllCil 
DOCllmellt SIPRST11994135, 19 July 1994, 
Reed. 
2M' Sam Barnes, "Peacekeeping in Mozambique". in Peacekeeping in Africa. 171-4. 
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Table 5.2.2.la: Cumulative Troop Cantonment and Demobilisation in Mozambique 
Frelimo Troops Renamo Troops Total Percentage of 
Total 
Initial group (1993) 
Registered 13,727 Not applicable 13,727 100 
Demobilised 13,727 Not applicable 13,727 100 
Assembly Areas 
Registered 43,409 17,524 60,933 100 
Demobilised 39,301 14.142 53,453 88 
Joined FADM 3,922 3,0]0 6,932 II 
Absent 186 361 547 1 
Non-Assembled Areas 
Registered 23,633 7,125 30,758 100 
Demobilised 18,260 6.386 24,646 80 
Joined FADM 4,594 651 5,245 17 
Absent 779 88 867 3 
-_._-
Total 
Registered 80,769 24,649 105,418 100 
Demobilised 71,288 20.538 91,826 87 
Joined FADM 8,516 3.661 12,177 12 
Absent 965 449 1,414 1 
The targeted programmes for the demobilised soldiers consume almost $95 million, 
proximately $1000 per person. The international community donates $83 million and the 
Maputo government provides $10,5 million. 287 
In short, the demobilisation process in Mozambique demonstrates two crucial aspects to 
success. First, the Mozambican experience explains that civilian control of the armed forces is 
pivotal. The soldiers are willing to obey political directives made to secure the peace process. 
Consequently, civilian control helps to prevent the spoiler problem that military factions 
represent. Civilian control ensures that soldiers carry out what the peace process requires, and 
comply with the orders from their political leadership. Second, the process demonstrates the 
importance of offering incentives to the armed forces. It is rational for the military to settle in 
the barracks if financial compensation is guaranteed. Then looting is no longer the sole bread 
winning procedure. Recall the long period of fighting in Mozambique, and that troops might 
have lost their opportunities to gain professional skills to apply in a civilian life. Herein, there 











financial guarantees. The demobilisation procedure In Mozambique practises both 
alternatives. 
Disarmament represents the second aspect of demilitarisation. The aspect has clearly a lower 
priority than has demobilisation. Instead, the ONUMOZ approaches disarmament as a 
component of the process of demobilisation.288 The CFe approves rules saying that the UN 
personnel would only disarm demobilised soldiers within the assembly areas. There is an 
uncertainty about the quantity of weapons present in Mozambique. Estimates vary from I,S 
million to 6 million AK-47s, and there is no information about quantities of other types of 
light weapons?89 Table S.2.2.lb gives an overview of the arms turned in. In short, the 
ONUMOZ fails to accomplish an effective disarmament for a numbers of reasons: (i) the 
parties anticipate reversal in peace process and retain as much weapons as the process allows 
them; (ii) ONUMOZ fails to set up a conceptual distinction between disarmament and 
demobilisation, as it has a restrictive mandate to disarm and likewise few resources; and (iii) 
no continuity of the disarmament after withdrawa1.29o The operation collects 222,399 
weapons, although the UN does not expect that disarmament is complete.291 In short, 
ONUMOZ does not manage to disarm and collect all weapons.292 
288 Alex Vines, "Disarmament in Mozambique", Journal of SOllthern African Studies Vol. 24 No. 
(March 1998): 191·205. 
289 Chris Smith and Alex Vines, Light Weapons Proliferation in SoU/hem Africa (London: Brassey's for 
the Centre for Defense Studies, University of London, 1997), 18·29. 
290 loao Honwana, "Mozambique: What Nexus among Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Development", 
in The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Alricu. ed. Ricardo Rene Laremont (Heineman: 
Portsmouth, 2002). 204-5. 
191 Joseph Hanlon, GH Lauriciano, and Rachel Waterhouse, "Reluctance to Demobilize", Mozambique 
Peace Process Bulletin Issue 8 (February 1994): 2; United Nations, "Final report of the Secretary-General on 
ONUMOZ", Security Council Documellf SI199411449, 23 December 1994: paragraph II; Joseph Hanlon, Gil 
Lauriciano, and Rachel Waterhouse, "Demob Data", Mu;:ambiqlle Peace Process Bulletin Issue 14 (February 
1995):11. 
2n Some even argue that there were some five million ,mall arms still in :Vlozambique at this time. 
These found their way \0 South Africa at a later stage and contributed to destabilise that country. See Vines, 











5.2.2.Jb: Disarmament in Mozambique 
Frelimo Weapons Renamo Paramilitary Total 
Weapons Weapons 
Assembly areas 73,673 14,627 43,491 131,791 
Non-assembly areas ! 87,767 2,841 Not applicable 90,608 
Total 161,440 17,468 43,491 222,399 
The CCFADM, composed of Frelimo and Renamo officials together with representatives 
from France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, supervises the formation of the FADM.293 It 
faces the problem of identifying sufficient numbers of troops to form the new armed forces. 294 
Both parties are late to submit lists of soldiers to be trained and enrolled in the FADM.295 
Moreover, because of the solution to the deadlock in the demobilisation process, the parties 
agree that the composition of the FADM would happen on a voluntarily basis. Subsequently, 
only one third of the numbered agreed to in the GPA volunteers for service.296 Table 5.2.13 
.illustrates that changes in the time schedule also have consequences for formation of the 
FADM. A total of 11,579 soldiers are enlisted in the FADM by December 1994.297 
Financial and logistical constraints make it impossible to have all the trained units in 
operation.298 Officers from FAM and Renamo share jointly the command of the FADM. With 
the establishment of FADM, the military structures of the Maputo government and Renamo 
disband. The most senior officers on both sides are demobilised in August,299 
In short, when the FADM is established the parties give away the military option that 
concludes the process of demilitarisation as a function of Conflict Transformation. 
293 United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", Secllrity COllncil Document 
5123685, 30 August 1993: paragraphs 12-3 (1-36); United Nations, Security Council Document 26666: 
paragraphs 29-31. 
294 In Rome, plans had been laid for an army of 24.000, an air force of 4,000, and a navy of 2,000 to 
the total of 30,000. 
295 Joseph Hanlon, Rachel Waterhouse, and Gil Lauriciano, "Training Yet to Start", ;'vlozambique Peace 
Process Bulletin Issue 8 (February 1994): 8 
296 SY11ge, 103-4. 
297 United Nations, Security Council Document SI1994114-19: paragraphs 14-6. 
298 United Nations, Semril\' Council Document 51199411449: paragraph 16. 











5.2.2.2 Rwanda: Mobilising for Genocide 
In Rwanda, the process of demilitarisation would take place in the second phase. It would 
focus on the three aspects of disengagement, demobilisation, and integration of the armed 
forces and gendarmerie. 300 The integration would be completed by the third phase. However, 
the belligerents in Rwanda want it otherwise. 
The UNAMIR operation witnesses high-levelled tensions. In the first two months of 1994, 
there is an explosion of violence leading to vicious demonstrations, roadblocks, assassinations 
of political leaders, and murders of civilians. In the end of February, the security situation is 
worsening, and Melvern recalls that "so serious was the violence that it seemed at times as 
though it would spiral out of control"?OI Increased military activity replaces demilitarisation. 
Instead of demobilisation, General Dallaire is made aware of the lnterahamwe to exterminate 
Tutsis in Kigali as well as an increased mobilisation. Rather than disengagement, flagrant 
distribution of arms to militias and civilians from the Rwandan authority takes place in 
addition to a stockpiling of arms. 302 Against its will, UNAMIR supervises polarisation rather 
h h · . f h . 303 l an t e mtegratlOn (1 t e armIes. 
As seen above, General Dallaire seeks permissions from the DPKO to take action with 
military force to sanction a seizure of arms. In practice, Dallaire requests the legitimate use of 
Chapter VII force and transformation of the multifunctional peace operation to that of peace 
enforcement. The DPKO declines the approach and encourages UNAMIR to consult 
Habyarimana with the growing problem. A man alleged to have instigated the mobilisation. In 
addition, the DPKO instructs the Force Commander to inform the ambassadors of Belgium, 
France, and the US.304 Moreover, the DPKO argues that the approval General Dallaire 
demands goes beyond the mandate that "authorised the mission to contribute to the security 
300 The issue of the gendannerie is discussed separately in the next section. 
lOI Melvern, A. People Betrayed: the Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, 100. 
3D" Stephen D, Goose and Frank Smyth, "Arming Genocide in Rwanda", Foreign Affairs Vol. 73 No, 5 
(September/October 1994): 86-96. 
lO' Khadiagala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda", 486, 
30. Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, "Request for Protection of Informant". fax sellt 10 Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations. New York, I J January 1994 [Available Online] 
<www.pbs.org/wgbhJpages/frontline/shows/evillwarninglcable.html> [19 May 2004]; Kofi Annan, "Contacts 
with Informant", fax sellt to Booil-BoohiDal/aire. UNAMIR, II lanuary 2004 [Available Online) 











of Kigali within weapolls~free zone, but which also made it clear that sllch a zone had to be 
established 'by' the parties ".305 In early 1994, the DPKO authorises UNAMIR to assist 
Rwandese police to recover illegal arms. However, the rules of engagement limit UNAlvUR 
that requires the operation to cooperate with local police. To make the situation worse, the 
police are allied with the Interhamwe.306 
Nonetheless, UNAMIR's impotence forces General Dallaire to requests more help from New 
York to boost the mandate. He seeks permission from the DPKO to address the growing 
problem. Belgian authorities make pleas to the Secretary-GeneraL307 The appeal is passed on 
to General Dallaire who drafts a response to the DPKO that seeks to substantiate Brussels. He 
leaves it to Booh-Booh to send it to New York. What Dallaire does not know, is that the 
SRSG downplays the information and emphasises the limitation in UNAMIR's mandate. The 
response from New York is as negative as before.308 
Thus, both the local leadership of the UNAMIR operation and the DPKO possesses 
knowledge of the increased militarization. The operation is eager to address the problem but 
lacks counter productive means. At the same time, the DPKO weighs its support from the 
Security Council and concludes to continue the lackadaisical provisions. Consequently, the 
UN's actions, or the lack thereof, stimulate to the acts of genocide that follow. The situation is 
critical. The UN demonstrates illiteracy when reading the Rwandan conflict, and mismanages 
to comprehend the zero-sum revolutionary nature of the Rwandan conflict. Habyarimana's 
regime has waged war against its Tutsi population that resulted in the RPF invasion and that 
culminates in the Arusha Accord. Herein, two factors incite increased violent response from 
the 'Hutu Power': (i) the peace agreement, and (ii) the Security Council's decision to reduce 
the strength of the mission. 
Subsequently augmented violence occurs on 7 April. Radio stations with bias to the Hutu elite 
urge Hutus to take vengeance against the Tutsis for their alleged murder of the president. 
lOS Boutrous-Ghali. The United Naliolls and Rwanda. 1993-96,32 . 
. ")6 Ibid., 3\-2. 
'01 Willy Claes. "Letter dated 14 ~arch 1994 from the Ivlinister of Foreign Affairds of Belgium to the 
Secretary-General expressing concern that the worsening situation in Rwanda may impede UNAMIR's capacity 
to fulfil its mandate", in The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-96,244 . 












Hutu militias start to attack the homes of Tutsis who flee for refugee in communal buildings. 
At this point, the militia is armed only with knives of various sorts.309 Des Forges dates the 
large-scale massacres to 11 April at the point when better-armed Hutu reinforcements 
commence its activities. These are few but armed with rifles, grenades, and machine guns?lO 
Kuperman concludes that until 21 April, only fifteen days into the genocide, that 250,000 
Tutsis have been killed. Moreover, that the large massacres see an end by the end of April.3ll 
Thus, the UNAMIR operation never really comes to core of monitoring demilitarisation in 
Rwanda. The problems of establishing the BBTG examined in the above section function as 
obstacles for demobilisation, disengagement, and integration of the two armies. The small 
amount of international pressure available is not enough to get the peace process on track. In 
short, UNAMIR proves ineffective when it comes to demilitarisation as a function of Conflict 
Transformation. 
5.2.2.3 Summing Up 
This section has been assigned to examine the process of implementing the demilitarisation 
programmes as aspects of the peace operations in Mozambique and Rwanda. It is apparent 
from the above that demilitarisation made its ways differently in these two countries. In 
general, the process concludes positively in Mozambique, and compared to Rwanda it stands 
out as an effective success. UNAMIR's military component is not allowed, neither by the 
spoilers in Rwanda nor by the DPKO, to execute demilitarisation. Instead, General Dallaire's 
troops witness an increased militarization. When this is said, demilitarisation in Mozambique 
did not process easily. A slow beginning due to the late deployment and reluctance, even 
ability, on the part of Frelimo and Renamo consequently delay the process. The SRSG 
demonstrates political and diplomatic skills to reach a solution. Renamo gets its money and 
international commitment proves solid enough to pressurise the process forward. In contrast, 
the international community is not willing to take such steps in Rwanda. Demilitarisation 
proves to be a precondition for Conflict Transformation as it is rarely successful. However, 
sufficient progress is made in Mozambique so that the parties give away the military option. 
JG9 African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, Second Edition (London: African Rights, 
1995). 258-60. 
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Herein, civil supremacy over the military proves to be an important factor in Mozambique. 
The Mozambican troops are willing to obey orders from the political leaders. In short, 
ONUMOZ proves effective, whilst UNAMIR demonstrates its ineffectiveness. Again, whilst 
the international community demonstrates a commitment to the peace process that makes 
ONUMOZ military component to conclude positively, the UNAMIR lacks this collective 
support from the international community. Moreover, the UN misreads the zero-sum 
revolutionary nature of the Rwandan conflict that has fatally consequences. 
5.3 The Police Component 
This section is concerned with the police component of the peace operations. The purpose is 
to demonstrate that the performance of the police is pertinent for a peaceful conclusion of the 
peace processes, and Conflict Transformation as such. The aim is to examine the 
effectiveness of the police component of ONUMOZ and UNA~llR. 
The issues of policing and reform of the internal security sector are relevant for Conflict 
Transformation. First, reform of the internal security sector is closely associated with the 
demilitarisation process. In intra-state wars, the conception of internal security and protection 
from external threats is blurred. Police is often assigned to support the military, and the 
military deployed to maintain internal law and order. The police become an instrument to 
protect the state and the regime rather than the general popUlation, as police in a democratic 
state is assigned to do. Second, restructuring of the police is also important to address the 
means by which the police have secured the non-democratic regime. In its work, the police 
apply unconventional methods of torture, illegal detention, and murder.312 The human rights 
abuses persist often after the cessation of hostilities. Thus to avoid further human rights 
abuses, the style of the police needs to be addressed. Third, demobilisation of ex-combatants 
makes weapons available that affects the security situation for the general popUlation. 
Without the necessary infrastructure and an effective police force, the crime rate would 
rise?13 Hence, to prevent looting the police needs to be present in the transition from war to 
peace. 
1!1 Kumar, 'The Nature and Focus of International Assistance for Rebuilding War Torn Societies", 13-
4. 
m Charles T. Call and William Stanley, "Civilian Security". in Ending Civil Wars: The impiementafion 
of Peace Agreements. eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rotchtld, end Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder and 











In short, policing and reform of the internal security sector are relevant for Conflict 
Transformation to guard the new order. These are important issues in both Mozambique and 
Rwanda. During the years of non-democratic rule and the violent confrontations, the police 
forces have acquired the features of 'regime police' and very few of 'democratic police'. 
5.3.1 Police in the Peace Agreements and the Mandates 
The following section considers the issue of police reform in the peace agreements and the 
mandates. 
5.3.1.1 Mozambique 
Protocol IV of the GPA stipulates the reform of the internal security sector in Mozambique. 
and establishes clear objectives relating to the "depolitisation and restructuring of the police 
forces". However, the issue is not given much attention. The protocol assigns the Police of the 
RepUblic of Mozambique (PRlvl) to perform its functions under the responsibilities of the 
Government. The GPA says that the police have to adhere to democratic principles, respect 
the rights of the Mozambicans, and demonstrate impartiality. Moreover, that the police are 
assigned to maintain law and order, and guarantee a social equilibrium. The COMPOL would 
verify the PRM, and is entitled to investigate the PRM's activity. The COMPOL would 
inform the authorities of any irregularities.314 
The peace agreement makes no provisions for a UN civilian police force to monitor the 
neutrality of the Mozambican police. Nonetheless, the Secretary-General urges the SRSG to 
discuss the issue with Frelimo and Renam0315 , and the Mozambican parties reach an 
agreement on the UN's role in police monitoring?16 Therefore, ONUMOZ's mandate 
includes a police component. The deployment of international civilian police (CIVPOL) 
would oversee the neutrality of the PRM, offer technical assistance to the National Police 
Commission, and monitor and verify the reform of the police. In addition, CIVPOL would 
.1H "Protocol IV", in The General Peace Agreemenl, 
115 United Nations, Security Council Documenl SI2-1892: paragraph 29, 
.116 United Nations, "Letter dated 8 September 1993 from Mozambique transmitting the linal document 
from 23 August-3 September meeting between President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama", Security COlilleil 











also monitor the conduct of the elections? 17 The Secretary-General suggests a total police 
force of 1,144, which the Security Council approves. The Security Council requires that a 
deployment of CIVPOL have to compensate for a reduction in the military component to 
avoid increases in the costS.318 
5.3.1.2 Rwanda 
The issue of police is more comprehensively discussed in the Arusha Accord. The parties 
agree that the prime objective of the 'National Gendarmerie' would be to maintain law and 
order. and protect the Rwandan citizens. Moreover, it determines that the police must execute 
its duties in an impartial manner and be responsible to the Rwandan authorities. The parties 
determine that the strength of the police would be 6,000 men.319 As with the army, the 
composition is 60-40 percent in favour of the govemment,320 These men would receive 
training over ten months. 321 The parties do not make provisions for a commission to monitor 
the geadarmerie, as do the Mozambican parties. In this, the NIF would verify that law and 
order are maintained dfectively and impartially.322 Finally, that the agreement proposes that a 
UN police force to be deployed in Kigali and the nine prefectures. 
Compared to the provisions and the requests in the Arusha Accord, the Security Council 
limits UNAMIR's mandate. The Secretary-General suggests that U::-.IAMIR would be 
responsible to monitor security through "verification and control" of the police?23 The 
Council disagrees and does not authorise UNAMIR to provide security for civilians. Rather, 
the mandate limits UNAMIR to "investigate and repmt on incidents regarding activities" of 
m United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", Security Council Document 
S/1994/89/Add./, 28 January 1994: paragraphs 9-} L 
m Ibid.: paragraph 16; United Nations. Security Council Document S/RES/89S . 
. 119 "Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Pal1ies". in The Arushl! 
Accords: Articles 83-85. 
3co Ibid.: Article 144. 
121 [bid.: Article 142, 
),: Ibid.: Article 54, 











the police. 324 Sixty police officers are required to accomplish this task. The training of the 
gendarmerie would be completed in the third phase.325 
5.3.1.3 Summing Up 
The above section has compared the issue of police reform in the two peace agreements and 
the mandates. The exercise finds that both of the peace agreements determine that reform of 
the internal security sector would have to occur. The details of the procedure are however 
different. Whilst the GPA vaguely stipulates this process, the Arusha Accords prescribe more 
details. Moreover, it takes intervention from the UN for the Mozambican parties to agree on 
the UN's role on police monitoring. The role of the UN force is clearer in Rwanda. It is also 
apparent from the above examination that the Security Council restricts UNAM!R's mandate 
both from the Arusha Accords' provisions, and the recommendations from the Secretary-
General. The strength of the two police components vary noticeably, as ONUMOZ's is 
significantly "H'ger. Finally, the composition of the police is another difference. Whilst the old 
police will ccntinue in Mozambique, both members from the old police and RFP would 
compose the police in Rwanda. 
5.3.2 Implementing the Police Programmes 
The section below examines the implementation of the police programme in the two cases. 
5.3.2.1 Mozambique: Preventing Looting 
Although the decision to include the CIVPOL component comes late in Mozambique, the 
component establishes itself quickly, The first observers arrive in November 1993, then to be 
almost fully deployed in September, a month before the elections. They are widely deployed 
around Mozambique. Out of 83 locations, 15 are in Renamo-controlled areas,326 
The Mozambican parties' lack of political will also manifests itself as challenges for 
CIVPOL. At the outset, the police component faces difficulties regarding access to 
information and visits to police stations, but CIVPOL solves this problem with the Police 
Affairs Commission and the PRM. Moreover, Frelimo and Renamo also obstruct CIVPOL 
J1-l United Nations. "Resolution 872 (1994)", Security COl/Ilcil DoclIl1!ellf SIRESI872: 3(h), 
J25 United Nations. "United Nations Assistance jvlis,ion for Rwanda (UNAMIR)", 343-4. 











from accomplishing its monitoring duties. Whilst Renamo denies CIVPOL access to areas of 
its control and to establish national police stations, Frelimo restricts CIVPOL admission to 
government police stations and especially to the facilities of its Quick Reaction Force.327 
Later, a gradually improvement takes place, though Renamo demonstrates reluctance.328 
Observers have rightfully questioned the capacity of just over 1,000 police officers to 
accomplish the component's mandate wi thin the boundaries of the Mozambican territory. 
Other difficulties are the accusations that the PRM violates civil and human rights. Alden 
notes that CIVPOL is only mandated to advise, and cannot act itself nor compel Mozambican 
authorities to do so?29 Thus, these violations could not be prevented because the belligerents 
fail to react to recommendations from CIVPOL. Moreover, Venancio is critical to CIVPOL as 
to how it could perform its duties given a lack of knowledge to the Mozambican languages.330 
Jett questions qualifications and the lack of effectiveness due to structural arrangements in the 
bun::,aucracy?3I Despite this, CIVPOL investigates 511 complaints (61 are related to human 
rights violations) within three categories of allegations: (a) illegal detention of civilians; (b) 
abuse of detainees' civil rights; and (c) criminal investigation involving political motives.332 
Moreover, CIVPOL monitors the electoral campaign and the voting process?33 Thus, as 
Malan suggests, CIVPOL must be considered as a "partial success".334 
On the other hand, the presence of PRM is vital to the peace process. The visible police force 
hinders lawlessness. With the newly available arms in the Mozambican society, looting could 
be a part of the reality if the police had been absent. The quality of the police and its degree of 
effectiveness are not as relevant for Conflict Transformation as the presence of the police. 
With respect to the peace process, the consequences of an absent police force are more severe 
m United Nations, Security Council Document SI1994151 I: paragraphs 34-5, 
m United Nutions, Secllrity Council Document .'1119941803: paragraphs 24-7, 
m Alden, "Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique": 124, 
))0 Venancio, "Did Peat:e-Keeping Work in Mozambique"", 105, 
HI Jett. Why Peacekeeping Fails, 86-7, 
1.1" United NUlions, Security Council Document S119941803: paragraph 27, 
m United Nations. Security COl/neil Document 51199411-149: paragraphs 19-22. 
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than that of a biased force that commits human rights abuses. It proves that the content of the 
policing is subordinated the importance of a visible police so that ordinary behaviour can take 
place. 
5.3.2.2 Rwanda: Fails to Commence its Duties 
In Rwanda, there is also a crucial need for the role of the police in the peace process. The 
police are the local representatives of the state to guard the transition from war to peace. As 
seen in the sections above, as the chaos engulfs there is a growing need for an effective police 
force. However, as with the demilitarisation, the reform of the gendarmerie is challenged by 
the delays to install the transitional institutions. 
Herein, the UNAMIR faces the problem to deploy its police personnel.33S The civilian police 
come into effect in February 1994 with its liaison section, investigation unit, and monitoring 
teams. From the outset, CIVPOL encounters allegations of political and ethnical motivated 
crimes, increased armed robbery because of the ready-made availability of weapons and 
complaints against the gendarmerie itself. The deteriorating security situation makes it 
necessary for CIVPOL to patrol.336 30 March, the Secretary-General suggests boosting 
CIVPOL with more officers and thus makes it possible to accomplish the mandate. However, 
as seen above, the Security Council determines to leave a token force in Rwanda and the 
police force fails to commence its duties. 
5.3.2.3 Summing Up 
The aim of this section has been to examine the implementation of the police programme. 
Reform of the security sector is an important aspect to improve the general human rights 
situation, and policing is a necessity to secure the transition from war to peace. It is apparent 
from the above exercise that ONUMOZ is more effective than UNAMIR when it comes to the 
policing. One of the reasons is the difference in size. Yet again, the growing tensions and the 
lack of sufficient mandate resources to address this problem represent a problem for 
UNA~lIR's police component as it does for the political and military components. 
It is also apparent from the above that reform of the security sector is not so much a necessity 
as the presence of the police is. The visible police in Mozambique hinders for disorder and 
1)5 United Nations. Security Council Document 5126927: paragraph 22. 











thus destructive activities such as looting. The crucial learning experience is that ordinary 
behaviour can take place. The problem of a biased police force is subordinated and needs to 
be dealt with on a later stage. In Rwanda, lack of resources makes it difficult to accomplish 
the mandate, and the Rwandan police is neither able to prevent the deteriorating security 
situation for the Rwandans. 
5.4 Providing Support for Elections 
Providing support for elections is the last sub-goal to contemplate. This section follows the 
same structure as above that starts to discuss the pertinence of elections for Conflict 
Transformation. The aim is to compare the electoral issue as agreed to in the peace 
agreements and authorised by the mandates, and the processes of implementation. Then the 
factors detennining effectiveness of ineffectiveness come to eye. 
With the ending of intra-state wars through negotiated settlements, elections have been 
designated in peace accords as the mechanism to end the transition from war to peace. 
Elections in war-tom societies, post-conflict elections, fulfil primarily two roles. First, they 
take part of a broader process of national reconciliation and political transfonnation towards a 
peaceful society.337 Second, these elections playa role in the process of democratisation: 
elections serve to legitimise the government both domestically and intemationally; the aim of 
elections is to initiate and consolidate the process of democratisation; and the ballot box 
functions to transform the currency for competition from bullets to ballots.338 In short, post-
conflict elections have a function for transforming the conflict from that taking place on the 
battlefield to that in the National Assembly.339 
.l.l7 Rafael Lopez-Pintor, "Reconciliation Elections: A Post-Cold War Experience", in Rebuildillg 
Societies Ajier Civil War: Critical Roles for IllIernationai Assistance, ed. Krishna Kumar (Bolder and London: 
Lynne Rienner. 1997),43-60. 
m Krishna Kumar, "Postconflict Elections and International Assistance", in Postconflict elections, 
Democratization alld lntel'llatiollal Assistallce, ed. Krishna Kumar (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, \998), 
7-8. 
JJ9 The record of ejections to mark the end of the transition from war to peace has in general proven 
problematic. For details see Terrence Lyons, "The Role of Pm.tsettlement Elections". in Ending Civil Wars: The 
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5.4.1 Elections in the Peace Agreements and the ;\landates 
The section below examines and compares the electoral component in the GPA and the 
Arusha Accords, as well as in the two peace operations' mandates. 
5.4.1.1 Mozambique 
Protocol III considers the electoral issues in Mozambique and sets forth the general principles 
that would guide the drafting of the Electoral Act. Four aspects need to be highlighted. First, 
elections are to be held within one year after the signing of the GPA, but the period can be 
extended. Second, the protocol provides guarantees for freedom of press and access to media, 
as well as freedom of assodation, expression, and political activity. Third, it defines the 
electoral procedures. An absolute majority of the electorate would determine the president in 
the first round, or to be followed by a second ballot between the two candidates with 
uppermost electoral support. Proportional representation would determine the composition of 
the National Assembly. Finally, the National Elections Commission (CNE) would be set up 
with the purpose to organise, conduct, and monitor the elections.34o The Accords leave many 
issues relating to the elections vague and subject to discussion. 
The Security Council authorises the electoral component to provide technical assistance and 
monitor the entire electoral process.341 ONUMOZ's electoral division would accomplish three 
interlinked roles. First, it would verify that political parties have freedom of organisation and 
unrestricted access to media, and that the electoral rolls would be properly completed. 
Second, it would observe the registration, polling, and counting of elections results, and report 
complaints and irregularities to the CNE. Finally, the component would conduct electoral 
education.342 In coordination with the electoral division, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) would provide technical assistance.3.!3 It is clear from the ONUMOZ's 
mandate that the Mozambican parties, through the CNE, share the responsibility for the 
electoral process. 
340 "Protocol Ill: Principles for Electoral Law and Process", in The General Peace Agreement 
[Available Online] ,http://www.incore.ulsLac,uklcds/agreemems/pdflmoz4,pdf, l18.0S.2004J. 
,141 United Nations, Security Council Ducument S124892: paragraph 18. 
,'U [bid.: paragraphs 30 .. n. 












The Arusha Accord is vaguer on the electoral issue. It states that democracy is founded 
on the idea that sovereignty belongs to the people, and that this is expressed through 
elections. Moreover, the elections need to be "regular, free, transparent, and fair".344 
Finally, the BBTG would have the responsibility for organising and holding the elections at 
the end of the transitional period lasting 22 months.345 An electoral commission would have 
the executive responsibility to prepare for and hold the elections.346 International assistance 
would only play the role as observers. Moreover, the Arusha Accord does not deem the 
procedures for elections. 
Consequently, the Security Council makes few provisions for UNAMIR with respect to the 
elections. The only task to fulfil would be to monitor the security situation during the final 
period of the BBTG's mandate, leading up to the elections.347 
5.4.1.3 Summing Up 
The peace agreements and the mandates outline that elections would celebrate the end 
of the implementation phase in Mozambique and Rwanda. Though the GPA is relative 
vague on this issue, the Arusha Accords is vaguer and only detennines elections to be 
held at the end of the transitional period. ONUMOZ would playa more central role 
than that of UNAMIR. 
5.4.2 Implementing the Electoral Programmes 
The following section compares the two peace operations' support for elections in 
Mozambique and Rwanda. 
)H "Protocol on Rule of Law", in The Arusha Agreement [Available Onlinel 
.http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uklcdslagreements/pdflrwan I.pdf> 118.05.2004\. 
J"l "Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing". in the Arusha Agreement: Article 22: "Protocol on 
Miscell,meous and Final Provisions", in The Arllsha Agreement [Available Onlinel 
,http://www.incore.ulsLac.uklcds/agreements/pdf/rwan I.pdf> 118,05.2004]. 
1.It'Ibid. 











5.4.2.1 Mozambique: Celebrating Conflict Transformation 
The post-conflict elections in Mozambique signify the final and most crucial test for the peace 
process. Progress toward elections is, however, necessarily influenced by the many delays in 
the implementation process. From the extension of ONUMOZ mandate follows postponement 
of the elections to October 1994. ONUMOZ's electoral component faces many challenges. 
The processes of voter registration, electoral campaign, and the holding of elections are 
considered here. 
Before the registration could commence, some obstacles needed to be solved. The GPA's 
vague text on the electoral law obliges the parties to finalise the law. When the parties meet in 
April 1993, the parties disagree over the composition in the CNE, and the status of overseas 
voters?48 Again, ONUMOZ's committed leadership resolves the impasse. It takes the 
personal intervention of the Secretary-General, with subsequent intercession of the SRSG, to 
resume discussion. The conclusions determine that an independent person would chair the 
eNE, made up of ten members from Frelimo, seven from Renamo, and three from other 
political parties.349 The electoral law comes officially into effect January 12 1994. With 
foreign assistance, the CNE takes up its duties to prepare for elections. 
The Technical Secretariat for Elections Administration possesses the responsibility for voter 
registration. The 8,000 registrars start the process in June. To ensure a comprehensive 
registration including people in remote areas, returning refugees, and demobilised soldiers, 
the cut-off date is extended with two weeks until 2 September. When the registration ends, 81 
percent of the eligible population is registered.3so In between, however, there have been 
problems with the completion of registration forms, cards, and books. Moreover, allegations 
of fraud have been made. Not an accusations are presented to the CNE as formal complaints, 
and some of those investigated were not substantiated.3sl 
The values of the multiparty democracy are new to the Mozambican people. Up until now, 
they had only been exposed to the Marxist-Leninist rules alien two a competitive party 
.1"8 Alden, "Resolution of the Conflict in Mozambique": 124-5 . 
.149 United Nations, Security Council Document 5126666: paragraphs 2-3, 9-12 . 
.lon Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and /v/ozamhique. 1992-95. 56-8. 
m United Nations, "Further report of the Secretary-General on O;>.lU:VI0Z", Security Council Document 











system. Instruction is vital. Then, voter education seeks to accomplish two objectives, i.e. 
teach Mozambicans (i) how to vote through electoral education, and (ii) why they should vote 
through education for democracy. The role of political parties need special attention as the 
relationship between party and electoral representatives for parliament is blurred for many 
voters.352 One of the main challenges is to reach the illiterate sectors of the population. 
I ' . k h' b ' 353 nnovatlve campaIgns see to overcome t IS arner. 
The extension of the registration period reduces the campaign period from 45 to 35 days. The 
election campaign commences 22 September. At this stage, there are twelve presidential 
candidates, and 3,117 candidates representing the twelve political parties and two coalitions 
running for parliament. 
On the ground, the situation is tense and spotted violent incidents occur, but without seriously 
threatening the electoral process. More than organised political violence, armed banditry 
represents the toughest challenge for ONUMOZ.354 Three other major issues test ONUMOZ's 
electoral component in the campaign. First, it is the problem of the "non-armed opposition" 
claiming the need for funding from both the government and the international community. 
Eventually, the former donates US $15,000 and the latter US $100,000. Second, there is the 
problem of fairness. With their party machinery, Frelimo and Renamo outnumber the other 
political parties.355 The smaller parties have no chance but to compete under unfair 
conditions. Third, growing tension, nurtured by Renamo's declaration that only victory in key 
provinces would satisfy the organisation, leads to violent incidents.356 Thus, Dhlakama 
contradicts himself as he on many occasions has been committing himself to honour the 
outcome.357 
JS2 Synge, 128-30. 
m Honwana, "Mozambique: What Nexus among Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Development", 207. 
354 United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", Security Council Document 
5//994/1196.21 October 1994: paragraph 3. 
m Honwana, "Mozambique: What Nexus among Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Development", 207. 
Joseph Hanlon and Rachel Waterhouse, "Renamo Threats", Mo::.amhique Peace Process Bullelin 
Issue 13 (II October 1994): 1-2. 
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In the campaign, the political message varies only slightly. The main parties pursue a 
democratic agenda with liberal po\icies.358 Whilst the opposition parties argue for fair 
distribution of power and resources to the central and northern regions of the country, Frelimo 
advocates continuity and its experience in governance. The international community is 
responsible for setting post-conflict arrangements on the agenda. Worried that the political 
outcome of the GPA envisages a winner-takes-all result, and with the Angola experience in 
fresh memory, the foreign sponsors of the peace process seek to adjust the parties to make 
provisions for power-sharing. Whilst the opposition pa11ies support the suggestion without a 
clear uniformed formula for the formation a government, Frelimo is hostile and argues that 
h I . h d 'h ,,359 tee ectlOns ave to etermme t e composltlon,' 
In mid October, the 1,200 UN election observers arrive. Furthermore, the international 
community works to secure Mozambican ownership to the elections. UNDP provides 
technical assistance and channels the international financial assistance through an electoral 
trust fund to the electoral operations, Again, the international community, through its 
representation in the esc, offers momentum to the peace process and the elections, and uses 
the donor resources as leverage to ensure continued Frelimo and Renamo participation.36o In 
short, as seen above, close donor coordination secures a successful conclusion. 
Over the three days of the electoral act, some 52,000 polling officers and 35,000 party 
monitors administrate the 7,244 polling stations. Moreover, just over 2,300 observers monitor 
that 87,9 percent of the electorate cast their votes.361 
Whilst the international community is to celebrate the elections, Dhlakama withdraws 
Renamo and himself as candidates in the elections.362 According to Ajello, there are three 
358 Rachel Waterhouse, "Special Political Parties Supplement", Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 
Supplement (August 1994): 1-10, 
359 The leading pressure comes from US officials. Consequently. ONUMOZ officials feel it is a part of 
the US strategy to secure Renamo a position, There is a widespread assumption that Frelimo and Chissano will 
win the elections, See Joseph Hanlon, Rachel Waterhouse. and Gil Lauriciano. "Pressure for unity government", 
Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin Losue 10 (July 19(4): 6-7; Joseph Hanlon, "National unity government?", 
Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin Issue 11 (August 1994): 5; Joseph Hanlon and Rachel Waterhouse, "Prior 
accordT, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin Issue 12 (September 1994): 5-6, 
'60 J. Micheal Turner. Sue Nelson, and Kimberly Mahling-Clark, "Mozambique's Vote for Democratic 
Governance". in Postcon.flict Elections, Democrwiwtioll and International Assistance, ed. Krishna Kumar 
(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998). 155-7. 











reasons for this: 0) Dhlakama receives a document portraying widespread irregularities only 
to secure Frelimo victory; (ii) he feels that the CNE does not take his complaints seriously; 
and (iii) he perceives that neighbouring states would support Frelimo even if it re-claims the 
position on an illegitimate basis.363 This is the most severe impediment in the election process 
that threatens the entire peace process. The SRSG initiates flurry diplomatic activities 
conducted by the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the members of the CSC, Nelson 
Mandela, and Robert Mugabe. 364 Promises to sort out the suspiciousness prior to any 
declaration of free and fair elections convince Dhlakama to re_enter.365 Consequently, the 
elections are extended with one day. Once sorted out, the elections proceed smoothly without 
disruptions. 
Voter turnout is very high, with 87,9 percent of voters participating and 91,4% of the ballot 
cast declared valid. Renamo's withdrawal does not affect the electorate. The poor nature of 
the communicational infrastructure prevents most voters from knowing of Renamo's 
action.366 Renamo loses both the presidential and parliamentary elections, but proves to gain 
more support than expected by many observers. In the presidential election, Chissano receives 
53,3 percent and Dhlakama 33,7 percent of the votes. Frelimo wins 44,3 percent of the votes 
and 129 mandates in the legislative election, while Renamo receives 37,8 percent giving it 
109 seats. The three-party coalition, U0367 , receives 5,1 percent of the votes and entitles the 
party to 12 seats in the Assembly.368 Interestingly, Chissano proves more popular than his 
party, and Renamo more popular than Dhlakama. The results demonstrate that Frelimo and 
Renamo are the only parties with national appeal. Table 5.4.31 illustrates that Frelimo and 
362 Joseph Hanlon and Rachel Waterhouse, "Dhlakama boycott", Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 
Issue 14 (February 1995),4-5. 
363 Ajello, "Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace-Agreemenl", 634-6. 
364 United Nations, "Statement by the Secretary-General emphasizing that Mozambique's elections must 
proceed as planned", UN Press Release 5G15M15456. 27 October 1994; "Message from the President of the 
Security Council urging Renamo to reconsider its decision 10 withdraw from the elections", UN Press Release 
5C/5922. 27 October 1994; Macqueen, United Nations Peacekeeping in Ni-ica Since 1960, 164. 
J65 Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-95.62-3,286. 
Turner et aI" "Mozambique's Vote for Democratic Governance". 161. 
307 The acronym of UD comes from its Portuguese name "Uniao Democratica" (Democratic Union). 
)I" United Nations, Security Council Document S1199411449: paragraph 8; Africa Report, 











Renamo feature regional strongholds. The former in the south, the latter in the centre and 
north. Moreover, it proves that the system negotiated between Frelimo and Renamo ensures 
adequate representation for them, but with the five percent threshold it denies opportunities 
for smaller parties. 
The SRSG accompanies the announcement of the electoral outcome and declares the elections 
international free and fairness. However, he admits some problems, irregularities, and 
disruptions. Nevertheless, none of these could discredit the credibility of the elections.369 
Dhlakama and Renamo accept the electoral outcome. 370 Nevertheless, Frelimo and Renamo 
disagree over the voting procedures for the assembly chair. Subsequently, Renamo boycotts 
the Assembly for three weeks only to realise that this makes it possible for Frelimo solely to 
pass legislation, and the Dhlakama orders his party back on the bench. 371 In addition, 
Dhlakama refuses the special position in the government offered by Chissano.372 
In short, when the elections conclude effectively they satisfy the Mozambican parties 
and the ONUMOZ operation. The elections mark the end of the transition from war to peace 
and the implementation. The Mozambican parties and ONUMOZ celebrate Conflict 
Transformation. For the parties, the elections conquered the impasse of the hurting stalemate, 
and they serve as an endpoint of the conflict. For ONUMOZ, the elections define a successful 
conclusion of the mission and allow for withdrawal. 
,69 United Nations, "Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General declaring the 
Mozambique elections free and fair", UN Press Release SG/SM/5488, 19 November 1994. 
1"1) Dhlakama continues to believe that the elections were filled with irregularities. See Boutros-Ghali, 
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Table 5.4.3.1: Distribwioll of seats ill the New National Assemblym 
Province Frelimo Renamo :UD Total Seats 
Maputo City 17 I 0 18 
Maputo Province j12 1 0 13 
Gaza : IS 0 . I 16 
Inhambane 13 3 2 18 
r--- --_.-
Sofala 3 18 i 0 21 
I 
l\lanica 4 9 io 13 
Tete :5 9 I 15 
Zambezia : 18 29 2 i 49 
Nampula 20 32 2 54 
Niassa 7 4 0 II 
Cabo Delgado IS 6 I 22 
Total 129 liZ 9 250 
5.4.2.2 Rwanda: Genocide 
Elections in Rwanda would take place at the end of the transitional period. As seen above, 
UNAMIR encounters major challenges that the operation cannot overcome. These obstacles 
are so considerable that the UN mission does not hold the arrangement of the elections as a 
realistic goal anymore. Neither is it on the parties' agenda. The last hope for installation of the 
transitional institutions sweep away as Habyarimana' s plane ironically crashes in the 
presidential garden, and with that goes prospects for elections that could symbolically end the 
implementation phase. Immediately, the extremist radio station, RTML, broadcasts bulletins 
portraying Tutsi responsibility for the plane crash.374 Roadblocks are constructed, curfew is 
imposed, the Interhamwe militia let loose, and the massacre of Tutsis begin. 
In this, the international response to the unfolding genocide follows the same patterns as from 
the start of the UNAMIR's deployment. Recall that the Force Commander informs the DPKO 
of the well-planned terror actions towards opposition leaders and the Tutsi group. Booh-Booh 
adds in the same cable information of a worsening security situation due to fighting between 
m The data is taken from Joseph Hanlon and Rachel Waterhouse, "Elections Statistics". Mozambique 
Peace Process BlIIletin Issue 14 (February 1995): 4. 
)H For an account of the role the radio station pl<lYS in the genocide see Frank Chalk. "Hate Radio in 
Rwanda", in The Patl! of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda 10 Zaire, eds. Howard Adelman and 











the Presidential Guard and RPF. As seen above, the Security Council's priority, championed 
by the US and the United Kingdom, is to withdraw UNAMIR from Rwanda.375 
5.4.2.3 Summing Up 
This section has been tasked to examine elections as a sub-goal of the Conflict 
Transfomtation project. In both cases, post-conflict elections would serve as symbolic 
endpoints for the implementation phase. They would also function as a resolution of the 
conflicts. However, it is apparent from the above that the record of implementation is 
different for ONUMOZ and UNAMIR. ONUMOZ makes sufficient progress so that CNE can 
organise and conduct the elections. The operation surmounts the impediments in the electoral 
process. Again, a few powerful actors care deeply to place the Mozambican conflict on a 
peaceful footing. They make arrangements to exercise apolitical manoeuvres such as the 
extensiVe funding for Renamo. ONUMOZ appears partial towards Renamo. On the other 
hand, however, the SRSG reads the situation carefully and identifies Renamo's needs. Total 
impartiality could have worked opposite. The transformation of Renamo required special 
attention from ONUMOZ. In Rwanda, elections are not on the agenda. Consequently, a date 
for the holding of elections that could mark the end of the implementation of the Arusha 
Accord is not made. Thus, it is apparent that whilst ONUMOZ celebrates Conflict 
Transformation, UNAMIR remaining and token force is a bystander to the unfolding 
genocide. 
5.5 Conclusion: The Critical Factors for Effectiveness 
This chapter has been assigned to compare and evaluate the Conflict Transformation projects 
in Mozambique and Rwanda. Four sub-goals of the two multifunctional peace operations 
have been examined in separate sections. A discussion that portrays the relevancy of each 
sub-goal for Conflict Transformation has been made. They have been compared as they 
appear in the comprehensive negotiated settlements, the mandates as they are authorised by 
the Security Council, and finally the record of implementation. The purpose has been to 
examine the effectiveness of ONUMOZ and UNAMlR to facilitate Conflict Transformation. 
What are the findings of this study? The critical factors that determine effectiveness for a 
multifunctional peace operation are clear. For analytical purposes, the below presentation 











distinguishes between critical factors at a general level and critical factors as they appear in 
each sUb-programme. The general factors are considered first. 
First, support from the international community, and from the US especially, is crucial. Given 
the composition of the Security Council, it is not possible for the ~ to secure a peaceful 
outcome without support from the US. Washington was willing in Mozambique but not in 
Rwanda. Scared by Rwanda's "twin sister"", the UNAMIR operation becomes half-hearted. It 
is clear from the examination that without ONUMOZ's presence the parties in Mozambique 
would have had a difficult job to find a peaceful implementation. The Rwandan parties did 
not see enough of this support. In this, it is important to note that the international community 
is represented by a few powerful actors that care deeply to end a conflict. These actors are 
able to make healthy dBcisions and provide financial and diplomatic resources. 
Second, the Security Council must be able to read the nature of the conflict sufficiently. Only 
with such analytical tools, the Council can address a particular conflict with a properly 
designed mandate. Again, this project demonstrates that this was done in Mozambique and 
not in Rwanda. For example, elections serve as function of conflict transformation in 
Mozambique and as a solution to the hurting stalemate. This i:; not true in Rwanda where 
UNAMIR is not mandated properly to address the conflict specific situation. Herein, 
sufficient resources are a vital to conclude effectively. The Security Council authorised the 
two multifunctional peace operations with different amounts of logistics. Whilst the 
ONUMOZ operation is given enough resources to accomplish its mandate, the UNAMIR 
operation is not. Consequently, the UNAMIR troops cannot fulfil their duties. 
Third, there is a need for successful conclusions of all of the sub-goals as they each 
substantiate vital aspects of the Conflict Transformation process. The comparative exercise 
has found that there is a critical interaction between the various sub-goals. Whilst ONUMOZ 
proves that success in one area affects effectiveness in another area, UNAMIR demonstrates 
the opposite. UNAMIR has difficulties to guide the peace process that affects demilitarisation 
and the other areas. Moreover, ONUMOZ's effectiveness in executing the political, military, 
police, and electoral programme assures an overall successful conclusion of Conflict 
Transformation in Mozambique. Despite this fact, there is not a need to conclude each sub-
programme completely as the section below demonstrates. Nonetheless, sufficient progress 











The section below recalls the critical factors for effectiveness in each sub-goal. Thus, the 
section portrays the degree of progress needed for an overall successful conclusion. 
First, a peace operation needs to enjoy the political guidance of the peace process. To take an 
influential lead, political guidance needs to entail three components. First, the leadership of 
the component needs to be composed of people who are committed to Conflict 
Transformation. Second, to secure political guidance the political component must be 
designed a mandate that prescribes them with good working conditions and the right goals. 
Third, it needs to include the right institutional framework. In short, ONUMOZ's political 
component has the privilege of being assigned all of the above, whilst UNAMIR's political 
component lacks the same dispensation. 
The management of the spoiler problem is herein a crucial aspect. Both of the peace 
operations run into this problem, but the way they are handling it is different. ONUMOZ 
manages to identify the problem and its solution effectively. Again, UNAMIR fails to do so. 
The former controls and manoeuvres the situation so that the parties perceive Conflict 
Transformation as an incentive. In Rwanda, CDR with its extremist ideology is not dealt with, 
and the total spoiler is allowed to jeopardise the peace project. Again, the cases demonstrate 
that the management needs to be sensitive to the conflict specific situation. 
Second, the exercise comparing the demilitarisation programmes explains several critical 
factors for effectiveness. Demilitarisation is a long-term project that is unfeasibly to conclude 
over a short period. The Mozambican case illustrates that a successful conclusion of the 
demilitarisation project is not a precondition for Conflict Transformation. Nonetheless, 
ONUMOZ makes enough progress in the area so that the parties give away the military 
option. In contrast, UNAMIR's progress is not sufficient. This illustrates that demilitarisation 
is a vital part of the continuing process towards transformation. Such attempts are rarely 
successful. Another learning experience from the exercise is that the military component 
needs to be innovative in nature to overcome obstacles. ONUMOZ proves to be smart when 
breakdowns are apparent and facilitate solutions. A key is the incentives given to the 
Mozambican troops to ensure demobilisation. In contrast, UNAMIR suffers consequences as 
the operation lacks the resources and the support from New York to consider innovative 
solutions when information of the unfolding genocide is known. A UN peace operation has to 
be intelligent when things go wrong and when violence escalates. A final critical factor with 
respect to the demilitarisation programme that determines success is civil supremacy. The 











troops. Herein it helps that the soldiers in both camps are tired of the warfare and seize the 
opportunity to regain the civilian life. 
Third, the comparison of the police components shows that visibility of the police is 
important so that the ordinary life of the people can continue. It is a question of presence or 
absence for the police where the answer needs to be that of visibility. Problems with the 
police need to be addressed on a later stage. The crucial point is that chaos and lawlessness 
must be avoided. Moreover, the problem with the biased and corrupt police needs to be 
confronted on a later stage. 
Finally, important aspects of the effectiveness are also located in the implementation of the 
electoral programme. In Mozambique, post-conflict elections represent the opportunity to 
solve the conflict. The parties accept elections as the method to solve the violent dispute. The 
elections represent somewhat more than a symbolic end of the conflict. The nature of the 
conflict determines the elections as the milestone. The hurting stalemate had been one of the 
factors paving the way for peacemaking. Either side had contemplated neither victory nor 
defeat. The parties have also given away their military option. This makes the elections the 
key event. The elections represent the ultimate objective and provide the final addition of the 
transition from war to peace in Mozambique. They have different implications for the 
Mozambican parties and ONUMOZ. For the parties, elections are seen as the way to solve the 
conflict and determine the winner. The parties see this procedure as legitimate and 
acknowledge their commitment. For ONUMOZ, elections are a useful short-term indicator to 
conclude effectively if the parties accept them as free and fair. Remember, the UN needs to 
analyse and address the nature of the conflict properly. Whilst UN manages to identify and 
tackle the mutually hurting stalemate between Frelimo and Renamo in Mozambique, the same 
organisation fails to diagnose the Rwandan connict to that of a zero-sum revolutionary nature. 
Only by accurately analysing the conflict the appropriate means can be applied. For these 
reasons, elections are never achievable in Rwanda. 
In short, the ONUMOZ operation is able to address the root causes of the Mozambican 
conflict and manages to reverse the destructive processes that accompanied the violence. 
ONOMUZ makes attempts to take the best out of Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, 
and Contlict Transformation to exercise the positive task of ending the conflict and not only 
the negative task of reducing violence. However, the distinction between negative peace and 
positive peace seems here problematic. First, it is difficult to measure the latter that rather 











occurs in trying to set out criteria for positive peace, and especially in connection to the 
question of positive peace for whom. A person in Maputo compared to a person in Kigali has 
a different opinion of what constitutes positive peace. Even, these different perceptions could 
differ from the perceptions in the academia. Moreover, the Mozambican might not be 
satisfied with the situation of today and say that sufficiently transformation of the context has 
not occurred. Subjective perceptions are connected to the concept of positive peace. 
Nonetheless, as from the day ONUMOZ withdraws neither of the parties have resorted to 
violence to further their interests. Recall, in contrast, UNAJVIIR fails to build the necessary 
conditions for an effective conclusion of the transition from war to peace and is not able to 
place the conflict on a peaceful footing. 
In sum, the critical factors that determine success of failure are to be found at a general level 












This has been a study about the ending of conflicts. It examined the UN capacities in Conflict 
Transfonnation activities through the deployment of multifunctional peace operations in 
Mozambique and Rwanda. It has been a study of how the UN sought to transfmm violent 
conflicts into the state of being non-violent conflict~. Thus, a study that examines the process 
of creating a self-sustaining peace (positive peace), and not only examining how to reduce the 
risk of resumption of violent conflict (negative peace). Herein, the study favoured the concept 
Conflict Transfonnation as an extension of the term Conflict Resolution. Thus, it has been a 
comparative case study of Conflict Transfonnation in Mozambique and Rwanda. The study 
was divided in five main chapters. 
The first chapter presented an outline for a theoretical framework in which the multifunctional 
peace operations was understood. A discussion of the relevancy that Conflict Management, 
Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transfonnation each has for a theory of third party 
intervention determined that Conflkt Transfonnation offers the best alternative when the aim 
is to establish positive peace. Nonetheless, these approaches are supplementing each other. 
The fulfilment of the positive task, i.e. the end portraying social justice and a sustainable 
positive peace, requires the transformation of the conflict. Both favourable components of 
Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution are needed to assist the Conflict 
Transformation approach. There would be shortcomings when one approach alone is applied, 
and an accumulated approach is needed to reduce the risk of resumption of violent conflict 
and the establishment of a self-sustaining peace. 
The second chapter gave an account of the evolution, typology, and different cases of UN 
peace operations. It showed that the Security Council has been able to authorise mandates that 
are more comprehensive after the Cold War. Consequently, multifunctional peace operations 











and thus assisted in the ending of conflicts. A typology of peace operations was made together 
with empirical examples. Herein, the chapter emphasised the multifunctional peace operation. 
Then, six multifunctional peace operations deployed in the beginning of the 1990s were 
shortly discussed with respect to their mandate, outcome, and the critical factors determining 
the outcome. TIle exercise found that not only do the many concepts of peace operations vary 
in breadth and depth, but the multifunctional peace operations also are different in nature. 
The third chapter examined the conflict specific situations in Mozambique and Rwanda in 
four sections. First, the causes of the conflicts are different. In Mozambique, the flawed 
Portuguese decolonisation, interventions from Mozambique's white minority regimes, and 
Frelimo's failure in the course of policy actions cause the cont1ict. In Rwanda, in contrast, the 
creation of the 'political identities' through the two social-revolutionary processes triggers the 
fighting. Second, the natures of the conflicts are different despite that both are intra-state 
conflicts. Whiist the l\lozambican conflict reaches a hurting stalemate, the Rwandan conflict 
portrays a zero-3um revolutionary nature. Mozambique is subjected to a stronger involvement 
from the neighbouring countries than the involvement of Uganda in Rwanda. Moreover, at the 
international level the superpowers are not heavily involved in the Mozambican conflict. The 
superpowers of the Cold War are more or less absent in Mozambique, and France is the only 
major power at play in Rwanda. Third, peacemaking became possible because the nature in 
both of the conflicts changed, and the parties developed an interest in negotiations. The 
outcome is two comprehensive negotiated settlements. It is important to recall that whilst the 
Mozambican belligerents face a hurting stalemate, RPF possesses the strongest card in 
Rwanda and could possibly have overthrown the government if the fighting had continued. 
Finally, the belligerents in both of the conflicts invite the UN to implement the settlements, 
and the Security Council authorises ONUMOZ and UNAMIR as two multifunctional peace 
operations that share both similarities and dissimilarities. 
Then. in chaptel' four, a comprehensive assessment of the multifunctional peace operations in 
Mozambique and Rwanda followed. The chapter considered four different sub-goals of the 
multifunctional peace operations' mandates: the political component, the military component, 
the police component, and the electoral component. The assessment of each sub-goal 
followed the same outline in which its relevancy for Conflict Transformation was discussed. 
ONUMOZ and UNAMIR were compared in two parts: (i) the sub-goal as conceived in the 
peace agreements and as mandated by the Security Council; and (ii) the record of 











In conclusion, the chapter identifies the critical factors for effectiveness. It was distinguished 
between the general factors and the critical factors as they appeared in e"ch sub-programme. 
In general, support from a few powetful actors representing the international community, and 
especially the great powers; sufficient resources; and the relative successful conclusion of 
each sub-programme are all vital for the effectiveness. The exercise also identified the critical 
factors for success and failure in each sub-programme. First, the peace operation needs to 
enjoy the political guidance of the peace process in which the management of the spoiler 
problem is a crucial task. Second, there are several factors determining the effectiveness of 
demilitarisation: it is a long-term project unfeasible to conclude quickly; neither is 
demilitarisation a precondition for Conflict Transformation; the military component needs to 
be innovative in nature; and civil supremacy is vital. In all, these factors were found in 
Mozambique but not in Rwallda. Third, policing is important to prevent disorder and 
destructive Hctivities so that the ordinary lives of the people can take place. Problems with the 
police can be postponed to a later stage. Finally, the peace operation needs to be innovative in 
nature and the international community, or at least a few powetful actors, must demonstrate 
semitivity to the peace process so that a successful conclusion of the elections can be made. 
Herein, representing the uppermost vital factor for effectiveness, the UN needs to diagnose 
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